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JAPAN'S PACIFIC ADVENTURE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR:

What Price New Order

The Japanese Paradox

Japan's Black Record

JAPAN'S
PACIFIC ADVENTURE

by
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PREFACE

AT the conclusion of the war against Japan, the newspaper reader, whose knowledge of Japan is confined to geisha girls and what the Japanese did in Hongkong, is conscious of a lack of background material. Such a background is I hope presented in the following pages.

What the Japanese *say*—newspapermen in Tokyo soon realised—is quite valueless, when placed against what they *do*. In the account which follows, I have attempted to describe Japanese reactions to several crises and developments that preceded Pearl Harbour. Seeing Japanese government in action—in the making of decisions, and in the day-to-day execution of policy,—is the best way of unravelling the Japanese character and gaining a clue to his overall policy in the past.

I have also started on a clean slate, because the story of Japan and particularly of the Japanese Pacific adventure begins not later than the time of Commodore Perry. The whole is a continuity; there is no sharp break between ancient and modern Japan. And it is not possible to appreciate the importance of certain features in the psychological, political, economical, and national make-up of Japan without having a background knowledge, however sketchy, of Japanese history. The role of militarism in the government, the role of the God-emperor in guiding the masses, the legend of the Sun-goddess and its effects on the Japanese mentality, the influences of national isolation, and the abrupt impact of foreign contacts—these are factors which if ignored would leave any picture of Japan incomplete.

I have sought neither to prettify nor to denounce Japan, beyond such prettifying and denunciation as are warranted by the facts. Some sense of proportion and intellectual honesty is very necessary when writing on Japan and the Japanese, for so many of us are content

PREFACE

with labelling them yellow barbarians and leaving it at that. I have been however encouraged to write this book because of the now widespread, honest interest in things Japanese and particularly in the realities underlying Japan's Pacific adventure, which has now ended in disaster.

I

ORIGINS OF THE JAPANESE NATION

A STRICT conformity with Japanese ideas of etiquette prevents one from discussing the origins of the race and nation in too obvious a manner. Besides, the topic borders perilously on the subject of Emperor worship and the divinity of the Japanese peoples—a subject which by a sort of tacit agreement is taboo in polite society. It is considered in some way sacrilegious to discuss a matter which should be so obvious to the meanest intelligence. When the inquisitive foreigner therefore, urged on by curiosity and Occidental insensitivity, plies his Japanese friend with a storm of questions regarding the precise whys and wherefores of his divine origin, he will be met with evasive generalities which the Japanese are past masters in creating.

I have never, in all my years in the country, heard a Japanese declare that he is a descendant of the gods in so many words during the course of a conversation. Far from suffering from an inferiority complex, as attempts have been made to prove, the Japanese—if they suffer at all from a complex—suffer from the superiority variety. The average Japanese has come to realise, either by intuition or experience, that the barbarian foreigner cannot be expected to understand or appreciate the divinity of the Japanese nation and race, and its divine missions. There is accordingly little, if any, argument. They scorn to argue about a matter in which they invest implicit faith. To them the subject is a matter of *feeling*, and therefore hostile to reason.

The nation's masses, as a whole, consist therefore of men (we exempt the women) who consider themselves the world's finest creation—a downright belief that they are the salt of the earth. And it is typical of them that, while

they do not say all this in so many words, they imply it with devastating emphasis and confidence. It is what diplomatic representatives in Tokyo were fond of describing as the 'holier-than-thou' attitude. The Japanese are so superior that they will not go out of their way to reveal that superiority, but we are made to know that they are exercising such commendable restraint.

Yet, the course of Japanese history has not been without redeeming features. And reason—indestructible as it is—dormant perhaps within the borders of Japan, continues to live on. The prisons are filled today with thousands of professors and men of learning who have refused to conform to herd-pressure. Tribalism is so pronounced that the pressure to conform is tremendous—certainly more than that to which the crank or non-conformist in other countries is subjected. Such men as Dr. Nitobe, Shidehara, Dr. Kagawa and Noguchi, and members of that little band of Japanese propagandists co-operating with the Chinese against their own countrymen, whether alive or dead, live on as advocates of reason within Japan. So far as the Japanese man in the street is concerned, it is simply 'not done' to doubt the divine origins of his race, and though he cannot reconcile his intellect with the dictates of mass suggestion and emotion, he is hardly bothered enough to trouble about it. Besides, it must be very nice and dignified to pretend that one is a god among fellow gods. . . .

If the foreigner should be so intrepid as to consult the *Gaimusho* or Foreign Office where as one lady resident in Tokyo declared 'they are so sleek and friendly and understand the Occidental viewpoint', he will perchance be disillusioned some time in the future. For the *Gaimusho* among its multifarious duties—foremost among which is the manufacturing of unctuously polite excuses for the recalcitrance of the Japanese army which they are unable to control—is the official juggler of dates. The cynic will declare that the text-books of all countries contain distorted history, a garble of the true facts, made out to cultivate national pride and patriotism. All

governments are no doubt guilty of this, in some degree. But the *Gaimusho* as in so many other respects, occupies a unique position in regard to 'touching up' history. When Admiral Togo died, for instance, his death was officially delayed for twenty-four hours, solely because the following day happened to be the thirtieth anniversary of the Battle of the Japan Sea in which the Admiral had distinguished himself. When nature failed to arrange things to a nicety, with a view to impressing upon young Japanese minds, through the medium of history textbooks, that the plan of the universe had only Japanese prosperity and glory as its aim—when nature failed, then the *Gaimusho* stepped in. The Japanese press always co-operates on such occasions. Not a murmur was let fall regarding the untimely death of the Admiral twenty-four hours too *early*. The following day the press, the *Gaimusho* and the whole nation, rose to the occasion. Banner headlines, speeches by prominent citizens over the radio, mass meetings at shrines, the playing of *Kimigayo*—the doleful Japanese anthem—all these filled the atmosphere to capacity.

So the *Gaimusho* cannot be trusted in the matter of dates, and the foreign student who with Occidental matter-of-factness and meticulousness, desires even an approximate date to put down in his notebook as the time when the unique nation of the Japanese originated, is provided with a legend to curb his curiosity and—to the Japanese—his offensive persistence.

SUN-GODDESS LEGEND

The legend in essence runs as follows: (in the derisive tones of Mr. H. G. Wells) "It (*Kojiki*) begins with a sort of storm of gods neither made nor begotten but passing away. From this tumult emerge two highly sexual figures, *Izanagi* and *Izanami* who might be described in Hollywood language as male and female sex

appeal'. They respond to each other with tremendous vigour, begetting gods and islands and at last a fire-god who burns up her mother Izanami. But by this time Izanagi is so set on procreation that everything about him procreates; he throws off his clothes and they become sea gods and land gods. Finally he produces the Sun-goddess from his left eye, and the Moon-god from his right eye, and the headlong Susa-no-o by blowing his nose. After which he seems to have retired from the stage, the Sun-goddess and Susa-no-o occupying the forefront. After various remarkable adventures, no doubt of the greatest spiritual significance and full of lessons to the true believer, Susa-no-o meets a formidable damsel-devouring dragon with eight heads and other alarming accessories, makes the beast drunk with sake (Japanese rice wine) and then kills it and cuts it up. But one of the tails resists and breaks his sword, because in it is hidden a better sword. This he extracts and presents to his sister, the Sun-goddess. It lies today thickly swathed in brocade, in the Family Shrine in the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. It is one of Three Sacred Treasures, the sword, the mirror and the jewel which the Sun-goddess transmitted to her heirs, the divine Emperors, the living gods of Japan."

The story, told in the vein of quiet satire of which Mr. Wells is a master, appears to be fantastic at first, but it has always been argued by Japanese friends who have not wholly abandoned their reason that the legend of the Sun-goddess serves as a convenient emotional outlet. All religions, they aver, are founded partly or wholly on legendary myths, the Christian religion not excepted. The Japanese case is peculiar because it has not hesitated to bring divinity down to earth, and to startle credulity with the assertion that men are gods. Beyond this, however, there is nothing exceptional about the legend of *Kanagara* according to which the Japanese Imperial Family has not—in common with humanity in general—descended from the apes, but from the gods aforementioned and afore-described.

Every holy book is studded with legends, and the

Japanese—so the argument runs—have only made use of one of their legends for a specific purpose: this purpose being to unify the masses, ensure their loyalty, provide a basis for emotional stability, and instil into them the positive vigour and determination which are the natural characteristics of a superiority complex. It is an interesting channel of speculation, to wonder whether Japan's phenomenal rise to the position of a world power would have been possible without the legend of the gods. The story has therefore a strictly utilitarian value, and I suspect that every intelligent Japanese accepted it as such, though not one of them would dare to confess even within the intimacy of the family circle. The so-called Japanese capacity for hypocrisy is tremendous. To illustrate: ninety-five per cent of the Japanese, if not all of them, have known for some time that the Co-prosperity Sphere is a fine label to cover up outright looting. Yet if the conspirators (to be equated with the looters) were to be gathered together in a room, they would continue to pretend to each other that co-prosperity was co-prosperity and nothing more. It would be a breach of etiquette to say or even indicate otherwise. And the Japanese are a very polite race.

It is unfortunate that Occidental writers have chosen merely to describe the *Kanagara* legend and comment on it, in derisive tones, failing to realise that it was boosted on the Japanese peoples—primarily through warped education—with a utilitarian purpose in view. The significance of the legend has till recently not been grasped, and the nature of the Japanese people is still an enigma to those who regard Japan as the land of a Gilbert and Sullivanish Mikado The first step in understanding the Far Eastern enemy lies in appreciating the role which the *Kanagara* legend has played and continues to play in Japanese-Pacific history. It occupies a key-point in the structure of the Japanese character. The Japanese are supposed to accept the *Kanagara* legend as Occidentals are supposed to accept the Bible as the last word on religion. Despite rationalism and free-thinking, it is considered 'bad form' to deride the Bible.

And the Japanese just happen to have different ideas of what is 'bad form' and what is 'done' or 'not done'. The doctrine contained in the Bible has little utilitarian value, unless it is argued that the British Empire is the result not so much of a fit of absent-mindedness, as of a conjunction of Bible and sword. To whatever opprobrious uses the Bible has been put, it was at least not meant to function as a means to worldly success and power. The *Kanagara*, as the basis of the Shinto religion, is however wholly utilitarian. It is worldly, of the earth, earthly. God is a little man that rides a white horse, and has biology as a hobby. Nothing is said of heaven though there is a pantheon of heroes and ancestors. With infinite good taste nothing specific is said of hell or original sin. In the name of Shinto, war, rape and murder may be justified. Surely this 'religion' is the most material, this-worldly, utilitarian, that has ever been devised by the mind of man. Readers will not fail to grasp that Shinto, more than any other one factor, made possible Japanese aggression and Pearl Harbour.

We cannot therefore afford to scoff at Japanese fantasies, solely because they carry extremely mundane meanings and are usually translatable in terms of south seas expansion and all round aggression.

And now a word for those men of reason and enlightenment who having resisted herd-pressure, renounced the legends of Japanese divinity. They sought to justify the legends (from the strictly Japanese viewpoint no justification is necessary) by admitting that the origins of the Japanese nation, in common with the origins of other countries, are entirely speculative. Many of them are now languishing in prison for this attempt to save reason and Japan's face Foremost among them was Dr. Inoue Tetsujiro who with a courage that was admirable and an impetuosity that was unwise, publicly questioned the authenticity of the Three Sacred Treasures, which was tantamount to casting doubt on the divinity of the Emperor and the Imperial Family. Fortunately, in Dr. Tetsujiro's day, the conditions were slightly more favourable for heresy than they have since become, and

the venerable professor could consider himself blessed in being let off so lightly. He was dismissed from the Imperial University, and bands of ruffians occasionally attacked him—young men more anxious to discover an outlet for their useless energies than to defend the divinity of their origins.

Reverting to our 'mythical' foreigner seeking the origins of the Japanese nation, the probability remains that he will be referred to the *Kojiki*, a compilation belonging approximately to the eighth century A. D., and containing the fundamentals of the Shinto religion. Written in archaic language it is intelligible only to the most accomplished scholars and has been partly translated into the English language. *Kojiki* is as we have seen extremely susceptible to ridicule, especially when the derision is buttressed by reason. But reason cannot pit itself against faith charged with emotion, and the reaction of the Japanese to Occidental ridicule has always been the realisation that the barbarian cannot be expected to grasp the significance of esoteric matters. The calm and almost complacent acceptance of the fact that they are superior, encouraged by Shinto teaching, is itself a shield protecting Shinto from the darts of critical derision. Thus Professor Naokatsu Nakamura of the Kyoto Imperial University stated with a tendency towards compromise: "When, in what manner, and for what purpose Japan was created, is not and cannot be clearly known. The people of Japan believe that they and their land were created as the offspring of the gods, by the will of the gods. They believe that the Imperial Family, in direct unbroken line from the gods, has ruled Japan from the beginning and will continue to do so for countless ages to come. They believe that the status and relationship of the Emperor and his chosen people, have by the will of the gods been fixed and changeless from the foundations of the nation. . . . The Japanese do not say 'Our country was created. . . .' They say 'Our country began. . . .' This belief in the divine creation, rule and future of the nation, is the source of that loyalty and devotion which make it not the duty but the highest privilege of every

Japanese to consecrate his full energies, even his life, to the support and protection of his country."

The professor was lecturing to an audience of foreigners, but in spite of himself, he inadvertently disclosed the grossly utilitarian value of the Shinto religion in his last sentence. How many of the audience realised what a magnificent instrument of power Shinto was to those who more or less controlled the Emperor and to whom the masses made humble obeisance? So utilitarian is Shinto that it has been denied the descriptive term 'religion' and as the present writer has shown in a previous work it is a mystic-political creed that has usurped the position of religion, retaining its followers by tickling, feeding and fanning their vanity.

How many clergymen of the Church of England have divested themselves of every vestige of orthodox belief and yet sustain themselves by investing emotional faith in the personality of Jesus Christ? How many supporters of Gandhi are his advocates not so much because of his doctrine as of his character?

Just as many of us are baptised and confirmed and initiated into the facts and fictions of the Christian religion before we are able to cry 'Jack Robinson', so the Japanese are hustled through into Shinto before they are able to realise that they are destined not as prospective entrants to heaven but as cannon fodder to die in some distant foreign field—for the glory of the Sun-goddess. Later reason may provoke doubt, but herd-pressure and consciousness are too formidable for the average Japanese to resist. He will eventually offer his co-operation in perpetuating the self-deception, and conform to the requirements of herd-harmony. As though to ease a troublesome conscience the Japanese usually refers to the Emperor in a whisper though the bolder spirit achieves a murmur. In public the Emperor is spoken of in terms of the strictest formality. There is no such thing as an informal discussion on the subject of the Imperial Family....

It is convenient for the individual Japanese, as it is

for the whole nation, to perpetuate the myth, for with such an inspiring though not veracious background, they cannot but be virile and positive in spirit. Thus with the growth of irredentist elements, more and more emphasis has been laid on Emperor divinity, constituting a spiritual and mental preparation of the masses for Pearl Harbour and its consequences. The expansion and development of their country, and their subsequent expansion abroad with all the tireless industry and enterprise of which the Japanese are capable, bear testimony to the fact that much may be built on foundations of myth and fantasy. We have laughed at the *Kanagara* legend, but in fairness it is to be admitted that for the time being the laugh is on H. G. Wells and his tribe.

II

FROM FEUDALISM TO FASCISM

AN attempt will now be made to sketch in brief the high-lights of Japanese history. My only justification in touching upon this aspect of things Japanese is the good one that many features of Japanese government and procedure can be explained only in terms of their historical background. No apology is therefore offered if some of the following paragraphs in this section are found 'dry'. Japanese history is so off the beaten track that it is apt to taste bitter to the palate—both academic and common (if one may mix metaphors).

Japanese professors are fond of starting their lectures (sponsored by that inimitable propaganda institution, the Society for International Cultural Relations in Tokyo) with the following classifications:

- (a) firstly, theocracy or government by the gods;
- (b) secondly, aristocracy or government by the upper classes; and
- (c) thirdly, constitutional government or government by law.

There is a fourth classification which the professors leave out, but which foreigners in Tokyo supplied themselves mentally. That is Government by Assassination. This last form of government has been most in evidence allied with Government by Political Bullying and Pressure at which the Japanese are past masters.

However, the classifications (a), (b), (c) are theoretically correct and as such are made to stand on their own legs without the support of the other categories. Government by the gods and government by law have been conspicuously absent to the casual observer, and the only government of which we may feel certain is Govern-

ment by the Aristocracy which was soon superseded by Government by Peasant-soldiers.

Big Charlie or Emperor Hirohito, the descendant of the Sun-goddess, has always been divine in varying degrees, though in the old days they were not very particular in stressing the matter. Effective power was centralised in the hands of the Shogunates or military barons, while such power as civilian government enjoyed later derived from the Emperor. Today the Shogunates, after having been temporarily eclipsed by civilian government and liberalism, have reverted to their positions of power. Originally they had lost their dominance because of their inability to control the masses. This time they are determined not to commit the same error, and have sought successfully to ensure loyalty and unity through the Emperor.

At the same time, it must be borne in mind that while executive power centred in the Shogunates, the Emperor's position was assured, it being buttressed by mythical tradition the influence of which on the masses cannot be minimised. The special function of the Emperor has been to establish contact with gods long departed on behalf of the people.

The first descendant of the Sun-goddess to rule Japan was the mythical figure *Jimmu Tenno*, his reign being placed somewhere in the region of six hundred years before the Christian era. By the third century when *Sujin Tenno* was on the throne, the Emperor's divinity suffered an eclipse and belief in his common humanity became widespread. Yet offerings to the gods, and tributes to the state were indistinguishable; the laws of the state, the orders of the Emperor, and the will of the gods being considered to be several manifestations of the same spirit, omniscient and omnipotent. In the language of that period, the word *nori* meant both *law* and speech of the Emperor which is sufficient evidence of the fact that the Emperor is more or less divine, but he is always divine.

CHINESE-JAPANESE CULTURAL
INTERACTIONS

Koreans and Chinese today are barbarians, more despised and ill-treated perhaps than Occidentals when the Japanese have them at their mercy. Only Japanese professors remember that in the sixth century the infiltration of Chinese and Korean culture into Japan began, craftsmen being invited to establish their homes in Japan and practise and teach in peace. Then began the famous Japanese technique of re-adaptation; admiring and respecting their teachers they absorbed such learning as they desired, moulded it into their own conception of what it ought to be and presented it back across the counter as Japanese civilisation. Ideas and customs flowed from China and Korea, and were silently consumed. Japan was the exemplary pupil; it sat at the feet of the world and dreamed of the day when their positions would be reversed.

Chinese characters or ideographs were assimilated rapidly, but the polysyllabic requirements of the Japanese language led to the invention of *kana* consisting of fifty symbols each representing a single sound and by the use of which every word in the language may be expressed. Highly educated Japanese are able to read *kanji* or Chinese ideographs, but the Japanese language proper is a modification and combination of *kanji* and *kana*. So much for the language.

BUDDHISM

From China came Buddhism *via* Korea in A. D. 552 undermining what were then the foundations of the Shinto religion. Buddhism reached the Emperor, and the higher aristocracy. It paved the way for the introduction of Chinese forms of administration, a typical innovation being the limitation by law of the authority of the Emperor

and the rights of the people. This was the period of Chinacraze. Everything Chinese was highly prized, and emulation, as only the Japanese can emulate, was fantastically unlimited. Buddhism proliferated into sects and sub-sects—*Zen* and *Shin* being the principal ones. *Shin* is typically Japanese in that it is mundane; it confines itself to the promotion of educational campaigns and other spheres of practical activity. Chinese scholars and philosophers visited Japan, and studies in Buddhism and political reform went hand in hand. Approximately 1,300 years after *Jimmu Tenno*, Taikwa or *Great Reform* was introduced, providing for the complete recasting of Japanese political administration in the Chinese mould. I have always embarrassed my Japanese friends by stressing this fact of history. It is impossible to reconcile Japanese bombs over China with the *Great Reform* wholly attributable to China.

Further evidence consists of the art forms of Japanese lacquer, woodwork, bronzes, and in the architectural style of temples built of concrete and which exist till the present day. Tourists in Japan are told by the newspapers and propagandists that the Japanese are out to civilise the Chinese; following the lecture they are taken to the *Shosoin* or the Museum of art treasures every one of which bears evidence of Chinese Tang influence. The contradiction is one which the Japanese mind is incapable of grasping.

The Japanese were however not slow to abandon slavish imitations, and concentrate on producing something of their own. *Kana* for instance is wholly Japanese though it is grafted on *Kanji*. It laid the foundations of Japanese national literature.

At first *Kana* was used solely by women, as men were supposed to adhere to the more difficult *Kanji* or classical Chinese. *Kokinshu* and *Genji Monogatari*, the first an early collection of Japanese poems, are well known to students throughout the world. *Genji Monogatari* was recently described by T. Fisher Unwin, the publisher, as a great novel, though many have confessed they have

not been able to wade through Arthur Waley's translation in six volumes. *Kana* soon increased in popularity until now Chinese histories have been translated into Japanese with ease and facility.

Buddhism had by this time entrenched itself firmly in the Emperor's court and in higher society where it was favoured because of its injunction to the masses that they should pray for the prosperity and tranquillity of the state. Which is yet another indication of the fact that religion in the Japanese atmosphere is conversant with all the political tricks of the trade.

The Heian period is the period in which Japanese culture is supposed to have achieved its 'independence'. Buddhist sects cultivated intense nationalism, and afforded the aristocracy an outlet for the flamboyant and flowery ceremonials which they affected. The inability of the masses to participate in this ostentatious display led to the formation of a new sect *Nembutsu* which is of interest and significance in this context because it won as converts the support of the *bushi* or warrior class. It is important to note that at this period the *bushi* was definitely inferior in social status to the aristocracy, and that it is only of recent times that the warrior-soldier has been able to regain the prestige he had originally lost. In common with China, Japan revered the scholar and blue blood. . . .

Converted to *Nembutsu* the *bushi* with characteristic briskness and disregard of niceties, eliminated all ceremonial, the complicated rites and doctrines of the aristocracy were relegated to the dust-bin, and only the essentials of the Buddhist religion retained. Militaristic simplicity and discipline were the key-characteristics of this movement, and a step towards uniting the masses was made in permitting small contributions from each member of the populace for the construction of Buddhist images, where hitherto members of the aristocracy had contributed their own images.

GOVERNMENT BY CLANS

Whatever the merits or demerits which characterise Japanese forms of government, it cannot be denied that they are extremely colourful. Government by Clans in common with Government by Assassination, covers such a colourful period in Japanese history, and is of value to us because it provides the setting in which the meteoric personality of Hideyoshi may be evaluated. Contemporary significance attaches to this piece of history through the fact that the spirit which animated Hideyoshi—the Napoleon of Japan—animated and perhaps still animates Japan's war-time leaders.

During the Middle Ages (A.D. 700–A.D. 1184) the Emperor was again reduced to the status of a symbolic nonentity symbolic of the Japanese respect for tradition. Castles and swordsmen came into their own, the period being marked with periodic clashes between the various clans.

We have already noted in the previous section the rise of *bushi* or the military class. Its ascendancy was now so pronounced that the aristocracy was compelled to acquiesce in the establishment of the *Kamakura Bafuku* or the supreme military authority. By the later periods of the 13th century militarism was well established and aristocracy was on the decline. Since then, militarism has been an inevitable and constant factor in Japanese government, subject to fluctuating fortunes, but never being wholly deprived of its powers. The argument therefore that militarism has been grafted upon the Japanese people is untenable. As early as the 13th century there is unmistakable evidence that militarism is as inherent in the Japanese peoples as their aesthetic capabilities. In the words of the French writer Dr. Paul-Louis Couchoud, "Here is evidenced the miracle of Japan: an artistic sensibility that is so highly refined united to an immutable military discipline; an island of poets which is the most united nation of today."

Prior to the founding of the *Bafuku* both the *bushi* and aristocracy were distracted with inner cleavages and

dissensions. The wars of the clans resulted in the emergence of Minamoto Yoritomo, head of the Minamoto family, who centralised power by means of the *Bafuku*. These military headquarters at Kamakura became the centre of a well-organised feudal system, and so long as this central administration was able to enforce its laws by military pressure, the country's unity was assured. With the accession of Yoritomo to power as the *Shogun* or generalissimo, and with the shadowy figurehead of the Emperor occupying the background, the Shogunate period from 1192-1868 was launched. The Shogunate was a governmental institution, the Mikado being merely a traditional symbol, introducing the element of divinity into matters that were otherwise grossly materialistic.

The establishment of the *Bafuku* had already contributed much towards the unification of the country, for we find that when in A. D. 1205 the victorious and mighty Kublai Khan attempted an invasion of Japan, he was met with a degree of vigorous opposition which he had clearly not anticipated. This is the first instance in Japanese history—it is of contemporary interest to note—when the under-estimation of Japanese strength and unity led to disaster.

Kublai Khan's embassy was rejected with finality by the Japanese, and an armada of 4,500 ships and 150,000 men was despatched against the cocky yellow men. Though outnumbered and inferior in arms (the Mongols used cannon) the Japanese met the invading force and with the help of a providentially provided typhoon scattered and sank most of the fleet, causing the Mongols to retreat.

This contact with an alien foe underlined the necessity of maintaining centralised control, and of having a 'strong man' at the centre to conduct operations and mobilise the country for the common cause. Chaos and anarchy were still however not finally eliminated. There were too many petty lords and barons with visions of becoming Shogun, and it was not until the emergence of Japan's Napoleon—Hideyoshi—that dictatorial unity was

finally achieved. Internal dissensions, inter-provincial strifes and battles were stamped out, while most of the warring lords were subdued by Hideyoshi—the first Japanese ruler to think in terms of foreign conquest.

Like Tojo and his erstwhile henchmen, Hideyoshi would stand no nonsense. Which meant that he was determined to have his own way. Fortunately the country was in need of unity and discipline, and Hideyoshi provided both. Religion and culture found roots in the hearts of the people. Trade and commerce of a sort—chiefly as suppliers of war materials—flourished and an integration was brought about among the various classes to a degree never before achieved.

Of lowly origin Hideyoshi is the type *par excellence* which is dominant in Japan today. He was a man of practical accomplishments, with a soldier's and conqueror's temperament. He was the author of Japan's first revenue system, an accomplished builder of fortresses, and the originator of a system of canals. Japanese imperialism was born with Hideyoshi, a fact which is in direct contradistinction to the theory that the Japanese expansionist programme was evolved as a consequence of modern industrial development. The aggressive instinct, though afforded an outlet by capitalist industrialism which is provocative of strife, finds its source in the character of the Japanese people as it has been moulded by the environmental influences of Shintoism.

Hideyoshi was not slow in bringing about a New Order of his own, his purpose being—like that of his successors—to bring about the unification of Korea, China and Japan, with Japan on top. After a successful campaign in Kyushu, the southernmost island of the Japanese archipelago where some opposition had been encountered, Hideyoshi proceeded to conquer Korea, and though he succeeded in his second attempt the cost of the venture was so great that he advised his successor to lead his army back home to Japan. Hideyoshi was unable to occupy vast territories and simultaneously continue to wage a campaign on a wide front just as the Japanese armies in China today

are not in a position to venture far into the interior, and seek to achieve a decisive and possibly victorious conclusion. Korean guerilla tactics (history repeats itself) proved more formidable than Hideyoshi had bargained for, and on his deathbed he confessed that his plans had gone tragically amiss.

JAPANISED CHRISTIANITY

The Japanisation of Christianity has been effected only in recent years, as a part—and a most important one—of the campaign designed to 'liberate' practically all spheres of cultural, religious and economic activity from direct foreign influence. Among institutions affected were educational establishments with foreign teachers and professors on their staffs, but the hardest blow was reserved for the various denominations of the Christian Church. Instigated by fanatical nationalists, foremost among them being the *Black Dragon Society*—a patriotic society which expresses its patriotism by murdering in cold blood all the best intellects and politicians which Japan has been fortunate enough to possess. The engineerings of Mitsuru Toyama, octogenarian leader of the Society, reputed to be the most powerful private citizen in Japan whom the police do not dare to molest, have far-reaching repercussions in Japan. Even the local barber-shop indicated its disapproval of Anglo-American 'duplicity and insincerity' by informing passers-by by means of a notice that it would not serve American or English citizens. In fairness it must be added that individually, the Japanese have never in any single instance allowed strained political relations with the Anglo-American nations to affect such ties of friendship and affection that existed in their own private circles. And there has been no lack of intelligent Japanese who have not hesitated to denounce such puerile gestures as that of the barber-shop. . . .

The campaign for Japanised Christianity was not

directed against Christianity *qua* Christianity, but was primarily aimed at foreign missionary workers many of whom had devoted the greater part of their lives to the propagation of the Christian religion in Japan. Salvation Army officers were arrested, clergymen in Korea and elsewhere throughout the empire were roughly handled, and pressure was gradually brought to bear on all foreigners who were attached to Japanese institutions in the capacity of advisers or executive workers. By reason of their intimate contact with the Japanese and things Japanese, this specific class of foreigners contained some of the foremost pro-Japanese Englishmen and Americans throughout the East. Not a few of them were married to Japanese girls, and were contentedly domiciled in Japan; they were invariably blind to Japan's shortcomings as they were eagerly willing to justify her policies, to boost her culture and civilisation.

To the Japanese fanatic no foreigner is capable of being a true friend of Japan; and even if he happens to be a naturalised Japanese subject he is not called upon to serve in His Imperial Majesty's forces. No barbarian however friendly, however enthusiastically in favour of Japan's policies, is considered fit enough to die for the Emperor. The Japanese have determined to do their own fighting, and the present writer has heard on authority that where—in rare cases—naturalised foreigners have been called up for training they have invariably been sent back as unfit, both physically and psychologically. To a Japanese, therefore, there is no such thing as a pro-Japanese foreigner, for the very fact that he is a foreigner precludes his understanding the Japanese viewpoint. Among the foreign newspapermen in Tokyo were several labelled pro-Japanese some of whom were so extreme in their views that the foreign community retaliated by cold-shouldering them, and sending them to Coventry. These apologists for Japan had logic-tight arguments ready up their sleeve, and if anyone questioned the sincerity of the New Order or Japan's purpose in China, they were trotted out with mechanical proficiency, in the cultured atmosphere of the Imperial Hotel. They wrote articles and

editorials in the local English language press, and proved themselves to be better advocates of the New Order than the Japanese who employed them. On December 7th, they were all rounded-up with the rest of the foreign community and—curiously enough—were in some cases more harshly treated than those who had been consistently anti-Japanese

The position of missionary workers was identical. They—more than anyone else—had good reason to believe that they would not be molested, considering that a majority of them had worked in social and educational fields for a quarter of a century, and had come unconsciously to accept Japan as their 'second mother country.' Their disillusionment was bitter. Japanese papers made good stories of the sob-stuff variety, dealing with the many severances of personal ties which were caused by the campaign against foreigners. Many institutions forbidden to receive grants from American and British trusts were unable to maintain foreign workers and teachers on their staffs. Dismissals and resignations were reported almost daily, during the period that was leading up to Pearl Harbour

The number of Japanese Christians is insignificantly small, but even if it is agreed that the measure of a group's influence does not correspond to its numerical size, it is impossible to state definitely whether or not Christianity has firmly taken root in Japan. On the one side it is argued that, despite the Japanisation of the religion during the last few years, the small number of Christians remain faithful and will in the future help to propagate the faith upon the return of more favourable conditions. On the other it is contended with no less force that though the existence of faithful Japanese Christians is undeniable, the fact of being a Japanese and therefore, automatically, a follower of Shinto, makes the Japanese Christian considerably less a follower of Christ. I have known many so-called Christians who were simultaneously devout believers in Shinto. They would attend church on Sunday and a shrine on week-

days, their minds being quite capable of effecting a reconciliation between the two faiths. In fairness they cannot be accused of insincerity or hypocrisy, for they were, if anything, absolutely sincere. The Occidental conscience would boggle at the prospect of paying respects to the Sun-goddess, and then acknowledge one, all-powerful omniscient Christian God. Yet the Japanese have done it, do it, and will continue to do it, so long as the Shinto cult permeates the whole cultural, political and spiritual structure of Japan. Few Japanese are able to escape Shinto's authoritative hand and brand, for it is the environment into which they are born and in which they die.

During the move by the Japanese Christian Church for autonomy and complete independence from foreign domination and assistance, the Japanese press featured reports of 'loyal' Christians who demonstrated their loyalty by installing 'god-shelves' in their homes, these god-shelves being Shinto altars placed in non-religious buildings such as homes and offices for the worship of the Sun-goddess. The military fascists, the patriotic societies, including the Black Dragon, made the most of this, denouncing Christianity as a menace to the polity of Japan, and incompatible with the outlook of the loyal Japanese.

In spite of the emphasis laid by government officials on the fact that the movement towards autonomy by the Christian Church, was not anti-Christian but merely an organisational change, it was obvious that Japanese Bishops of the Nippon Seikwokai (Holy Catholic Church in Japan) acceded to the pressure of government officials because

- (a) the new movement was in line with the New Structure launched by Konoye at the instigation of the war-mongers;
- (b) it was a manifestation of the sudden growth of a spirit of nationalism, and
- (c) it was the result of a widespread spy-scare.

Japanese apologists pointed out that it had always been the desire of foreign missionary workers in the Japanese

field, to help their Japanese colleagues to attain autonomy and that if the recent movement hustled things with little regard to niceties, this was a concession to the necessities of the time.

It was freely accepted that a government department had persuaded Bishop Naide and his colleagues to conform to the requirements of the New Structure, and though everything possible was done to respect the proprieties as far as officialdom was concerned, the cat was let out of the bag by so-called patriotic fanatics and fire-brands who spared no words in denouncing Christianity as inimical to Japanese prosperity and the tranquillity of the Imperial Household. One such speech by a member of a newly organised society (societies were then being organised for every conceivable purpose) known as Japan Christian Organisation Expulsion League was based on the following argument:

- (a) The Nippon Sei-kwo-kai is a body under the domination of the Archbishop of Canterbury who presided over an anti-Japanese meeting three years ago.
- (b) Christianity sets forth a heaven of illusion under the fair name of freedom, equality and philanthropy, and it forces men to believe in Jesus Christ, bespeaking its Jewish policy of seeking world conquest. This would radically destroy the polity of Japan. Christianity, a device of Jewish ideas which threatens to encroach upon the spirit of the Japanese race, should be eliminated; and
- (c) therefore, all who are interested in Christian institutions are advised to resign, since Christianity is radically opposed to the Japanese national structure.

Furious attacks were launched against the Salvation Army, some officers of which were arrested and released only on condition that foreign assistance and direction would be renounced. Other speakers or tub-thumpers at mass meetings appeared to delight in reiterating that

Christianity was in direct controversion to 'Hakko-ichiu' or the Imperial Way.... Charged with organising secret societies, planning rebellious activities and slandering the Emperor and insulting the Ise Grand Shrine (the unfortunate missionaries must have been paragons of monumental courage to have done all these things) Christian workers in Korea were arrested and kept in confinement. Japanese authorities when queried about this, replied neatly, that the arrest of missionary workers in Korea was a matter under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General to whose agents inquiries should be addressed.

Meanwhile in Japan proper, where proprieties demanded the maintenance of calm and orderly behaviour, the government never failed to slip from their pretence that the Christian movement towards autonomy was not a result of government pressure, and that it was wholly without political significance. If fire-brands made statements that belied government assurances, the authorities were helpless—free expression of opinions must be permitted. There was thus, both inside and outside Church circles, an attempt to shirk describing the factual realities of the situation in plain blunt words. Everyone tried to pretend that everything was all very nice and orderly.... Patriotic diatribes were dismissed as emotional fire-works or completely ignored. Relations were described as never having been 'more cordial than they are now.'

When two missionaries described the movement as partly due to recent Japanese anti-British demonstrations and to Japan's tie-up with the Axis, they called down fire and brimstone upon themselves. They were denounced both by Japanese officials and Church colleagues who wished to get the whole nasty business over as quickly as possible. Then suddenly, like a bolt of reality shooting into a dreamland of make-believe, came cables from Home Boards urging immediate evacuation. Although Japanese officialdom had politely sprinkled perfume over the Church autonomy movement, these cables coming at a time when there was an all-round pretence that nothing whatever was wrong with anything, raised a

nasty stink. The Japanese were visibly embarrassed, and naively inquired why Americans and British were so jittery.

The missionaries themselves were reluctant to leave, believing in common with most foreigners that the threatened show-down in the Pacific would never materialise. They were moreover keen to see how the movement for autonomy would turn out, and a sense of duty which was wholly admirable in view of the conditions then prevailing, persuaded them to remain at their posts. Among those who did leave considerable emphasis was laid on the fact that they were leaving on 'furlough' or for 'health reasons', and the Japanese helped by assuming that no one would be foolish enough to leave because of cables sent by frantic, panicky Boards without any political sense. Dr. Luman J. Shafer, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church of America, sensing the tension sent the following cable to Dr. Walter van Kirk, Secretary of the Federal Council of the Church of Christ in America:

'Situation in Japan offer little leeway compromise
Relief American pressure only hope lessening tension
Urge efforts non-aggravation delicate situation.'

Meanwhile, the position of mission institutions was financially critical. In many instances educational establishments with foreign members on their staffs, continued to pay them their salaries, assuring them that they would not be dismissed. Realising however the heavy financial strain of maintaining a foreign staff, and the impossibility of avoiding official pressure for long, foreign workers resigned in large numbers, and left the country. Only skeleton staffs were left to carry on the work.

In her madness Japan had estranged her firmest friends—the missionaries, as Hideyoshi and his successors did, perhaps with more reason.

Under Hideyoshi and Nobunaga, Jesuit missionaries were surprisingly well-treated, the former going to the extent of personally arranging the erection of a Church and

residence for Father Organtino some time in the sixteenth century. High administrative posts were occupied by Christians, and no discrimination whatsoever was applied to them. He entrusted them with his treasures, his political secrets, his fortresses; Jesuit missions from Nagasaki were cordially received and given permission to preach throughout the country, being exempted from such inconveniences as having soldiers billeted in their houses.

Hardly had Hideyoshi returned from his campaign in Kyushu, however, when 250,000 Catholic converts were promptly persecuted, tortured and rolled down alive into craters. Other methods of expressing disapproval need not be described here, save that they would have satisfied the gentlemen of the Spanish Inquisition. Whence and why this sudden transformation in the attitude of Hideyoshi?

Historians have attempted to supply a convincing answer, but they have all one failing in common. They have attributed the sudden anti-Christian move to one specific cause, when the possibility should not have been overlooked that more than one cause was operative.

Missionaries in those days, being more fanatical than they are supposed to be now, were not averse to preaching and propagating the word of God at the point of the sword. They were not furthermore indifferent to such material spoils as came their way through converts. Their manners, in short, constituted a menace to Hideyoshi's power over the masses.

After his campaign in Kyushu he summoned the vice-provincial of the Jesuits and conducted an examination—over the centuries, the Governor-General of Korea and his henchmen did the same to missionaries arrested there.

- (a) Why and upon what authority had he and his fellow propagandists constrained Japanese subjects to become Christians?
- (b) Why had they induced their disciples and secretaries to overthrow temples?

- (c) Why had they persecuted the bonzes?
- (d) Why had they and other Portuguese eaten animals useful to men, such as oxen and cows?
- (e) Why had the provincial allowed merchants of his nation to buy Japanese to make slaves of them in the Indies?

The provincial replied that he could not be responsible for the acts of his countrymen, but did not refute the charges. Hideyoshi clearly feared that, given the opportunity, the Jesuits would subdue the whole country and challenge his own position. He had originally encouraged them to offset the increasing influence of the soldier-priests attached to Buddhist temples. He could not now continue to encourage Jesuit zeal any more. The following edict was therefore issued :

'Having learned from our faithful councillors that foreign priests have come into our states, where they teach a law contrary to that of Japan, and that they even had the audacity to destroy temples dedicated to our Kami (god) and Hotoke (departed spirits), and although the outrage merits the most extreme punishment, wishing nevertheless to show them mercy, we order them on pain of death to quit Japan within twenty days. During that time no harm or hurt will be done them. But at the expiration of that term, we order that if any of them are found in our states, they should be seized and punished as the greatest criminals. As for Portuguese merchants we permit them to enter our ports, there to continue their accustomed trade, and to remain in our states provided our affairs need this. But we forbid them to bring any foreign priests into the country, under the penalty of the confiscation of their ships and goods.'

Although Hideyoshi was not sophisticated enough to launch an autonomy movement like that of his successors in twentieth century Japan, he knew when his self-interests were threatened. The pilot of a Spanish galleon

which had been stranded on the Japanese coast sent the following message to the Minister of Works : 'Our kings begin by sending into the countries which they wish to conquer, religieux who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our kings have not much difficulty in accomplishing the rest.'

This was reported to Hideyoshi, who was understandably enough alarmed at this fifth column talk. He flew into a rage and the following announcement was made:

'So long as the sun shall continue to warm the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan ; and let all know that the King of Spain himself, or the Christian's God or the greatest God himself, if he violate this command shall pay for it with his head.'

This edict must have made all the gods tremble—and is typical of the astonishing audacity with which Japanese officialdom feature their announcements.

Admitting then, that there was much to provoke Hideyoshi to persecution measures against the early Christian missionaries, the fact that justification of his action is possible, does not preclude the probability that he was actuated by a sudden surge of nationalism and anti-foreignism. The Japanese have always been clannish, and even before the abolition of the Shogunate and the formation of constitutional government, there was a general united feeling against the foreigner. Priding themselves on their self-control, they are liable to run *amuck* at times, suggesting the presence of a Malayan streak in their psychological make-up. Opportunism which to the Japanese is mere realism, has also been a constant factor in their policy towards the foreigner, causing abrupt transformations of attitude which are extremely bewildering.

One is thus never certain whether a Japanese is to be ranked as a friend, an acquaintance or a deadly enemy.

He confounds all attempts at classification. He is all things all the time and never one thing any time. So much so that Lafcadio Hearn, on his deathbed, admitted that the Japanese character remained an enigma, despite his life-time of study.

Suddenly aware of a hostile world outside, and of their own shortcomings in terms of material civilisation and power, the Japanese welcomed the policy of self-isolation. Japan tried to forget the world around, and buried herself in obscurity, cultivating the arts and concentrating on self-development. As a Japanese minister bitterly commented however: 'As long as we consecrated ourselves to the work of an intense civilisation, as long as we produced only men of letters, men of knowledge and artists, you treated us as barbarians. Now that we have learned to kill you call us civilised.'

THE SAMURAI

To obviate misunderstanding, a few notes on the Japanese military class are necessary. The samurai were the fighting men acting as retainers to the daimios or feudal lords. They are more appropriately termed warriors rather than the military, for unlike the common run of soldiery they were not without the cultural graces and refinements of the aristocracy. During the Tokugawa period they were mainly responsible, in co-operation with Chinese scholars and teachers, for modern systems of education. They were perhaps the finest body of hereditary fighters the world has ever produced. Despising worldly goods, their sole desire was to achieve the right to wear two swords where they wore one. Loyalty they accounted the highest virtue, and stoicism a quality which they esteemed next to courage. They regarded themselves as guardians of their fief's honour and of their country's welfare, and thought nothing of sacrificing themselves at the altar of loyalty. Hardened and self-

controlled by means of a rigid system of training, they would undergo the severest of trials, even till death, so that their honour may be vouchsafed. Emotional display they accounted to be a weakness, but the very intensity and determination of their acts of loyalty indicated a store of emotional energy that is astonishing. Their word was their bond, and an insult to their honour sufficient provocation for a struggle unto death. The sword would not be drawn for a petty cause, but once drawn, it would not be placed in its sheath till its purpose had been achieved. The samurai occupied most of their time in martial exercises, hardening themselves for the rigid nature of their lives. But they also cultivated the arts and the graces, and developed a righteous scorn of the commoners. In his contacts with fellow-samurai he was profoundly courteous, and manifested respect and courtesy to his enemies, till the time when swords were drawn. Wealth was no consideration to the samurai especially if it came from a commoner. Yet it must be noted that there was no strain of cruelty in the samurai's character. His philosophy dictated that death was the natural corollary to defeat, and on the basis of this belief expected no quarter and provided none to his enemies. Death in sword-play was instantaneous. Spite and hatred hardly ever played a role in these encounters which were regarded as inevitable necessities. Thus full honours were accorded to the fallen enemy.

Above all disgrace must be avoided at all costs; hence the convenient technique of *hara-kiri* or *seppuku* which owing to their familiarity we need not translate. *Hara-kiri* may be used as a last resort to avoid disgrace, and it was and is customary for members of the aristocracy and in early times of the samurai ranks to learn the technique of *hara-kiri* and the various ceremonials and rites that attended the custom of stomach-slitting (which is a literal translation of the term *hara-kiri*). Disproportionate emphasis had been laid on the diabolical horrors of this heathen practice by Occidental writers on the subject, and no attention has been paid to the interesting fact that a whole technique, sanctified and substantiated

by tradition, must be studied if *hara-kiri* is to be committed in the appropriate, time-honoured manner. A vulgar slitting of the stomach is not sufficient. It is not just done anyhow, as most people are apt to presume. It has been elevated to the status of an art.

The one apparent weakness in the samurai's character was his lack of fidelity toward women. He considered his sword of greater importance. . . .

Self-imposed segregation for three centuries during which the country's domestic life was not unduly disturbed by strifes and dissensions, facilitated the development of a Japanese culture based on the digested elements of Chinese learning and philosophy. The Confucian doctrine was the basis of much philosophical teaching, and those who were engaged in its study were accorded the highest respect. Initially they were classified socially with priests and physicians, but in the course of time they were elevated to the rank of samurai. They did much, in the course of their intellectual activities, to adapt Chinese philosophy and administrative system to the requirements of the Japanese nation.

The extent of the inspiration which the Chinese afforded Japanese scholars cannot adequately be measured, for if in certain conceptions of life, the Japanese differed from the Chinese, most Japanese forms of culture were *initially*, though only initially, founded on Chinese inspiration. Chinese artists, philosophers, writers, dramatists, administrators and priests in aggregate supplied the necessary impetus which set the Japanese going, just as the opening of the country by Commodore Perry to foreign trade, set them going until they developed into diabolical imitations of Western materialistic barbarism. All that the Japanese required was the initial impetus; the rest could be conveniently left to their characteristic forms of originality. To deny Japanese art, literature and philosophy on the score that they are derived from China, is to confess to profound ignorance and excessive puerility. That the Japanese have developed their own national culture is patent and

requires no emphatic justification. The fact of an inspiration emanating from an alien source does not detract from the essential creative originality of the product of such inspiration. As regards the Chinese and Japanese conceptions of life, they are different, for while the former regards filial piety as the greatest of the virtues, the Japanese place loyalty above all else.

COMMODORE PERRY

The advantages or otherwise of the seclusion into which Japan retired, there to concentrate on the development of her own culture, undisturbed by influences from the imperialistic west, have never completely been assessed. Historians are agreed that the direct results of Japan's seclusion were not disadvantageous. It is contended that Japan could not have learned much from 17th century Europe, if indeed they had anything to teach her. As regards religious toleration, international morality, social amenities and etiquette, artistic conception and execution, or in the way of what is termed the notable shibboleth of modern civilisation—the open door and equal opportunities—Japan had nothing to learn from Europeans. Yet it must be admitted that lack of competition and the stimulative exchange of ideas, caused an inevitable lapse in Japanese progress. Although lethargy is a quality alien to the Japanese temperament, a complete state of seclusion from the inspiriting give and take of international trade, caused the setting in of this paralytic social disease. As a Japanese professor pointed out, 'Water which stands still in a jar becomes stagnant and unfit to drink. Who can say that the 200-year-old isolation of Japan was not in this category?' Conversely there is no doubt that the Japanese are what they are—startlingly distinct in character and outlook from other nations throughout the world—because of her period of self-imposed isolation, a period during which the rest of

the world, and especially Europe, advanced considerably in terms of material civilisation.

Although power was centralised in the hands of the Shogunate, the Japanese hierarchy was headed by the Emperor and the Imperial Family to whom the official and military class was theoretically directly responsible. The latter included the feudal knights, lords and court nobility, and some of the literati who dabbled in art and literature; they were entitled to wear two swords and were exempt from taxation. Below this class came the agricultural class or farmers, then farm workers and then in the lowest scale but one the merchants. Tanners, grave-diggers and beggars constituted the lowest class. All the classes except that of the nobility were heavily taxed, but there appears to have been no public feeling against this oppression, for this hierarchy, characteristic only of the Tokugawa period and the period of seclusion, was accepted as right and proper. Public life was unmarred by strifes and bitterness arising from the economic subjection in which the lower classes lived. With the simple-hearted belief in the righteousness of tradition and things as they are, the Japanese accepted the social structure into which they were born. And in this, they were no different from the rest of humanity in the outer world.

It is often erroneously assumed that the seclusion in which Japan immersed herself was natural to her temperament, and that it was not so much alien provocation as an inherent desire for seclusion that caused her to segregate herself from all foreign influences and intercourse. This however was most definitely not the case, for it was evident to the Japanese that the isolation which they sought was forced upon them by circumstances for which they were not responsible. And however regrettable it cannot be denied that the country's isolation was directed as much against Christianity as against foreigners as such. The distinction implied here cannot be overemphasised, for the complete reversal of policy which the nation underwent from the middle of the 16th

century to the 17th century presented too startling a contrast to be ignored.

In 1541 the Japanese were celebrated or notorious throughout the Far East for their exploits on the high seas; they were described as 'kings of the sea', and manifested all the liberality and eager efficiency which that term so aptly suggests. They welcomed foreigners and commerce and general intercourse, with no thought of erecting obstacles to the propagation of foreign creeds. In the space of a few years they had established contact with twenty overseas markets, so efficient and quick were they in appreciating the mutual benefits of free trade and commerce. Portuguese, Dutch and English merchants were authorised to trade at every port city in the Empire. Essentially, the Japanese gave every evidence of laying the foundations of a prosperous commercial structure, endowed as they were with an intelligence that was quick, fertile and enterprising. All the requisites of unhindered progress were present. . . .

Yet in 1641 the position is diametrically reversed. Foreign trade is completely abandoned, except with a handful of Dutch stationed on a prison island. Strict edicts threatening decapitation if any Japanese were discovered favouring any foreign creed were issued and enforced. Any attempt to leave the country or indeed build a ship capable of being manœuvred on the high seas involved Japanese subjects in the most drastic punishments. Historians are agreed that this transformation in the nation's policy must be laid largely at the door of Christian propagandism. This view is substantiated by the fact that the Japanese regarded foreign intercourse and Christian propagandism as identical. Occidentals were known as *bateren* (padres) while the terms in common use today *gwaikoku-jin* or *seiyo-jin* or *i-jin*, meaning, foreigner, westerner or alien, were not in current use. When it was suddenly discovered that foreign intercourse, hand in glove with Christian missionaries, invariably paved the way for aggression and the subversion of the Mikado's ancient dynasty,

the hostile reaction of the Japanese is not surprising. They cherished their independence and their little island country with all the simple ardour of which the Japanese, untainted by Occidental materialism, is capable. When once their suspicions were aroused there was little opportunity for explanations; ruthless extermination of a potential fifth-column movement was an inevitable result.

Unique in their ways and reactions the Japanese relapsed into self-imposed seclusion for three centuries. Throughout this period the only contact with the outside world was through the small Dutch settlement at Deshima. Strict penalties awaited those who in any way attempted to leave the country or procure foreign text-books on science.

Russian gestures inviting peace commercial contacts continued to arouse Japanese suspicions. Envoys who had been cooling their heels at Nagasaki were peremptorily ordered off. The Russians retaliated by sending armed forays against Japanese settlements in Karafuto and Sakhalien. Japanese ships were looted and burned with ease. The Japanese islanders were not fighters, and they learned the bitter and disastrous lesson that if complete immunity was to be ensured, the arts of the foreigners had to be learned. They realised later that if progress was to be assured, foreign arts had again to be learned. Quick on the uptake the Japanese authorities removed the veto on foreign text-books, and everything was done to popularise the study of the barbarian's wonderful accomplishments.

When once it was known that contact with the outside world was necessary in Japan's own interests, there was little dilly-dallying, but it is doubtful if Japan—the clever pupil—would have emerged so quickly if it had not been for Perry's black ships that sailed into Uraga Bay in 1853. It is difficult for us to realise now that when Perry burst open the country to foreign trade he found a land, as Mr. George Godwin says, 'without railways, telegraphs, postal system, newspapers, no properly constituted law-courts or machinery for administering justice, no system

of education, no merchant marine, no fleet, no army, no civil service, and no proper government.' It is difficult for the average Japanese to realise it. He rather tends to forget it—it is more convenient for the purposes of arguing that Japanese civilisation is infinitely superior to all those in existence. (Japanese nationalists have even argued in the papers that the porcelain bath-tub and wireless were invented in Japan by Japanese inventors.)

The impact of Perry's mighty force—the largest the Japanese had ever seen—on the feudalistic seclusion which had been maintained for approximately three hundred years was shattering. The British and French had already made overtures to the Japanese, seeking trade and intercourse, and the Americans were also prepared for a 'show-down' in this area before the British were able to bring their diplomatic wiles to bear on the scene.

The Americans arrived first with the most powerful force before which the martial and aggressive spirit of Hideyoshi melted. The Japanese have always been realists, and they could not then ignore the impossibility of venturing out and challenging the Americans, however much they might have wished to do so. Faced with an alien menace, however, patriotism of a sort immediately asserted itself. A council of feudatories was held—in itself a surprising move on the part of the Shogunate which had never before deigned to recognise their existence. The Imperial Court at Kyoto asked the nation's masses to invoke heavenly assistance.

For long during the centuries of isolation the Japanese had anticipated in their unconscious mind, such an event, expressing their apprehension in a folk-song which ran as follows:

Thro' a black night of cloud and rain,
The Black Ship plies her way—
An alien thing of evil mien—
Across the waters grey.
Down in her hold there labour men
Of jet black visage dread;

While, fair of face, stand by her guns,
Grim hundreds clad in red.

With cheeks half hid in shaggy beards,
Their glance fixed on the wave,
They seek our Sun Land at the word
Of captain owlsh-grave.

While loud they come—the boom of drums
And songs in strange uproar;
And now with flesh and herb in store,
Their powers turn towards the western shore.

And slowly floating onward go
These Black Ships, wave-tossed to and fro.

(Dr. Nitobe's translation.)

Commodore Perry was under strict orders from his superiors not to resort to force, and to rely solely on the moral effect of the display of western might. He carried a letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan who was addressed as the 'Great and Good Friend.' The President pointed out that Japan and America being two contiguous countries, greater intercourse between them, and the establishment of commercial ties, would be to their mutual advantage. He assured the Emperor of his most friendly sentiments and expressed his willingness to arrange for certain privileges regarding trade. He desired above all the appointment of a certain port where American vessels might obtain coal and provisions on their way from San Francisco to Hongkong. Perry's ships sailed up Yedo Bay on July 8th, 1853, '... through the peaceful waters, in full view of the white-capped peak of Fuji-Yama, every height and vantage ground along the shore seemed alive with troops and with wondering and alarmed inhabitants.'

On July 14 the letter was delivered, though the Japanese made it unequivocally clear that this was done in direct contravention of Japanese law which decreed that all negotiations with foreign governments should be conducted at Nagasaki. In acknowledgment they replied :

'The letter of the President of the United States of North America, and copy, are hereby received and delivered to the Emperor. Many times it has been communicated that business relating to foreign countries cannot be transacted here at Uraga, but in Nagasaki. Now, it has been observed that the Admiral, in his quality as ambassador to the President would be insulted by it; the justice of this has been acknowledged; consequently, the above-mentioned letter is hereby received, in opposition to Japanese law.'

This was a naive acknowledgment of the fact that the Japanese appreciated the hint embodied in Commodore Perry's ships of war. Perry did not press for a treaty, but sailed away on the 17th of July, informing his Japanese hosts that he would return for the reply to the President's letter in the following spring. This was a happy and wise diplomatic procedure, for the Japanese, given time, were able to ponder upon difficulties in which fate had placed them and their country. Though fully conscious of their hopeless inferiority in regard to the arts of modern warfare, and of their inability to resist foreign aggression of the magnitude suggested by Perry's ships, the Japanese daimios were proud enough to consider the prospect of resisting the enemy. There is no doubt that if their incapacities had not been so evident they would have resorted to an armed combat in the true Hideyoshi spirit. The promptings of reason were however too insistent, and the urge toward reckless heroism was readily checked.

OPENING UP OF COUNTRY TO TRADE

During the breathing space afforded by the departure of Commodore Perry, the Japanese occupied themselves in feverish military activities—preparations which only served to accentuate the impracticability of offering resistance. Orders vetoing the construction of large sea-

going vessels were rescinded, and the Dutch at Deshima were requested to import the latest books on the sciences of military warfare. Feudal lords were commissioned for the construction and equipment of war vessels, while the Dutch received urgent requests that they build and fit out a modern vessel of war. Those Japanese, who during the country's period of seclusion, had contacted the Dutch at Deshima and studied modern European science, were pardoned or at least had their peccadillos conveniently connived at by being drawn into the ranks of officialdom. Forts were feverishly built, soldiers drilled, and cannons were cast. But the more they toiled, the more it became evident that the resistance to Perry's ships should they offer aggression was beyond the capacity of the country's armed power. The fact that the nation's resources for defence, such as they were, were mobilised, indicate that the Japanese were not at all decided whether to meet the returning Americans in battle or in peace. Controversy raged throughout the country, but it is credit to the good sense of the country's administrators that they quietly but steadily concentrated on the building up of the nation's facilities for defence.

Most of the daimios were against opening the country to foreign trade and intercourse, one of them being so convinced on the question of the day (in the manner of old gentlemen who write to *The Times* expressing their dogmatic views) that he prepared a memorial giving reasons why the country should not be opened to the foreigner, and that aggression should be met by aggression. This was veritably the blood of the Hideyoshi boiling and the voice of aristocratic hereditary princes speaking :

1. The annals of our history speak of the exploits of the great, who planted our banners on alien soil ; but never was the clash of foreign arms heard within the precincts of our holy ground. Let not our generation be the first to see the disgrace of a barbarian army treading on the land where our fathers rest.

2. What! Trade our gold, silver, copper, iron and sundry useful articles for wool, glass and similar trashy little articles! Even the limited barter of the Dutch factory ought to have been stopped.
3. The policy of the barbarians is first to enter a country for trade, then to introduce their religion and afterwards to stir up strife and contention. Be guided by the experience of our forefathers two centuries back; despise not the teachings of the Chinese Opium War.
4. The Dutch scholars say that our people should cross the ocean, go to other countries, and engage in active trade. This is all very desirable provided they be as brave and strong as were their ancestors in olden time; but at present the long-continued peace has incapacitated them for any such activity.
5. The haughty demeanour of the barbarians now at anchorage has provoked even the illiterate populace. Should nothing be done to show that the government shares the indignation of the people, they will lose all fear and respect for it.'

Though the majority of the daimios agreed with the views expressed in the above memorandum, they were able to appreciate the extreme unwisdom of resisting the Americans equipped as they were only with obsolete armour. The government had already issued instructions on December 2nd that should the American fleet return, all negotiations should be conducted peacefully. When Perry returned on February 13th, 1854, with a fleet of ten ships, his force amounted to two thousand men. Courtesies and complimentary gestures were exchanged during the ensuing six weeks, while negotiations for the treaty were being conducted. The Japanese were so impressed by this extravagant display of aggressive power that they submitted with grace and a treaty was drawn up.

Thence followed a period of confusion and turmoil,

for the controversy regarding the opening up of the country to foreigners developed into an internal issue between the Yedo officials or Shogunate and the Kyoto court. The former was placed in a position of great embarrassment which the American and British representatives at that time failed to appreciate. Much has been written in connection with what foreign historians have regarded as the duplicity of the Yedo administration because it did not refer their decisions for the sanction of the Imperial Court at Kyoto. The misapprehension here is that the Shogunate was not entitled to act on its own right in regard to negotiations with foreign nations, whereas the fact was that the Yedo officials had no reason whatsoever to seek the sanction or the approval of the court in Kyoto in concluding treaties with foreign governments. It was natural that this independence on the part of the Shogunate, though constitutionally defensible and legally sound, created resentment at the Imperial Court which favoured uncompromising seclusion, the rejection of the treaty and the ousting of the barbarians from the land of the gods. The more realistic Shogunate administration was in a dilemma, for the country was torn with strife and controversy—one party favouring a policy of free intercourse and progressive liberality; another advocated the provision of certain limited privileges to the foreigners while time was gained for military preparations; while a third party, identifying itself with the Imperial Court, stood for uncompromising seclusion and hostility toward foreigners.

The Shogunate could not of course deviate from the policy which it had favoured—that of liberality and progressive intercourse. Seeking, however, to establish some compromise between the conflicting parties, it summoned a convocation of feudal barons, but the latter without exception favoured a policy of absolute seclusion, and the Yedo officials had then no alternative but to enforce their policy on the nation. This was a most dangerous attitude to adopt, for the country was becoming increasingly aware that a dual form of government was an embarrassing inconvenience to the nation, and

was almost in unanimous favour of abolishing the Shogunate.

By this time, it must be remembered, the original treaty concluded by Perry in 1854 had been followed in its wake by similar treaties with the Dutch, British and Russians who were determined not to be outdone by the Americans. The Japanese were flabbergasted by this increasing encroachment on their preserve of peace and quietude and simple manners and simple living. But they reconciled themselves to the inevitable, and quietly determined to pick up the ways of these barbaric foreigners and play their own game against them in time to come. . . .

And so the colourful confusion continued, until the arrival of the first American Consul-General in Japan, the enterprising Townsend Harris whose monument stands to this day in Japan, though his country and the country which he came to love and respect were to engage in war. Arriving in August 1856, he concluded a preliminary treaty in June of the following year which provided for the permanent residence of American citizens in Shimoda and Hakodate, the opening of Nagasaki and the right of consular jurisdiction. These were mere concessional flourishes with which the Japanese were willing to comply, but Townsend Harris, in the manner of the American businessman, still carried the big deal up his sleeve and it was not until the appropriate preliminaries had paved the way that a commercial treaty was suggested.

The difficulties with which the Yedo officials were enmeshed are obvious. They had, with the greatest difficulty and danger to their position, advocated concessional liberality to the foreigners, construing this policy as one of magnanimity on the part of the Japanese toward the foreigner. But the conclusion of a commercial treaty could not be construed in such convenient terms. On the one hand they could not arouse the indignation of an already incensed public, while on the other having committed itself to the policy of liberality and co-operative progress, the Yedo administration could not abandon its

original stand. Besides it was convinced, whatever the attitude of the Imperial Court at Kyoto, that a greater co-operative understanding between the foreign powers and Japan would be to the latter's advantage.

It is understandable in view of the circumstances that ten months elapsed before Townsend Harris was permitted to journey to Yedo, there to confer with the country's administrators who had reconciled themselves to a firm but benevolent enforcement on the country of their policy of co-operation with the foreigner. It is ironical that both the American and British envoys, ignorant of the nature of the internal situation and of the domestic dissensions, should have held the Shogunate administration responsible for the troubles which they inevitably encountered. And it is a reflection upon the so-called integrity of historical justice that historians yet continue to criticise the Yedo officials for the turmoil in the country, for the delay in the negotiations, and for the alleged duplicity by which Yedo tried to minimise the importance of the Imperial Court.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that from the point of view of the Japanese nation and from that of the foreigner, the resolute and realistic policy of the Shogunate was to their mutual advantage. The misunderstandings that were then rife, however, resulted in an overwhelming immediacy of problems that provoked public opinion to question the policy and good faith of the Shogunate administration. It is only in retrospection that we are able fully to appreciate the anguish and anxiety with which the Shogunate was afflicted, and the surprising courage and forthrightness of character with which it acquitted itself.

In November 1857, Townsend Harris was received by the Shogun at Yedo, and it is perhaps an indication of the stately and leisurely diplomatic ways then current or of the reluctance of the Yedo administration, that the commercial treaty was finally signed on July 29th, 1858. By the terms of the treaty Yokohama was to be opened on the 4th of July 1859, and trade between America and

Japan freely carried on there. This was in direct defiance of the wishes of the Imperial Court, and the widespread uprisings and internal turbulence that greeted the signing of the treaty were therefore not unexpected. The Shogunate government had committed itself to a promise that the treaty would be signed, and it could not see its way to disappointing Townsend Harris whose pleasant personality and understanding nature had befriended him to the Japanese. A decree was forthwith issued to the effect that the Shogunate government considered a liberal progressive attitude toward the foreigners as in the interests of the country, and that consequently measures would be taken to ensure that adequate recognition be accorded such a policy. Henceforward the situation was clear-cut and uncompromising. The Shogunate and the Imperial Court at Kyoto were diametrically opposed, and the country was split into two hostile camps—one labelling themselves the conservatives and the other liberals.

Outrages were committed on foreigners by the anti-Shogunate clique, hoping by these means to prejudice the foreigners against the Yedo officials—a piece of chicanery that was absolutely successful. Townsend Harris and British envoys suspected, in their ignorance, that the turmoil was due to the duplicity of the Shogunate administration which they assumed was attempting to fan anti-foreign feeling in the country as a counter-balance to the treaty. Arousing suspicions on all sides, and being in a precarious state of imminent collapse, the Shogunate had no alternative but to effect a compromise with the Imperial Court, placating the latter's outraged feelings with the promise and guarantee that the present intercourse with foreigners was of a temporary character only, and that ultimately the barbarians would be ousted from the country, when the Japanese were powerful enough for this purpose.

That the Shogunate was driven to reconcile itself to such a compromise and thus abandon, to a certain degree, the position of absolute liberality which they had elected

to adopt, is perfectly understandable when it is noted that the pressure of events was imposing upon it the necessity of considering its own preservation. Circumstances were such that the Yedo administration had lost the popular support which had formerly buttressed it, while the Imperial Court, owing to its divine associations, was immune from public criticism. If the dual form of government was to be abandoned, the Shogunate and not the Imperial Court, was to suffer eclipse. It is most unfortunate that the foreigners were unable to grasp the difficulty of the situation in which the Yedo government was placed, and it is not inappropriate to regard their unfounded suspicions of the Yedo officials as typical of the Occidental attitude toward the Oriental and things Asiatic. Lack of trust and faith on the one party has engendered a similar response on the other. Hence, Kipling's nonsensical line about the East being East and the West being West and never the twain shall meet; only the absence of faith has lent credence to this bankrupt philosophy.

When it was discovered that the Yokohama settlement was threatened by anti-foreign elements, precautionary measures were taken by the Yedo government to protect foreigners residing there. Yet so puerile and hopeless was the understanding of these "barbarians" that they solemnly informed their respective governments that they were being subjected to a deliberate piece of spy-manceuvre. They interpreted warnings sent them by the Japanese authorities as attempts to curtail their precious liberty. The suggestion that inmates of the various legations should not show themselves too openly in the streets was brushed aside as an insult. As a last resort to counter the sublime stupidity, if not asinine idiocy, of these foreign embassies, the Japanese authorities arranged that foreigners should be escorted in the streets by armed guards. A British representative whose capacity for manufacturing reasons in order to justify his suspicions (it is incapacity in ourselves that sees it in others) evokes admiration, reported to his government that spies and police officers had been grafted upon the foreign settlement. . . .

As regards the relationships between the common Japanese masses and the visiting foreigners, there is no want of evidence to support the view that the latter were favourably impressed. Lord Elgin, who visited the country in 1858, expressed approval of the cleanliness of the houses, of the gardens and of the beautiful scenery. The following are illuminating excerpts from his journal :

'August 10th, 1858—The Japanese are most curious contrast to the Chinese, so anxious to learn, and so prevenient. God grant that in opening their country to the West, we may not bring about misery and ruin.

August 22nd, 1858—It is difficult, of course, to speak positively of the political condition of a country of which one knows so little; but there seems to be a kind of feudal system in vigour here. The hereditary princes (daimios), some 360 in number (I doubt much their being all equally powerful), exercise extensive jurisdiction in their respective domains. The daimios themselves spend half the year in Yedo and the other half at their country places. The Supreme Council of State appears to be in a great measure manned by the daimios, and the recent change of government is supposed to have been a triumph of the protectionist, or anti-foreign party. . . . A perfectly paternal government, a perfectly filial people; a community entirely self-supporting; peace within and without; no want; no ill-will between classes. This is what I find in Japan in the year 1858, after one hundred years' exclusion of foreign trade and foreigners. Twenty years hence what will be the contrast?"

We may gather from the above observations that Lord Elgin was a singularly tolerant and sympathetic and keen appraiser of human character. This is more evident in the following thought with which Lord Elgin concludes his remarks on his visit to Japan :

'August 30th. Eleven a.m. We are again plunging -

into the China Sea, and quitting the only land which I have left with any feeling of regret since I reached this abominable East—abominable, not so much in itself, as because it is strewn all over with the records of our violence and fraud, and disregard of right. The exceeding beauty external of Japan, and its singular moral and social picturesqueness, cannot but leave a pleasant impression on the mind. One feels as though the position of a daimio in Japan might not be a bad one, with two or three million of vassals; submissive, not servile, because there is no contradiction between their sense of fitness and position.'

ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTION

Although several treaties were concluded between the various foreign powers and the Shogunate government, the former were uneasy about the validity of these treaties in view of the absence of any Imperial consent. Hitherto the Emperor and the Imperial Court at Kyoto had occupied the background, but it was now felt that an imperial sanction to the treaties was necessary if the latter were to be regarded as valid. An impressive display of allied fleets was arranged off Osaka where the most influential Shogun lived, and who was most susceptible to such glamorous influences. He immediately sent a memorial to the Emperor requesting him to grant imperial sanction to these treaties, as he and his colleagues were embarrassed with the thought that they had negotiated with the barbarians without his blessing; he added furthermore that the foreign representatives were keenly desirous of receiving the consent of the Emperor in the absence of which the treaties could not be regarded as wholly valid.

That some measure of co-operative agreement had been reached between the Shogunate and the Imperial

Court may be adduced from the following prompt and favourable reply:

'The Imperial consent is given to the treaties, and you will therefore undertake the necessary arrangements forthwith.'

But the emergence of the Imperial Court into the forefront of national affairs was inevitable. In spite of what must be admitted to have been an efficient and worthy administration of the country, the Shogunate government was compelled to face the fact that the dual form of government was a grave disadvantage to the country, especially when the complexities of foreign intercourse were being forced upon it. The Shogun himself realised that in the interests of the nation, governmental power should be centralised. A brief civil war ensued among the clans but on January 3rd, 1868, a decree was passed by the order of the new Emperor Meiji that 'the government of the country was henceforth solely in the hands of the Imperial Court.' This in Japanese history is known as the Restoration. The eclipse of the Shogunate was final.

A Charter was drawn up which provided that 'a deliberative assembly should be formed, and all measures decided by public opinion; that the principles of social and political economics should be studied by all classes of the community, and that wisdom and ability should be sought after in all quarters of the world, for the purpose of firmly establishing the foundations of the empire.' A court assembly of daimios took the Charter oath, and the first administrative centralised Japanese government based on Western constitutional models was established. Hereditary territories belonging to the daimios were voluntarily returned to the State, clans being forthwith abolished and prefectures being established in their places.

It must be noted in passing that the passage from feudalism to centralised constitutional government, far from being painful and plunging the country into disastrous civil wars, was facilitated greatly by the almost

eager willingness of the daimios themselves. This may be interpreted as an indication of the progressive spirit that was prevalent at the time. The Japanese were in a hustle, and meant to get somewhere as quickly and as efficiently as possible. They hustled through periods of weeks and months where the rest of the world had plodded through them in years and decades. When once the disadvantages of feudalism were evident, there was no hesitation. It was gladly and thoroughly abandoned. Provisions were made both for the samurai and the daimios, though the latter were completely ousted from the administration of the country when their incompetence in governing the prefectures was discovered. Unlike other aristocracies, incompetence is a failing which no amount of blue blood will countervail in the ranks of the Japanese aristocracy. Incompetence is not tolerated.

In 1889, a new constitution on Western lines was established, and ten years later judicial autonomy was granted providing for the assumption by Japanese tribunals of jurisdiction over every person, whatever the nationality and creed. Extra-territoriality was abolished, and the various treaties subjected to drastic revisions, the main features of which was the retention by the Japanese of the control of tariffs, and a law forbidding the ownership of land by foreigners, although the latter could lease it.

These steps towards absolute independence were wholly due to the enterprising and vigorous nature of the new government, in the head of which, the Emperor's power was centralised. Ministers of State and heads of departments were made responsible to him. The House of Peers and the House of Representatives were established, and two main political parties jockeyed into position, in a happy caricature of Western parliamentary democracy. This, within a few years of the formal abolishment of feudalism, is indicative of the hustling impatience with which the Japanese rushed through their history. It may be remarked in this context, that the measure of independence gained from the imperialistic incursions of

the various foreign powers is singular in view of the various facilities which China was compelled to grant to the foreigner. The geographical features of the Japanese country discouraged penetration into the interior, and the measure of unity among the Japanese was pronounced enough to deter the foreigner from taking excessive liberties. The contrast between China and Japan, in their respective contacts with the Western powers, is most evident today.

The establishment of a parliamentary democratic constitution marked the beginning of the phenomenal development of Japan in all aspects of her national life. In the fields of militarism and commerce and education she ran the course at a gallop.

Comparisons have been established between the rapidity which characterised Japan's rise at this stage and the spurt of development that was the diagnostic of England's industrial revolution. Such parallels are justified, but they required to be qualified with the fact that whereas in Japan the tempo of development was maintained from the formal abandonment of feudalism to the present day, the English, having greater facilities gained while Japan had been buried in seclusion, accepted things at a more leisurely pace.

Japan would not, or could not, recognise the necessity of transitions for the convenience of pedantic historians and scholars. From unadulterated feudalism she passed, without ceremony or fuss, into the beginnings of parliamentary government. Simultaneously, a similar impetus in trade, militarism and internal development worked like a leaven within the country. Japan stormed the strongholds of Westernism and Fascism at full throttle.

We have spoken of the Japanese parliamentary system as a caricature of Western democracy, as undoubtedly it was and is. But in thus deriding it, we are guilty of the assumption that Japan should not have deviated from the Western pattern—an assumption which has absolutely no foundation and cannot be justified. The secret of Japan's success has been and may yet continue to be the rapidity and ease of her capacity for

adaptation, and there is no reason why in adapting the Western parliamentary democratic system she need not have distorted it superficially to suit the Japanese political climate.

The Emperor, the Army and the Navy were the three factors that spoilt the Western democratic pattern ; the first reserved for himself absolute power (theoretically), while the Army and Navy reserved for themselves practical power, responsible (theoretically) only to the Emperor, descendant of the Sun-goddess, remote and sublime.

NATIONALISM AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The internal development of the country and the rapid rise in industry facilitated the emergence of a new vital stratum in the structure of Japanese society, consisting of the mercantile and financial elements in industrialised Japan.

Formerly, in the days of the Shogunate, the merchants were extremely low in the social hierarchy, but the transformation in values effected by the establishment of the new constitution and the emergence of the country into the forefront of the world's political stage, precipitated the rise of the mercantile class in the social scale. The aristocracy, in the manner of aristocracies everywhere, have absorbed the more financially powerful of the merchants and financiers into their own ranks.

Though constitutionally democratic in form, there was little vestige of any liberal democracy, the evil necessity of imperialist expansion being forced upon her by the rapidity of her industrialisation.

Moreover, the military has never been other than a factor which could not be ignored, even during the most liberal phases of Japanese history ; and with the emergence of the country into the world's ranks of industrialised nations, the military constituted one of the pivotal points around which the country's policy revolved. The military

clique has never ceased to exercise a considerable influence upon the conduct of national affairs; now it may be said to be in complete power.

The substitution of a national army for a class one and the imposition of conscription were followed, later, by positive attempts to inculcate the spirit of militarism into the rising generation through schools and colleges.

The war against China in 1894 proved Japan's new army to be well-trained and disciplined. Its initial victories evoked the admiration and respect of the various Western powers, and Japan, accordingly, rose in their estimation. Even at this early stage it cannot be doubted that various groups in Japan envisaged the possibility of an imperialist expansion on the Asiatic Continent, and though it was sometime before they realised their dreams, we are compelled to admit, in any consideration of the Japanese body politic, the urge for imperialist expression that was constantly inherent in it.

It has never wholly been abolished, and its fortunes have been varied; only a major defeat in the field of battle will give the liberal elements in Japan the long-awaited opportunity to gain absolute control of the affairs of State. While the imperialistic military remain in power, the chances of a revolt are nil.

As a naval power, Japan precipitated herself into prominence by her successful action against the Russians in 1904-05. Her industrial policy was established along two distinct lines of development, emphasis being laid rather on the integrated nationalism of the major industries than on the internal development of backward fields and classes. Strategic industries were, on the one part, given priority attention, while the interests of the agricultural classes were wholly neglected. Fundamentally, the country was integrated solely for establishing a basis upon which to construct the country's defence forces.

The comparatively weak merchant-banking class was subsidised generously so that its entry into the field of industry might be facilitated. It was only by such a broad policy of concentrating upon important national industries

(made possible by heavy taxation) and of curtailing the less vital fields of industrial endeavour, that Japan was able to create and maintain a merchant marine, an overseas market, and an efficient navy.

The standard of living at home remained low, but nationally the country had developed into a major power. This integration of her economy served not only as a means to planned development but as a bulwark against the introduction of foreign capital.

By the time of the European war in 1914 she was prepared to exploit the situation to her advantage. A quick assimilation of German possessions in the Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland followed. While Japan's Navy convoyed Allied ships in the waters of the Far East. Her trading advantages were even more remarkable, for both Europe, at war, and Asia became her customers, enabling her to raise her gold reserves from 130 million yen in December 1913 to 700 million six years later. Foreign balances, amounting to 1,300 million accumulated in New York, while 664 million yen had been advanced to the Allied governments, including China.

Japan's detailed role in the Great War, on the basis of the alliance between Japan and Great Britain, will be examined later. Sufficient is it in the present text to maintain some continuity, so that the reader might gain a fitting impression of the rapidity with which Japan stormed the stronghold of Western modernism.

Japanese industry was firmly established by 1930, although 48% of the workers were still on the land and 38% engaged in commerce and industry. Textiles were the most important of the light industries. This is indicated by the fact that 37% of exports during 1938-39 consisted of raw silk, while silk manufactures, cotton yarn and piece-goods amounted to no less than 20%. Japan's wars with China provided an impetus to the heavy industry which was being constructed in Manchukuo. Articles of domestic use were all produced at home, though she was dependent on imports for high quality steel, certain machine tools, motor trucks and aircraft.

What was continually emphasised, however, by foreign commentators, evaluating the power of the country as a belligerent nation, was the fact that her industries were wholly dependent on the raw materials which were imported. This is a disadvantage which is common to most highly industrialised countries, but Japan's plight was doubly unfortunate in that she was dependent on the import of raw materials mainly from the British Empire and the United States. While undoubtedly this fact cannot be lightly dismissed, it cannot be made the basis of the innumerable sweeping assumptions regarding the inherent economic weakness of Japan.

Totalitarian countries have already more than once confounded the orthodoxies of economic experts. Those who were resident in Japan during the war against China since 1937 are aware of the reiterating monotony with which economic commentators assured us that Japan was on the verge of collapse. It was again solemnly intoned that she could not possibly engage in war with the United States on account of the grave straits in which her economy was floundering.

Orthodox economists have found their theories confounded; they do not yet appreciate the immense striking power and maintenance energy that may be generated by establishing the nation on a complete totalitarian basis and by draining the country of every value and unit of energy of which it is capable. The cumulative effect of this thorough integration is tremendous. The country is suddenly capable of economic and military feats of which normally she would be utterly incapable. It was toward this primary end of national integration that Japanese industries were made to develop; Japan did not bother to have a period of liberal capitalism. She hustled forward almost as if her national consciousness was aware of the deadline of the morning of December 7th, 1940.

Since 1930, Japan has been geared to war production with economic and social consequences that mounted to a climax about the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. The detailed processes of the gradual tightening integration of the country during

the last decade will be examined later, when the background of the present war is sketched and examined.

The position in 1940, as it had been in a minor degree for the last decade, was that of a unique totalitarianism. Small factories, workshops and home industrial units were absorbed into larger and more complex concerns in the process of nationalised integration. In the government the growing dominance of the military clique was unmistakable, and with the elimination of all political parties and of the trade union organisations the government, with which the military are to be identified, assumed absolute dictatorial powers. The railways, the banks, the postal services, the arms industries, the dockyards, clothing, tobacco, camphor, salt and other essentials were all within the jurisdiction of the government.

The latter was headed, theoretically, as a condescending flourish to tradition, by the God-Emperor, but was, until Japan's collapse, dominated by an uncertain partnership between the military and *Zaibutsu* or the financial oligarchy (the Big Four).

The oligarchy consisted of the four major Japanese concerns—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. Their relations with the military were vague and amorphous, and require a careful analysis more appropriate to a later context. An attempt has been made to establish an illustrative parallel between the *Zaibutsu* and the notorious German cartels, but the veracity of such parallelism may well be questioned. The *Zaibutsu*, though perhaps appropriately regarded as the equivalent of the cartels, were characterised by a centralisation of power unparalleled by anything in Germany. More than one-third of all the deposits in non-government banks were owned by the Big Four, while subsidiaries under their control retained responsibility for 70% of all trust deposits.

Of the Big Four, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the two dominating giants, controlling the paper industry between them and much of the country's flour milling capacities. They produced 44% of the raw sugar and 37% of refined sugar, which left precious little room for other would-be industrial capitalists. All four controlled one-third of

Japan's foreign trade and three of them owned half the shipbuilding capacity of the country. Each of them owned a bank and their insurance companies generally dominated the field. In the fields of engineering, mining, brewing, paper manufacture, chemicals, sugar, steel, oil refining, food canning and innumerable other industrial activities, the Big Four reigned supreme. 95% of the coal output, 98% of cotton spindleage, 90% of artificial silk, and 90% of transport were in their control. Universities, political parties and half of Japan's radio stations came within the sphere of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi concerns.

It is apparent from this recital of grotesque capitalism that the State was largely dependent on the *Zaibutsu* in any national enterprise involving economic and industrial co-operation, for the Big Four constituted a major factor in the government of the country. With the increased integration of national industrial effort, the development of State control on the lines of Western Fascism was an inevitable corollary. The basis of such control was founded in March 1938, when the National Mobilisation Law came into effect, authorising the government to control labour, production, property, profits, consumption and exchange of goods.

The law and the government made itself felt in practically every sphere of national life. News services, whether agencies or newspapers, were strictly controlled, while labour disputes, wages, profits, salaries, and exports and imports were determined by the authorities.

The Japanese are never in the habit of playing with words, and when they say mobilisation, they mean mobilisation with a vengeance. In 1941, the Act was extended to cover the requisitioning of houses, goods, land, mines, patent rights and funds. Ultimately, the Law was supplemented by separate enactments, covering various aspects of every branch of industry. In a word this was complete totalitarian industrial mobilisation. The curtailment of such liberty as they had so far enjoyed, and the increasing hardships suffered by the Japanese masses, were, however, never made the basis of an antagonistic attitude toward the government.

Unless driven to extremities, the Japanese are respectful and docile to authority; they refrain from any revolutionary tendencies on the unconscious realisation that the destiny of the nation is in the hands of their betters. The authorities, moreover, were cute enough to realise the importance of emphasising the God-Emperor aspect of any national drive involving the co-operative goodwill of the public. However hard and cruel the pressure to which they are subjected, the masses will respond willingly if it is made known to them that the Emperor has sanctioned the national policy of his immediate ministers.

Manchuria, the fruit of Japan's modern imperialist expansionist programme, is often spoken of as a liability rather than as an asset. Such a view, however, cannot be substantiated, for if the returns on her investments in Manchuria were not immediately encouraging, the territory was a source of food, coal and iron; it also constituted part of the yen bloc which Japan established in Occupied China—a source of great inconvenience to the United States and Great Britain. Within the bloc Japanese currency was enforced Japan's trade with this territory approximating 50% of her complete trade in 1939.

We have referred previously to the seemingly miraculous manipulations with which Japan's Finance Ministers had confounded the orthodoxies of economists, and the "China Incident" is perhaps the best illustrative example of the strain which a totalitarian economy, limited not by finance but by labour, is capable of bearing. The acquisition of coveted raw materials in the field of battle leads not so much to a diminution of such economy as to a continual bolstering up of it. Only defeat in arms would impose upon the totalitarian structure a pressure great enough to cause its breakdown.

The policy of the Army toward Manchuria was openly criticised by Japanese Liberals in 1931, and if the League of Nations had adopted a firm and uncompromising attitude, it would have found supporters within Japan itself. Its vacillating weakness, however, encouraged the

Army clique, which consolidated its positions, following their success in Manchuria. Since 1932 the military gradually tightened their hold on the country, leading up to the *coup d'état* in February 1936, described in the following sections.

Although, ostensibly a failure, the *coup d'état* ended in favour of the militarists, and by November 1936, commentators noted the way the wind was blowing by the Anti-Comintern Pact which Japan signed with Germany. With the establishment of an Imperial General Headquarters, headed by the Emperor and consisting of the Premier, the Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers and the various Chiefs of General Staffs, all was set for the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937.

The big bombshell, however, came with the signing of the Axis Tripartite Pact, though it had been anticipated by newspapermen in Tokyo for several weeks prior to the official announcement. Nazi-Fascist advisers and newspapermen poured into Tokyo. Throughout the country last touches for the "der tag" were being prepared. In the political field, a movement was afoot for the abolishment of the various political parties, and the establishment in their stead of a single party. Under pressure, the Minseito and the Seiyaku parties were dissolved while other minor factions and political groups broke up without ceremony. Trade unions were thrown on the scrap heap, pressure on foreigners increased, and the Japanese Christian Church completely Japanised.

When General Tojo, the firebrand, entered the scene with his coterie of pro-Axis politicians and army fireworks, all hope of peace in the Pacific dwindled down to an alarming nil. Tojo intoned to the Foreign Office that Japan stood at the crossroads, and must rise or fall. When foreign journalists heard this they crossed their fingers, and packed up their bags. As far as the British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie was concerned, it was another mission that had failed.

Our sole concern in this short review has been a kaleidoscopic survey of Japan's rise to Fascism. We

shall require to go over the same ground again in greater detail in dealing, especially, with that period immediately prior to the outbreak of the *Pacific War*.

III

MODERN JAPAN

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

THE story of modern Japan may most appropriately start with an account of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As an important factor in determining the future course of Japanese policy it cannot be minimised. The alliance of 1902, renewed in 1905 and 1911, was the first of its kind concluded by Great Britain with any Oriental power,—a political tie-up between a major European country and a country lately released from the trammels of feudalism. The growing power of Czarist Russia toward the turn of the 19th century was clearly the main cause which induced Britain to favour the conclusion of the pact with Japan.

From the Japanese standpoint it was a great encouragement to ally themselves with the British whose prestige and power were respectfully recognised by the Japanese. Their emergence from national seclusion was yet too recent to have enabled them to establish what may be termed a foreign policy. Japan was yet immersed in her major task of sloughing off the handicap with which she had started the race of capitalist imperialism. It was not long however before she committed herself to a policy of flagrant opportunism, seeking national aggrandisement with all the precocious energy of the recently initiated.

China was the melon around which the fortunes of Far Eastern politics revolved, and it was therefore inevitable that the first temptation to which Japan succumbed came from this direction. Various European powers had already established themselves firmly in this region, so that the prospect before Japan was at first that of a closed door. Her opportunity came however in 1874 when the Japanese Foreign Office's capacity for seeking reasons to

justify Japanese military activities was called into play. Some Japanese ship-wrecked sailors in Formosa, it was claimed, had been ill-treated, and an expedition was despatched to right matters with the consequence that the Japanese still remain in occupation of the island. This is a technique which, as we shall see later, was often resorted to by the Japanese with alarming success. During the 1870's other minor island groups continued to be annexed by the Japanese—including the Lichiu and Bonin islands.

A rebellion in Korea afforded the energetic Japanese further opportunity for militaristic expeditions to this country, the consequence being the imposition on the Chinese of the Treaty of Shimonoseki by the terms of which Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan and the independence of Korea officially recognised. Having tasted of the first fruits of successful imperialistic endeavour, Japanese interest in the Asiatic continent flamed with an increasing intensity, and the adumbrative outlines of her policy in the Pacific area became gradually evident. The Japanese are if anything realistic in the conduct of their national affairs, and it cannot be doubted that even at this early juncture, those sections of Japanese political opinion which had committed themselves to the policy of southward and continental expansion had reconciled themselves to a conflict with the allied powers. The scramble for concessions and territories in China was then at the height of its rapacious impetuosity, and Japan, initiated into the imperialistic ways of the great European powers almost the moment she had emerged from her isolation, was no mean competitor. Britain which had possibly recognised in Japan a valuable potential maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, leaving Japan to indulge in her adventurous forays in China.

Encouraged by such tolerance on the part of the British government, and reassured by the Anglo-Japanese pact of 1902, Japan precipitated matters between Russia and herself, emerging victorious and gaining the respect

of European exponents of power politics. The Treaty of Portsmouth, consequent upon Russia's subjugation, recognised Japanese supremacy in Korea, made over the lease of the Liautung Peninsula and gave Japan in 'perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the island of Sakalien, and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon.' An agreement was also reached by which provision was made for the joint Russo-Japanese exploitation of railways in Manchuria for commercial and industrial purposes.

The absorption of Korea into the growing Japanese hegemony followed as a matter of course, and it is perhaps a sad reflection upon power politics that the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911 discreetly omitted to mention the independence of Korea as in the previous and original treaty of 1902. Within China conditions were turbulent, the revolution of 1911 and the disintegration of the Manchu Empire throwing the length and breadth of the country into chaos. Japanese attention came to be riveted on Manchuria and Mongolia where her expansionist schemes were paralleled by similar tactics on the part of Russia. Both Japan and Russia, and especially the former, exploited the advantages of British preoccupation in the problems of European pre-war settlement, with the result that Britain and America confined themselves to the status of mere spectators.

JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE GREAT WAR (1914-18)

Japan's opportunist policy has never been more blatantly exemplified than during the Four Years War of 1914-18, for it was obvious to the most superficial observer that her desire solely to seek national aggrandisement through whatever means at her disposal, constituted the essence of her foreign policy. Already, keen observers were aware of the nature of the dissension within the

camp of the Japanese extremists one section of which dominated by the Navy inclined toward southward expansion, and another dominated by the Army advocated the expansion of Japan on the continent. It was however only after the successful conclusion of the Great War that these tendencies came to be observed in sharp outline, and the nature of her activities during the conflict were clearly indicative of the policy of aggression which Japan was formulating.

It might be supposed that owing to her geographical position Japan would refrain from interfering in European affairs, and that a strict state of neutrality is not impossible. A superficial knowledge of Japanese history will reveal however that this supposition is wholly without foundation. Ever since Japan's emergence from national isolation her relations with the Western powers have been such that the political situation in Europe has been a guiding factor in formulating her policy. She has never been able to maintain anything resembling a neutrality of all-round indifference, and especially was this so in 1914 when she was bound to Great Britain by a treaty of military alliance.

Though the Great War was confined primarily to the European sphere, the Far East was not as unaffected as historians tend to imply. The principal belligerents maintained naval squadrons in the Orient to protect their possessions, but the conclusive factor in embroiling the East in the war, was the enterprising character of both Germany and Japan, the former despatching raiders and wreaking serious havoc, and the latter being called upon to assist in hunting the German raiders down. The first few days following the declaration of war found Japan maintaining a dignified calm, seemingly based on a magnificent indifference to such gross matters as war. And indeed it was generally assumed that the war would be confined to the European continent. The Japanese press almost unanimously supported the view that Japan should not interfere in a remote controversy. British, German and Australian warships in the Pacific had already commenced warlike operations, but the unflurried Japanese

Foreign Office officially informed the German Ambassador on August 3rd, 1914, that Japan desired to remain neutral and would take part only if Britain laid claim to her assistance under the terms of the military alliance treaty.

In spite of this cautious and reserved attitude on the part of the Japanese government, an inspired section of the public (of which there is always one in Japanese society) was vociferously advocating an immediate declaration of war on Germany. With avidity members of this school of thought raked up history, recalling the "notorious" role of Germany in the Triple Intervention of 1895, and reminding the public with reiterated emphasis of the country's treaty obligations to Britain. According to the press reflecting this particularly violent shade of opinion the German base at Kiaochow developed into a 'disturbing factor', the German raiders were a menace to shipping, and German expansion in the Pacific was beyond toleration.

Though not a few of these arguments were the brain-children of that fanatical section of Japanese opinion which is invariably favourable to any policy of action rather than inaction, and which but lately played a major role in whipping up anti-Allied feelings in Japan prior to Pearl Harbour, some of their reasons supporting Japan's projected declaration of war on Germany were, far from being fancied, very real. Merchant vessels fearing capture took refuge in Japanese ports, war risk insurance rates soared to unprecedented heights, and shipping was generally handicapped and the situation was not one which Japanese commercial interests could look upon with satisfaction.

If, however, cautious elements in the Japanese body politic sincerely desired to avoid being engaged in a European war, the British government was reluctant to call upon Japan for assistance. These factors would therefore have been sufficient to counteract those influences advocating Japanese intervention, had it not been for the naval situation which developed in the Western Pacific.

The Germans were in possession not only of the fortified base at Kiaochow (which since 1897 when the base was built, had been a constant source of anxiety for Japan) and numerous islands in the Western Pacific including considerable territory in the East Indies, but controlled a powerful naval force built around the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, two formidable cruisers of 11,420 tons each. The notorious *Emden* had also commenced operations by capturing Allied merchant vessels and converting them into raiders. The Japanese however were more interested in removing the offensive landmark or 'disturbing factor' as they termed the German base at Kiaochow which had been allotted to Germany after Japan had been deprived of the Liantung peninsula following the war with China. These considerations buttressed by the realisation on the part of the British government that the assistance of the Japanese navy must be invoked if British shipping was not to suffer heavily, paved the way for the entry of Japan into the Great War.

British and Australian naval strength in the Pacific was certainly greater than that of the Germans, but not so much greater that the latter's convenient bases and skilful concealment of movements were effectively counteracted.

The then First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, reviewing the situation expressed satisfaction and assured his listeners that there was no reason for anxiety in the Pacific. Others however were of a contrary opinion, both Julian Corbett, the celebrated British naval authority, and Admiral von Tirpitz recognising the entry of Japan into the war as a relief to the naval situation in the Pacific. The Admiral wrote subsequently in his memoirs 'the entry of Japan into the war wrecked the plan of a war by our cruiser squadrons against enemy trade and against the British vessels in those seas.' Hopelessly out-gunned as he was, Admiral von Spee concealed his whereabouts and struck boldly whenever an opportunity presented itself. Such tactics constituted more than a mere nuisance value. Furthermore, due to the superior

speed of the enemy vessels British cruisers in the Pacific could not draw them into combat, this being possible only for the *Australia*. Ignoring the improbability of both combatant units contacting each other in mid-ocean, the hunt for German cruisers and raiders could be conceived as a most arduous and irritating task.

Difficulties were again encountered when the plan of campaign formulated by the British government was found unsatisfactory by the Australian naval and military authorities. Two days following the British declaration of war the British Colonial Office in London requested the Australian authorities to seize the German wireless stations in New Guinea, Yap and Nauru. While the Australians were willing to carry out this occupation of enemy territory, they considered such a move inadvisable without first dealing with the German fleet. It was surmised by the London *Times* that the plan of seizing German territory at the outset of the war was favoured in London because it was widely held that the struggle would be over in a few months, and that the possession of enemy territory would constitute valuable pressure for bargaining purposes at the peace conference. The inability, however, of the Australian government to accept this plan, necessitated a revision which then presumably involved requesting Japan to enter the war. Sir Edward Grey in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador a few days previous to the outbreak of the war pointed out that in the event of hostilities the situation would not necessarily affect the interests covered by the treaty, but that 'should a case arise in which we need her (Japan's) help, we would gladly ask for it and be grateful for it.' If the Foreign Secretary had anticipated the reaction of the Australian government to the plan which the British authorities had formulated, it is conceivable that a request for assistance might have been forwarded without hesitation to the Japanese government. When Australia's attitude was finally known however, the British Ambassador in Tokyo left a memorandum at the Japanese Foreign Office on August 7th requesting Japan's assistance in the prosecution of the war.

It was intimated by the British Ambassador to the Japanese Foreign Minister that 'a certain new factor was injected into the situation obliging England to ask for immediate assistance of Japan.' Although the nature of this 'new factor' has as yet not been ascertained by historians, it is generally assumed to consist of the refusal of the Australian government to adapt itself to the convenience of the Colonial Office in London. It was pointed out furthermore by the British government that the destruction of the German fleet in Asiatic waters would be a long and arduous task, and the co-operation of the Japanese fleet in the hunting down and destruction of these enemy vessels 'which are now attacking our commerce' would be most helpful.

Now it is evident from such an arrangement that while the Australian vessels would be free to operate in the projected seizure of German Pacific islands, the Japanese navy would be assigned the arduous and dangerous task of bringing the German raiders to book. The concrete spoils of victory would pass into British hands the Japanese argued, while the major responsibility of ridding the Pacific of the enemy fleet would devolve on the Japanese navy. It is therefore understandable that the Japanese were reluctant to enter the war on such ambiguous terms; they stressed that the mere threat of the German fleet did not constitute a reasonable basis on which to invoke the assistance of Japan and that the elimination of the German navy in the Pacific was desirable as a corollary to the subjugation of the German base at Kiaochow. The latter was regarded as the real menace to peace, and Japan was willing to co-operate if the limitations imposed upon her by Britain were either lifted or made more liberal. She would not tolerate a limited scope of Japanese participation such as that proposed by Britain that the Japanese navy should concern itself solely with protecting shipping and commerce.

It is obvious that the British government feared the expansion of the war on the continent on Chinese territory, the outcome of which might be inimical to her

interests there. China herself was bringing to bear pressure on the British and American governments in an attempt to prevent the entry of Japan into the war and the inevitable expansion of war into Chinese territory which Japan's belligerency would involve. As, however, naval operations had already been opened in Chinese territorial waters, and British naval activities included the blockade of Kiaochow, it was not clear how to prevent the expansion of the war on the continent.

Anglo-Japanese negotiations had resulted by August 14th in a mutual understanding of the scope of Japanese activities, and within twenty-four hours the famous Japanese ultimatum to Berlin was despatched demanding the surrender, 'without condition or compensation' of the leased territory of Kiaochow 'with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China'. When the time-limit for the reply had expired, the declaration of war against Germany followed as a matter of course on August 23rd, all limitations on Japanese participation being waived. There was almost universal jubilation in Tokyo, although certain sections of the Japanese body politic did not care to conceal their disappointment that Kiaochow was earmarked for China. British opinion had generally favoured Japanese entry into the war, emphasis being laid on the advantages of using Japanese naval strength. Even Australia which was openly anti-Japanese showed signs of approval, but its press urged the immediate occupation of German territory by Australia in order to prevent being 'forestalled by any other power'. Anti-British and anti-Japanese elements in America naturally adopted a violent stand against Japan's entry into the war, but such extremity of opinion was counter-balanced by sentiments that were manifestly pro-British and therefore pro-Japanese. Average American opinion though favouring anything conducing to British victory, nevertheless regarded Japan's entry into the conflict with suspicious caution. The *New York Times*, evaluating the motives which had caused Japanese participation, pointed out that the terms of the treaty did not require such intervention on the part of an Oriental country, especially when the issues of

the war were dominantly European. It may be noted in parenthesis that American policy in the Pacific, which would necessarily involve her policy toward Japan, was never wholly devoid of suspicious hostility.

It cannot be gainsaid that German propaganda in the United States skilfully fomented anti-British and anti-Japanese feeling, the gradations of opinion between the extremities of violent pro-ism and anti-ism being innumerable, and extremely susceptible to propagandist influences. A report compiled by the Bureau of Information of the British War Office states in brief:

'German propaganda falls into two groups, one of which lays most stress on the necessity of Germany and Japan coming to terms after the war, especially with regard to China, the other attempting to scare the world and particularly the United States with the Japanese danger as the real form of the yellow peril.'

Emphasis was laid by 'American German propagandists on what was termed the menace to the Pacific, and it was claimed that Japan's action was detrimental to the interests of the United States. German-American residents in Chicago urged that America could not be indifferent to Japan's belligerent policy in the Pacific, while the president of the Germania Society declared, according to the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, that Japan's motive was primarily 'to be recognised as a bed-fellow of the white nations.' The German-American Alliance of New York stressed the danger to American possessions in the Pacific and urged the American government to bring pressure to bear on the Japanese. The current of intense feeling which had been generated by Japan's policy toward the war, may be gauged by the following telegram despatched by the Chamber of German-American Commerce in New York on August 16th, 1914, to Governor Hiram Johnson (a noted Japanophobe):

'This is the same England that during the struggle of the American colonies for independence aroused the Indians and armed them against American

patriots. England having refused to localise the European troubles to the Balkans is not content in having mobilised the Russian semi-barbarians against German civilisation and culture, but has now dragged into the sphere of war the Mongolians, and through them the Pacific Ocean. . . . Already the status quo in that part of the world has been upset by England's perfidious act, and what will become of the open door on the Asiatic shore of the Pacific ?'

The fears of the non-extremist or more stable sections of American society may be enumerated as follows:

- (a) That Japanese entry into the war would upset the status quo of the East and the Pacific,
- (b) That hostilities would be injurious to American commerce and interests in that area, and
- (c) That Japan would take advantage of the war by indulging in territorial expansion.

These fears it will be noted were not without foundation, being based on a rational and unprejudiced view of the situation, and prompted rather by feelings of patriotic pro-Americanism than by those of anti-Japanism which German propagandists were attempting energetically to generate.

A war in Europe, whatever the source of its provocation, and whoever the main belligerents are, cannot but instigate repercussions in American society. If in aggravation, an Oriental country, particularly a Pacific one, aligns itself with one of the European belligerents, American attitude toward the former is naturally subjected to drastic conditioning. Official reactions to the situation in 1914 were outwardly calm; China's plea that America should prevail upon Germany to cede her Kiaochow for eventual restoration to China, and thus prevent the expansion of war on the Asiatic mainland, left Secretary of State Bryan completely unmoved.

The United States was solely concerned with the protection of its own interests in China, for it recognised

the inevitability of hostilities extending into Chinese territory, where leased areas were of a military nature. In a statement that must stand unparalleled in Pacific politics, the American government informed the Chinese authorities that although the welfare of the Chinese nation and peoples was a matter of the sincerest concern to the American government, 'it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of China's territorial integrity to entangle the United States in international difficulties.' The period of 1914 which was characterised by such extreme isolationism even in regard to Asiatic affairs, was a reaction against the vigorous interventionist methods of Theodore Roosevelt, while Henry Stimson's bold collectivist policy by which he hoped to control Pacific problems, was yet to come. Moreover, the fact of America's racial complexity favoured an attitude of isolationism, and the maintenance of a strict neutrality.

The petty quibbling which heralded the entry of Japan into the war, and which was concerned with the limitation of Japan's belligerent activities, was superseded by a degree of whole-hearted co-operation which stands unique in the annals of Pacific history. While it cannot be denied that both Britain and Japan were not oblivious of the advantages accruing to them through the mutual alliance pact, it is noteworthy that both nations despite their major concern for their own interests never failed to live up to the letter and spirit of the alliance. Admiral Jerram who had been assigned the task of blockading Kiaochow bay was relieved by the Japanese on August 22nd, 1914. A Japanese squadron assisted by the *Triumph* and one British destroyer commenced operations against Kiaochow. The British furthermore promised to send military reinforcement from the garrison at Tientsin to assist in the siege operations. Two modern Japanese cruisers, the *Ibuki* (15,600 tons) and the *Chikuma* (4,950 tons), were assigned to Australian waters, while Admiral Jerram removed his fleet to Singapore.

The two Japanese cruisers were a valuable asset, for

the exploits of Admiral von Spee and especially the *Emden* were seriously hampering Allied plans for the transportation of troops from New Zealand and Australia across the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile operations against Kiaochow had commenced, and despite the heroic defence of the small number of Germans stationed at the base, resistance was futile against 30,000 Japanese and an overwhelming naval force, and the base surrendered on November 10th. The removal of the German base undoubtedly helped considerably to relieve the Far Eastern shipping situation.

Throughout August and September the whereabouts of von Spee's fleet remained unknown, but with the collapse of the Kiaochow base, the Japanese were eager to bring the sea marauders to book, and presumably volunteered to send more war vessels for this task. Thus on September 10th the British Admiralty informed the Australian authorities that Japanese men-of-war would cruise in waters adjacent to the Marianne and Caroline islands in search of the German squadron. On the 22nd news was received in Australia that two Japanese units had arrived at Jaluit and Rabaul, and Admiral Patey of the Australian fleet was instructed to co-operate with them. Contact, however, was not established between the Japanese and Australian forces, for the Japanese were constantly cruising among the islands, so far failing to detect the enemy.

Admiral Patey was then ordered to proceed to the Fiji islands and establish himself temporarily at Suva and it was while on his way that he learned of an arrangement between the British Admiralty and the Japanese, by which the latter were assigned a certain sphere of activity. The significant message reads:

'Japanese Admiralty have been asked to agree to the following arrangements. Japanese Second Squadron to cruise north of latitude 20 degrees S., and west of 140 degrees E. Japanese First Squadron to cruise north of equator and east of 140 degrees E. . . . All these squadrons (including

the Australian Squadron which is to cruise and search south of equator and west of 140 degrees W.) should communicate whenever possible with each other and with their respective Admiralties and will by their movements assist each other's operations.'

It would appear that the Japanese Admiralty had first suggested 140 degrees E. as the line of division—the British and Second Southern Japanese Squadrons to cruise west of the line, and the Australian and First Southern Japanese Squadrons to co-operate east of 160 degrees E. This would have involved the placing of the Australian Squadron under Japanese command, and it was with infinite tact therefore that the British Admiralty suggested an alternative arrangement based on the message given above. The official historian of the Australian navy noted incidentally that the Japanese had been allotted 'all German islands north of the equator.' This was the first intimation of further developments regarding the political settlement of German islands in the Pacific.

On October 14th, Admiral Patey at Suva received word from the Colonial Office to the effect that the Japanese had landed marines at Yap in the course of their search for enemy vessels among the Southern Pacific islands. It was emphasised that the occupation was temporary, organised solely to investigate the wireless and cable stations, and according to the message the Japanese were willing to hand over the island to an Australian force. Earlier in the Pacific operations, it had been suggested by the Japanese that Yap should be occupied by British, Australian or Japanese forces, but the inactivity and lack of response of the former two, provoked the Japanese to action.

The Colonial Office in connection with this incident informed the Australian authorities :

'On account of strategic importance the island must be occupied by some force. Your Ministers will remember it was originally intended that they should

send force to occupy Yap (referring to the first communication to the Australian government at the outbreak of the war) and they will no doubt agree that it is desirable to relieve Japanese as quickly as possible of the task of holding the island. Japanese government have therefore been informed it is the intention of your government to occupy Yap, and I am communicating with the Admiralty as to provision of transport.'

The Australian Naval Board was in complete agreement with the suggestions contained in the message from the Colonial Office, and the suggestion was forthwith made that the occupation of all the German islands should be arranged—the Pelews, the Marshalls, the Carolines and even the Mariannes. Unhappily Admiral Patey who was still stationed at Suva was not wholly in favour of despatching his ships for the occupation of German islands in the Southern Pacific—an operation which was not without certain risk. He argued further that the number of vessels at his disposal was insufficient for hunting down the enemy squadron, and intimated that on the basis of information received from the British Admiralty, Yap was already within the sphere of Japanese operations. The Naval Board contacted the former and suggested that a few ships should be detached from the China Squadron, and that Australia would then provide a few secondary vessels for the project of occupying enemy territory. The British Admiralty characteristically enough pointed out that the occupation of German islands was the legitimate task of Admiral Patey and that the Admiralty could not spare the vessels of the China Squadron for such a project.

The uncertainty of the final occupation by Allied troops of Yap island, was now provoking the alarmistic section of the Australian press to stress the necessity of procuring these islands as an integral part of the country's programme of national defence. . . . The Australian Naval Board, confronted with an embarrassing predicament, then arranged on October 23rd that Yap should be

occupied at a later date urging upon Admiral Patey that the prompt occupation of the island was essential as the territory thus absorbed would be a vital factor in the naval defence of Australia in the future. While these negotiations occupied the forefront of the Anglo-Australian scene the Japanese were quietly and methodically occupying enemy territory within the sphere of operations which they had been allotted, Yap being retained in Japanese hands. Towards the end of November, Japanese public opinion which suddenly became aware of their government's guarantee that territory occupied during the war would be relinquished in due course, developed a hostile and uncompromising mood. Demonstrations were held in Tokyo and pressure was brought to bear upon the government, the outcome being that the Japanese authorities withdrew the offer previously recorded that they would relinquish Yap island to any Australian force. The possibilities of a serious dissension between Japan and Australia were appreciated by the British government which suggested to the Australian government, through the Colonial Office, that Anguar island of the Pelew group should be handed over to the Japanese 'without prejudice to permanent arrangement.' Astonished at this unfavourable turn of events the Australian government inquired of the Colonial Office whether this conciliatory attitude applied only to Anguar or to all the Pacific possessions of the enemy so far occupied by Japan. To this the Colonial Office pointedly replied :

'We think it desirable for the present that the expedition to occupy German islands should not proceed to any islands north of the Equator.'

On December 3rd, the above note was followed by a footnote which read '... for strategic reasons it would be most convenient to leave all the northern islands (the Pelews, the Mariannes, the Carolines and the Marshalls) to Japan, leaving the whole question of future disposition to be settled at the end of the war.'

South of the Equator German territory was effectively occupied by Australian troops by February 1915, but the

problem of island occupation which had engaged the attention of the Pacific allies was suddenly relegated to the background by the embarrassing intrusion of the *Emden* into the Indian Ocean where for two months she remained undiscovered and unharmed. It was estimated that within six weeks, twenty-one vessels totalling 100,000 tons were either captured or sunk by this German raider which added to its exploits by bombarding Madras and raiding Penang. It was not until November 9th that the *Emden* was finally destroyed by the *Sydney* of the Australian navy. Japanese cruisers assigned to Australian squadrons did meritorious work, convoying troopships across the Indian Ocean from New Zealand and Australia. Von Spee's squadron met its fate at the hands of a British fleet off the Falkland islands in November, and it was thus possible to consider the Pacific as having been rid of the German menace by the end of 1914. That this was the view of the Allied naval authorities was evident, for several vessels of the Australian navy, including the powerful *Australia*, were detached and assigned to European waters. Nevertheless it was hardly possible to relax naval vigilance in the Pacific, as the exploits of the *Wolfe* and other raiders amply indicated during 1915-16. The convoying of troopships across the Indian Ocean was a task which Japanese cruisers undertook vigilantly and patiently, provoking the then chief of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, to acknowledge 'the powerful and untiring assistance of the Japanese fleet.' Historians, it is interesting to note, are in complete unanimity in regarding the potential strength of the Japanese navy as having constituted a major factor in bringing the German fleet to book. In the absence of Japanese naval assistance it is thought that the combined Australian and British naval forces in the Pacific would not have been powerful enough to turn the balance, and the early destruction of von Spee's fleet would have been impossible.

Shortly following the entry of Japan into the war, the feasibility of despatching Japanese troops to the European theatre of war was seriously considered.

though such a consideration was ordinarily confined to the layman whether in Australia, Japan or Britain. The military authorities, it was to be presumed, had given this aspect of Anglo-Japanese co-operation their analytical attention, though the terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty made no provision for such a contingency. No record exists of a request from the British government to the Japanese that the latter provide military assistance in Europe, but the matter was raised in the British press, notably in the *Fortnightly Review* in which the writer suggested, on the assumption that the Allies required 250,000 fresh, well-trained troops along the Western front, that the only country which could provide such troops was 'our gallant devoted ally, Japan.' It was furthermore proposed by this enlightened writer that the force should be transported to Europe via Canada and that Japan should be compensated by an offer of German East Africa.

Such startling approaches to an aspect of the alliance that had never seriously been broached attracted attention, and it was a matter of time before the French press launched a campaign advocating the despatch of Japanese troops to the Western front. Back in Tokyo a publicist with a vociferous section of Japanese society backing him, sought to persuade the government round to the view that the despatch of troops was necessary. Meetings and rallies were held in an attempt to foster enthusiasm for the project, but a question in the Diet regarding the matter evoked the reply from the Minister of War that no formal request for military assistance in Europe had been received by the Japanese government. Meanwhile a more realistic minded section of Tokyo society made the weight of its opinion felt above the frivolous clamour of common opinion. A writer in the Japanese magazine *Taiyo* of December 1914 argued that Germany in Europe was not the enemy of Japan and that the cost of transporting troops to such a distant theatre of war was prohibitive. Moreover the national security of Japan was hardly affected by German activities in Europe, and it was not therefore conducive

to national welfare to involve the country in unnecessary suffering and expense. Among the Japanese notables there was a sharp division of opinion, Viscount Ishii being an ardent champion of the project, and Foreign Minister Kato being strongly opposed to the scheme. In an interview to the paper *Jiji Shimpō*, Foreign Minister Kato defended his attitude in the following terms:

'That we were obliged to fight against Germany was because we wanted to maintain peace in the Orient. But where is the necessity of sending our Japanese troops to Europe when we are not directly interested from the point of view of the nation's safety and the peace of the Orient? Besides, in sending several hundred thousand troops, we should require an enormous amount of money.... From the financial viewpoint alone, it is a matter which should not be discussed carelessly. Even if the Allies win we should perhaps find it difficult to get war indemnity from Germany.... As for allowing the Allies to bear our expenses, it would be a great loss of prestige on our part to do so.'

As late as January 1917, however, the possibility of securing Japanese military assistance was semi-officially considered in London. The Japanese Military Attaché and Colonel Charles Repington of the War Office analysed the feasibility of despatching 250,000 troops to Russia's Galician front via the trans-Siberian railway. Contact was made with the Russian Embassy in order to ascertain its reaction to the plan which presumably was unfavourable for nothing came of the matter. Lloyd-George moreover, learning of the projected compensation of Japan by handing over the northern territories of Sakalien, considered such co-operation ill-advised. Russian pride and anxiety regarding the presence within her territories of an alien army the disposition of which following hostilities was wholly contingent on the nature of the peace, were perfectly understandable reasons for the rejection of what had since its incipency been a

fantastic scheme. It was argued informally by a member of the Russian Embassy that his country did not require men but munitions, and that political reasons prevented the Embassy from favouring the presence of Japanese troops in Egypt and Asia Minor.

Meanwhile Japanese interest in the matter had been aroused and with their characteristic thoroughness and energy sought to clarify the situation without delay. Colonel Repington was informed by the Japanese Attaché in London that the Japanese government had been approached by France in 1915 regarding the provision of military assistance by the Japanese in Europe. In compensation, however, it was suggested informally that Russia should offer northern Sakalien, and as a gesture of goodwill, dismantle fortifications in Vladivostok, and provide Japan with control of the Manchurian railway to Harbin. An illuminating sidelight is shed on the situation by the following entry in Colonel Repington's journal for February 25th, 1917:

'I asked . . . (the Japanese Military Attaché) to consider how Japan would be viewed by the Allies after the war if, when all the others, including perhaps America, had fought hard, and Japan had done but little fighting . . . I was left with the impression that Japan would act if the concessions named were granted.'

On March 4th, 1917, Balfour offered the suggestion that the Russians and Japanese be left to arrive at an arrangement without the intervention of the British government. He commented moreover that the Japanese price was 'too stiff', which it undoubtedly was. From the Japanese point of view both the problems of financial provision and transportation constituted obstacles which the Japanese government could not afford to ignore. Tonnage was not available for the transportation of troops by sea, and the trans-Siberian railway was hardly in a condition to stand the strain that would be imposed upon it, not only in transporting, but in maintaining the army in the field. The Japanese were furthermore

in a position to stress that the Anglo-Japanese treaty recognised no obligation on the part of Japan to despatch military assistance to Europe, and from the point of view of national self-interest there was no reason why Japan should implicate herself in European matters. The purposes of the alliance had been served (perhaps too thoroughly and rapidly to encourage equanimity among powers interested in the Pacific) by Japanese naval operations in the Pacific, and by her occupation of Kiaochow and German island possessions north of the equator. Further 'assistance' of this violent and thorough nature was not particularly sought after by the Allied powers, and it was generally recognised that they could afford to dispense with Japanese aid for the duration.

It may justifiably be contended that the refusal of the Japanese government to despatch troops to Europe without the concessions noted above was a diplomatic slip the consequences of which were apparent during the peace conference. The life and death struggle in which Europe was engaged naturally tended to facilitate the opinion that Japan's uncompromising attitude and policy of national opportunism were callous in the extreme. The despatch of a small force, as a mere gesture of Japan's goodwill and sincere participation in the Allied cause, would have established her position at the peace conference, and not provoked the hostile suspicion which eventually met her during the post-war period. This however is not to deny the valuable work which Japan's navy was performing in European waters, notably in the Mediterranean and also in the Near Eastern waters. The *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* cruised in the Indian Ocean doing convoy duty, but with the arrival of the German raider *Wolfe* into Indian waters from the Baltic Sea, and the consequent menace to shipping, the British government requested the Japanese to provide heavier escorts consisting of more cruisers and battleships. To this the Japanese responded promptly and transports from Fremantle to Colombo and thence to the Red Sea, and from Fremantle to the Cape were adequately convoyed by units of the Japanese navy. It was however significant that

the Japanese provided more ships than were requested, two cruisers being despatched to operate in the New Zealand-Australian area, the *Tsushima* and *Niitaka* being stationed at Mauritius, and another force being assigned to the Indian Ocean for convoy work. This was overflowing generosity with a vengeance, and Julian Corbett, the British naval historian, noted that the 'Japanese government became the predominant partner in the Indian Ocean'. This view was further substantiated by the arrival at Singapore of the *Suma*, three light cruisers and four destroyers.

In February 1917, the British government requested naval assistance in the Mediterranean, and eight destroyers were therefore detached for this task and stationed at Malta where the independent Japanese command was constructed to co-operate with the French and British naval forces. In August four more destroyers were sent to the Mediterranean to join the Japanese fleet, but with the loss of the Japanese destroyer *Sakahi*, which was torpedoed by the Germans, two British destroyers were placed under Admiral Kato's command. It is estimated that during the last eighteen months of the war the Japanese fleet in the Mediterranean escorted 348 convoys, engaged in 37 encounters with enemy submarines, and lost five vessels. The convoys aggregated 750 vessels with transport facilities for 500,000 troops.

Japanese naval assistance in the European theatre of the war was therefore far from negligible. Ships, munitions and loans were also forwarded to Russia, while the United States following her entry into the war in April 1917 secured maritime assistance from Japan. Allied shipping was failing to bear up under the heavy demands that had been imposed upon it, and Japan's rapidly growing merchant marine was of great importance. Sixty-six vessels aggregating 514,000 tons were placed at the disposal of the United States, twenty-four being chartered by the United States Shipping Board.

Although neither the United States nor Japan was bound by the terms of a formal alliance to render each

other naval assistance, we find the American Navy Department arranging with Japan for the assignment of a Japanese cruiser for patrol duties in Hawaiian waters and thus relieve the American *Saratoga* for duties elsewhere. These innumerable and volatile activities on the part of Japan were finally climaxed by the unfortunate Siberian expedition from 1918 to 1921. On her own initiative and under the pretext of counteracting the spread of Bolshevism, 75,000 troops were despatched to Siberia and maintained there until other Allied forces had been withdrawn after having achieved their object of relieving the stranded Czechoslovak force and seizing the Russian stores.

Comparatively it cannot be denied that Japan's role in the Four Years War was spasmodic and constricted, her naval losses being but one destroyer, *Sakahi*, which as was recounted above was torpedoed in the Mediterranean, while militarily her operations were confined to the siege of Kiaochow in which Japan's losses were 12 officers killed, 40 wounded and approximately 1,400 men killed or wounded. 280 officers and men were killed when the destroyer *Takachiho* struck a mine. These slight losses however cannot be made the basis of an assumption that the German garrison was overcome with ease. Far from this being the case, the Kiaochow base maintained a vigorous defence till the very end.

Financially Japan's participation in the war was proportionately heavy, one and a half billion yen being expended during the war, according to figures released by the Bureau of Information of the Prime Minister's Department. Costs for the Russo-Japanese conflict amounted to 1,720,000,000, slightly greater than the sum consumed in the Great War, while the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 required a mere 200,000,000. As regards material spoils, the Great War was a disappointment for Japan. The Sino-Japanese war had resulted in Japan being elevated to a treaty position in China on par with other powers, the strategic and wealthy island of Formosa had passed into her hands, and a satisfying indemnity

covered all expenses that had been incurred. No less favourable was the Russo-Japanese war which though more expensive in terms of men and materials, netted Japan the southern half of Sakhalien with its valuable coal and timber resources, fishing rights off the coast of maritime Siberia, and a goodly section of the Manchurian railway and its accompanying concessions, and the Russian leasehold on the Liautung peninsula. Japan gained moreover in the eyes of Western powers the status of a great power—which undoubtedly was an extremely gratifying prize for a recent initiate into the ways of high diplomacy and international affairs.

Despite the obvious anxiety with which Japan contrived to ensure profitable returns in the post-war period her gains from the Great War were of doubtful value. Micronesia, situated north of the equator and consisting of approximately a thousand islets totalling 836 square miles, was the main prize. With it however went certain limitations in the form of a Class 'C' mandate under the League of Nations which, needless to say, was conveniently ignored by the mandatory power. The German base at Kiaochow was restored to China, although Japan put forward convincing claims for the transference of German economic concessions in that area. A number of German vessels was the last item on the prize list—one hardly commensurate with the extent of Japan's activities and with the expense she had borne. The positive advantages however were slightly less obvious. She had gained valuable experience, and the strategic importance of the Mandate islands was not to be ignored, her economic structure had developed rapidly, and internal prosperity was on the upward trend. This was no doubt in part due to the casual nature of Japan's participation in the war; while a belligerent her geographical position was such, and the extent of her naval and military activities so limited, that she enjoyed the economic advantages that normally accrue to neutrals—selling goods, loaning money, and leasing ships.

NINE POWER TREATY

To the student of Pacific political problems, there can be no doubt that post-war settlements in the field of Sino-Japanese relations constitute a dark and inglorious chapter in the era of appeasement which had unmistakably set in. In 1916, the Allied powers keenly desired the possession of German vessels incarcerated in Chinese ports, and had accordingly brought to bear pressure on the Chinese government with a view to facilitating China's entry into the war. Japan however was opposed to any such Chinese intervention, ostensibly because, as Japan's ministers claimed, the arming and militarisation of millions of Chinese would be a menace to civilisation, but essentially because Japan was definitely in favour of maintaining conditions which prevented unity and coherence in China's political outlook. Anything that tended to introduce a unifying or invigorating element into the Chinese body politic was therefore subject to Japan's opposition. In common with most European countries, but perhaps more so on account of her geographical propinquity, Japan could not divorce herself from that attitude of mind which regarded China as the happy hunting ground of economic and commercial concessions. The combined pressure, however, of the British, Russian and French governments on the Japanese authorities resulted in the latter adopting an attitude which clearly indicated Japan's willingness to consider proposals. Meanwhile the Sino-Japanese treaty of May 25th, 1915, ensured that China's intervention in the war would be impossible without the consent of the Japanese government whose veto upon China's participation was, as pointed out above, perfectly understandable. The Allies, moreover, preoccupied as they were with the waging of the war, paid slight attention to the local, and subsequently international, implications of the policy of appeasement to which they had evidently afforded their support. If Japan therefore was unwilling to remove her veto upon China's participation in the war, the Allied powers were in no mood to involve themselves in pro-

longed negotiations. The arrangement of a secret treaty by the terms of which Japan extorted from Britain, France and Russia the undertaking that Germany's rights in Shantung would be transferred to her at the peace conference, was smoothly facilitated, and the offending veto upon China's entry into the war was removed. Furthermore, a secret treaty signed in February 1917, when the entry of America into the war was an increasing possibility, provided the assurance of the British government that Japan's claim to all German islands north of the equator would be supported by British delegates at the peace conference. Thus were China and her rights sacrificed at the altar of expediency, although in the manner of formal diplomacy the Allied powers and the United States, in reply to China's declaration of war, assured the Chinese government 'of its solidarity, of its friendship and its support, and promised to do all that depends on it in order that China may have the benefit in her international relations of the situation and the regard due to a great country.' Thus are words made the substance of political duplicity.

That the United States was party to this facile hypocrisy was subsequently made unequivocally evident by the Lansing-Ishii agreement signed on November 2nd, 1917, by which it was recognised that Japan possessed 'special interests in China based on territorial propinquity.' Such assurances and agreements in the aggregate inevitably resulted in Japan's delegates to the peace conference assuming confidently that Japan's newly formed power in the Pacific and more especially on the Asiatic continent would not be disputed. The temper, however, of the wholly unsuspecting Chinese delegate Dr. Wellington Koo was appreciated neither by the Japanese nor by the Allied powers who had committed themselves to the support of Japan's claims. It is interesting to note that as early as June 26th representatives in the Diet in Tokyo queried the Foreign Minister in regard to the final disposition of German rights and possessions in Shantung and in the Pacific. They were assured that the government had taken measures to ensure that Japan's claims to these

strategic areas would be recognised by the Allied powers.

All that was required of the Japanese delegates Baron Makino and Prince Saionji was to request the formal transference of Shantung province and German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Baron Makino's statement to this effect was therefore made on January 27th, 1919, to be confronted with the immediate opposition and counter-claim from Dr. Koo who declared that China maintained sovereign rights over territories which had formerly been leased to Germany. The restoration of Shantung therefore to China was a claim to which Dr. Wellington Koo felt China was thoroughly entitled. In spite of the secret treaties to which the Allied powers had committed themselves the Shantung issue delayed final agreement for three months during which period the Chinese delegates—Dr. Quo Tai-chi and Dr. Wellington Koo—worked indefatigably and impressively for the justice that was being denied their country. Both China and Japan, be it noted, were for the first time on the forefront of a stage on which the world's attention was riveted. For the first time China had been disinterred from the obscure status of an exploited middleman, to that of a major power contending against the imperialistic policy of a neighbouring country. In retrospect we are able fully to appreciate the significance of Dr. Wellington Koo's staunch stand against the case which Japan put forward at the peace conference, and we are thus able to interpret it for what it was—the first round between the forces making for peace in the Pacific, and the forces of imperialistic Japan making for aggression and war. The fact, however, that negotiations were prolonged over a period of three months, in view of the almost unanimous support accorded to Japan, appears to indicate with justice the vigour and sincerity of fervour, with which Dr. Koo and his colleague pleaded the case of his intrigue-ridden, despoiled and stricken nation. Weight of public opinion and sentiment, thanks mostly to skilful propaganda and the calculated obscurantism that was generated, constituted too formidable a barrier for the Chinese. The latter, true to their breeding, conceded

gracefully but China to this day remembers, and continues to struggle against Fascism as her delegates did twenty-five years ago on the international stage. President Wilson, who was more obsessed with the idealistic desire to establish a League of Nations, did not concern himself with the more immediate desirability to ensure justice among nations. Subjected to Anglo-French pressure he supported Japan's claims. China's reaction was a blank refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles. On May 6th, at the plenary session of the peace conference, the Chinese delegates gave notice of their reservation on the Shantung clause, but reservations not being permitted by the conference, China had no alternative but to sign the treaty as a whole. Appeasement with its inevitable corollary of encouraging the imperialistic elements in Japan had carried the day, and the restraint which if applied then would have transformed the course of Pacific history, was never resorted to.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

When it was realised that an imperialistic Japan with unknown industrial potentialities would be a serious rival to the Allied powers, the latter's policy of appeasement underwent a belated transformation. Dominion delegates at the First Imperial Conference favoured the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, while the United States, conscious of the necessity of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, lent its support to this view. The Washington Conference of 1922 was a clear indication of the nature of the conflict that was to burst upon the Pacific approximately twenty years later. Naval and economic competition was developing with mounting intensity, and the major powers were jockeying for favourable relations with the no-man's land of China—the melon, as we pointed out, around which the round-about of Pacific politics revolved. It was openly admitted by the American delegates that while the various parties were desirous of

ensuring the welfare of the Chinese and their country, an important condition of any agreement was the settlement of the competition 'for trade and industrial advantages in China between the outside powers.' The ludicrousness of such a statement though obviously not appreciated by the diplomatic mind is perfectly evident.

The Washington Conference though laying the foundations of subsequent strifes and conflicts, was nevertheless the scene of a surprising magnanimity on the part of the various powers—so surprising that we are tempted to regard stricken consciences as a factor occasionally in the moulding of national policies. The Anglo-American delegations persuaded the Chinese representative to hold separate conversations with the Japanese, with Secretary Hughes and Mr. Balfour, heads of the American and British delegations respectively, presiding and enjoying the right to intervene when they saw fit. This resulted in the bipartite treaty signed by Japan and China by which Kiaochow was restored to China and Japanese troops were withdrawn from the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway. The province of Shantung, which had passed to Japan following the Great War on the basis of the secret treaties between the Allied powers and the Japanese government, was returned to China, while the British and French returned Wei-hai-wei and Kwangchowwan respectively. Such all-round relinquishment of territory was unprecedented in the annals of Pacific diplomacy, but our impulse to applaud is tempered by the realisation that it constituted no more than a manoeuvre on the part of the major powers to facilitate greater economic infiltration in the future. Furthermore any magnanimous gesture on the part of one power imposed an obligation on the others to follow suit, for the fact has never verbally been denied though it has constantly been contradicted by deeds, that those powers whose interests lay in the Pacific were fully conscious of the claims of China and that their sole and only desire was to seek the prosperity and happiness of China's millions. The temporary benefits which accrued to China therefore are best interpreted as a result of a choice bit of Pacific diplomacy with nothing at all to commend it to the

idealist. Nevertheless, in the light of the kaleidoscopic history of the Pacific today, the Washington Conference ranks as a singular achievement unparalleled in the sphere of international relations. The final result of the conference was the cancellation of seventeen of the twenty-one demands which Japan had lodged on China during the war in January 1915. It was not until May that the notorious demands were made public, when the *Japan Advertiser* scooped the world with this story. With the exception of the United States whose concern in Pacific affairs was more direct than that of the Allied powers, no major power had opposed this flagrant imperialism. American pressure, however, was instrumental in modifying the demands and the waiving of group five which would have subjected the Chinese government to a complete subservience to the Japanese. The Washington Conference caused the almost complete abrogation of the demands, and relations between China and Japan were temporarily readjusted. British policy in the Far East however was still influenced by the Japanese alliance the ultimate abrogation of which was the result not so much of a deviation in Britain's attitude toward Japan, as of the realisation that the maintenance of America's goodwill was essential. Certain powerful sections of British opinion represented by Lord Northcliffe and Lord Grey vigorously urged the annulment of the alliance not only, as they declared, because it was provocative of suspicion in America to whom Britain was heavily indebted, but because it was now an anachronism serving no British interest in the Far East. That such a strictly utilitarian attitude was justified is indicated by the fact that it was only after the annulment of the alliance that the British and American delegates to the Four Power Treaty succeeded in reaching an agreement. By the terms of the Four Power Treaty, the contracting powers, Britain, America, France and Japan agreed to respect their rights attached to and involving possessions in the Pacific area, and that any difficulties arising in regard to the Pacific question should be resolved at a conference; any belligerent gesture on the part of a power would be counter-

acted by the combined opposition of the other three contracting powers. Article 4, it may be noted, read as follows:

'The treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible . . . and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan which was concluded at London on the 13th of July 1911, shall terminate.'

The next milestone in Pacific history for which the Four Power Treaty was a preliminary curtain-raiser was the Nine Power Treaty which, futile and hypocritical as it would appear now, expressed the solemn desire of all powers with interests in the East to respect the integrity of Chinese territory and contrive to bring about the prosperity of the Chinese peoples. Article 1 of the treaty covers the main points of the treaty:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Unhappy though it is to confess the fact, it cannot be denied that these treaties which followed hard one upon another at the conclusion of the Great War, appear to be more in the nature of an agreement between predatory robber barons than a co-operative understanding among civilised States of the world. This anxiety to restrict the rights of States within the sphere of influence of the Pacific area conterminous with China, may be seen in retrospect, as an index to the undercurrent of

suspicion and hostility that was being generated among the rival imperialisms of the various great powers including Japan.

We have followed Japan's career in detail during the war and immediately following, and we are therefore able to set the situation engendered by the above treaties and the Washington Conference, in contrast to the less dominant position in which Japan now found herself. In taking advantage of her alliance with Britain during the Great War, she had exceeded the limits to which international toleration would stretch. Both the United States and China, the latter having emerged from the war with a greater national and political consciousness, were determined to counteract the insidious influences by which Japan had insinuated herself into the forefront: The United States was responsible especially for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and it was her diplomatic pressure that resulted in the withdrawal by Japan of her twenty-one demands which she had imposed on China during the war. Japan's foreign relations were therefore from this stage, influenced by the United States, the predominant power in the Pacific area. With the abrogation of the military alliance Britain had by circumstances been relegated to the background, and ceased to wield as great an influence as that of the Americans on Tokyo's increasingly difficult foreign policy. Provisions for the limitations of naval armaments in the Four Power Treaty though apparently serving to preserve peace in the Pacific and to place a check on Japan's expansionist programmes, were of great advantage to the Japanese, for they ensured that neither Britain nor America would be able to construct and maintain naval bases of a formidable character. Part of the Article in question read as follows:

'The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measure shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that

no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions specified.'

The security which this Article afforded Japan was of the greatest importance, though young Japanese naval officers (who are the counterparts of the military fire-brands) considered the naval limitations ratio of 10-10-6 for America, Britain and Japan, as nationally *infra dig*, and blustered and flustered with annoyance. Strategically, as the Japanese must have realised up their voluminous sleeves, Japan had secured an impregnable area of the Pacific as a no-man's sea which would fall into her hands during the first few weeks of a Pacific war and which would facilitate her communication lines with the continent. Both Hongkong and the Philippines, as the present war has tragically proved, were defenceless in the event of hostilities breaking out. It was inevitable therefore that the first round of any war with Japan would be to the latter's advantage. It has even been claimed with every justification that this single Article in the Four Power Treaty more than compensated Japan for the renunciations and withdrawals which she was compelled to undergo following the conclusion of the Great War. Reflecting upon this point in the light of the present situation in the Pacific we are disposed to agree.

IV

THE TANAKA MEMORIAL

FEBRUARY 26TH REVOLT

SINCE the entry of Japan into the war, commentators have found themselves unable to refrain from quoting from the Tanaka Memorial, and they have done so with all the solemnity and academic flourishes of the uninitiated. In Japan one never heard or read about this notorious document, and passing references to it were casual and usually indicative of the fact that it was nothing more than a forgery, and that in the final analysis it represented the thoughts and aspirations of General Tanaka and not of the Japanese government or the Japanese people. To regard the Memorial therefore as an important factor in Japan's expansionist programme on the basis of the indiscriminate boosting to which it has been subjected by enterprising newspapermen is to open oneself to grave risks of misinterpreting the situation. While admitting that Japan's imperialistic activities have faithfully followed the lines laid down by General Tanaka, it does not, I feel, necessarily suggest that the Memorial is to the Japanese government and people what *Mein Kampf* is to the Germans and Nazis. I doubt indeed if the average Japanese has even heard of the Memorial, though he would be familiar with General Tanaka's name. It must accordingly be recognised that the Memorial is of value to us only in so far as it reflects an attitude of mind representative of a rapidly increasing section of the public and of Japan's rulers.

Japan had been recognised as a major power in the Pacific, and revolutionary elements within the country were already conscious of the inevitability of a clash between the Allied powers and Japan. The Washington

Conference was supposed to have laid the foundations of co-operative peace in the Pacific, but as far as Japan was concerned her co-operation was confined to a brief period between 1925-27 when Shidehara's Foreign Ministership established friendly relations with the League powers and economic co-operation with China. With the collapse of the Minseito government General Tanaka came to the fore as a member of the Seiyukai party and forthwith proceeded to prepare his plans. In his Memorial he expressed consciously what the Japanese were feeling unconsciously though it was subsequently repudiated by the authorities, and various 'hush-up' methods (at which the Japanese are adept) were resorted to in an attempt to prevent extensive publicity abroad. To this day therefore, there is a calculated avoidance of any reference to the Memorial both among Japanese discussion groups and in Japanese newspapers.

General Tanaka it was evident had been ahead of his time. He had been too precipitate, and extremely undiplomatic in advertising his thoughts in so alarming and flamboyant a manner. Japan's policy of aggression was not a result of the Tanaka Memorial; the latter was an offshoot of the former which nearly gave the game away. But it is erroneous to assume that Japan intends faithfully to follow the plans outlined in the Memorial, though her foreign policy has unavoidably coincided with the General's plans. Japan's motive force has been and will continue to be political and military expediency and no pact or treaty or document will cause her to deviate from what she is convinced to be a policy conducing to Japan's welfare.

The Memorial is therefore appropriately studied as an expression of an attitude of mind or of a spirit of feudalistic imperialism which has impelled Japan into what cannot be regarded as other than a tragedy of the Pacific. It transformed what had hitherto been a vague and amorphous complex of feelings into a concrete set of plans upon which to act. When as Foreign Minister, Tanaka presided over the conference of Chief Ministers,

General Staffs, and Consuls-General, at the end of June 1927, he was more conscious than any other single Japanese of the country's 'national destiny', or of the inevitability of Japan's commitment to imperialistic expansion. He was in the position of a political visionary, understanding and sympathising with the Japanese sub-consciousness in which the leaven of imperialistic desire was working. General Tanaka was therefore confident of the moral support of the Japanese masses, even though he might incur the formal disapproval of the authorities. The following paragraphs are typical of the firm tone of determination which runs through the whole document:

'... For the sake of self-protection, as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of 'blood and iron'. But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us and China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Seas countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realise that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.

For the sake of self-preservation, and as a warning to China and the rest of the world, we must fight America sometime. The American Asiatic Squadron stationed in the Philippines is but within a stone's throw from Tsushima and Senchima....'

The reiterated emphasis on the inevitability of a clash with the United States is significant, especially to those

who have discussed the United States with the Japanese themselves. During the most friendly periods between the two countries, one felt that the Japanese had reconciled themselves to the ineluctable necessity of a war with the United States. With fatalistic gestures, the Japanese would smile and ask how such a clash could be avoided. . . .

How explicitly and skilfully General Tanaka had gauged the temper of his country may be realised when we reflect that it was only four years later that Japan's Manchurian adventure was launched. In September 1931, a short strip of railway line was blown up by the Japanese; the Chinese were blamed, and the 'incident' was staged and completed within six months. Manchuria was dubbed Manchukuo, while the Western democracies entangled themselves in economic and monetary crises. Japan had started her favourite game of exploiting the advantages of European preoccupation with its own specific continental problems. And she had carried the gamble through successfully. Pearl Harbour could have been avoided at least, or even prevented when Japanese troops crossed the Manchurian border, but appeasement—that bankrupt policy of which senile politicians in their second childhood were so enamoured—won the day.

Reviewing the Pacific drama from 1931 to the climactic catastrophe of Pearl Harbour it is seen in the right light as a tragi-comedy. The whole of it constitutes a sad commentary on the Anglo-American Eastern policy, and affords valuable substantiation of any advocacy urging the complete transformation of such a policy into one which is based on the realities of the situation. Of these, the then paramount reality was the inevitability of Japanese aggression, and the machinery of the League of Nations was subjected to the supreme test when in September 1931, following the Japanese announcement of the invasion of Manchukuo, the Chinese government appealed to the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant, requesting that an immediate meeting of the League

should be arranged. In summing up his decision, however, Lord Cecil declared that the matter was beyond the province covered by the League as it affected the Kellogg Treaty and the Four Power Pacific Pact of which America was a signatory. A resolution was consequently adopted by which it was solemnly requested that both Japan and China would not precipitate matters by avoiding conditions which would facilitate hostilities.

Meanwhile by November 15th, the Tanaka Memorial had been published in Geneva, provoking the Japanese government to protest vigorously and denounce the document as a forgery, and as 'one of the numerous apocryphal documents which Chinese propaganda has made every effort to circulate for some years past.' It was stressed furthermore that the policy outlined in the Memorial was one to which no Japanese government or political party subscribed. On January 7th, 1932, Mr. Stimson despatched identical notes to the Chinese and Japanese governments pointing out that the American government was unable to recognise any settlement brought about in defiance of international obligations. The British War Office in reply to the American notes stated:

'Since the recent events in Manchuria the Japanese representatives at the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva stated on October 13th that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Further, on December 28th, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan would adhere to the open door policy, and would welcome participation and co-operation in Manchurian enterprise.

'In view of these statements His Majesty's government have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese government on the lines of the American government's note, but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these as-

surances from his government.' (*The Times*, January 11th, 1932).

On January 29th, the Chinese government again appealed to the League of Nations under Articles 10 and 15 of the Covenant as well as under Article 11. Meanwhile it is significant to note that the Seiyukai (of which General Tanaka was a member) was successful in the General Elections in Japan. On November 21st, the meeting of the League Council considered the report of the Lytton Commission, while the vitriolic Mr. Matsuoka presented Japan's case, declaring that Japan had not violated the Covenant nor the Nine Power Treaty nor the Kellogg Treaty. The Chinese representative Dr. Wellington Koo accused the Japanese of attempting a conquest of Asia, and that China was being absorbed into the Japanese orbit as Korea had been, and as all Asia would be, if measures to counteract the menace were not immediately considered and acted upon. Sir John Simon, ever true to and indicative of the school of thought of which he was a representative, suggested that direct negotiations between Japan and China should be facilitated, and that in such circumstances the League would be able to assist in the work of conciliation. China however was firmly opposed to such negotiations, and advocated collective pressure upon Japan by means of the machinery provided by the League.

Soviet troops in China (Chinese Communist armies) had by this time joined the government forces in a common front against the enemy. In Japan 6,900 communists were arrested and 2,200 are believed to be in detention at the time of writing. In March 1933, Jehol, the easternmost province of inner Mongolia, was occupied by Japanese troops, half of the province being subsequently absorbed into Manchukuo. Meanwhile negotiations between Soviet Russia and Japan regarding the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway were launched in Tokyo. On July 24th, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued the first of his periodic warnings in connection with the loans for the purchase of ammuni-

tion by China which Mr. T. V. Soong was negotiating in Europe. According to the Japanese the sale of ammunition to China would instigate the nationalists of that country into acts which would disturb the peace of the Orient. In September 1933, a spokesman of the Japanese government declared that the U.S. naval programme had provoked the Japanese 'to accelerate their own naval construction'. Japan's army estimates were 447 million yen and navy estimates 428 millions which registered an increase of 56 millions.

Communists continued to be harassed and arrested throughout Japan, while one of the few Japanese liberals, Baron Wakatsuki, who had been imprudent enough to make speeches defending the London Naval Treaty, was attacked by members of one of Japan's numerous patriotic societies. He came through the adventure unscathed, but the incident was undoubtedly a pointer to future events. In March 1933, the Navy Department announced that the sovereignty of the various Pacific islands was vested solely in Japan on the basis of the secret agreements made during the Great War. It was claimed that the mandates were derived from the peace conference and not from the League.

Since June 24th, 1932, when the Palace Revolution in Siam, instigated by the People's Party, paved the way for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, Japanese policy towards this country had been based on and inspired by calculated opportunism. Japan's Naval and Military High Command had realised the value of cultivating co-operative relations with Siam and the fruits of its foresight were evident during the campaign in that area during and after the fall of Singapore. When in February 1933, the League of Nations Assembly passed a resolution denouncing Japan as the aggressor, Siam was the single abstention. In April, a Royal Decree dissolved the People's Assembly and appointed a New State Council until an election could be held under the constitution. Simultaneously a law was passed declaring communism to be a menace to the state, and provisions were made for

the prevention of communist propaganda. On April 4th, the government of the Mandated Islands issued a statement claiming that Japan's withdrawal from the League did not affect her position as regards her island possessions in the Pacific.

In March 1934, the Petroleum Industry Law came into effect. By the terms of this new provision, foreign oil companies were obliged to maintain in Japan oil stocks amounting to six months' supply, the specific quantity being proportionate to the oil company's imports. They were further requested to construct storage depots and necessary accessories for the preservation of such stocks. Under such an arrangement oil refining in Japan progressed rapidly while the country's stocks of oil were to a certain degree ensured in the event of a war.

In April, the world's attention was focussed on the infamous Amau statement on Japanese policy—a statement which struck a bolder tone than heretofore:

'There is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia . . . Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance, are bound to acquire political significance . . . Japan must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle.'

We defer comment on the reply of the British government to the Amau statement. Sir John Simon stated 'His Majesty's government are content to leave this particular question where it is.'

Japan meanwhile carefully cultivated relations with Siam laying the ground with patient thoroughness. In June, a Siamese Trade Commission visited Japan for a month which was followed by a return visit in August of Japanese businessmen to Siam. Perfectly oblivious of the course of events, a leading financial member of the Federation of British Industries Mission to Manchukuo and Tokyo declared: 'I can say that practically every

thinking Briton is in favour of a revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.'

In December, the sale of the Eastern Chinese Railway was completed between the Soviet Union and Japan, while the latter announced its intention to terminate the Washington Treaty. In the spring of 1935, Siamese consulates established themselves at Kobe and Nagoya. A Japanese cotton expert was despatched to Siam to promote cotton-growing and provide markets for Japan. Two fast liners were placed on the Bangkok run, while Japanese in Siam rapidly increased their numbers

Preparatory plans for the North China coup were laid in Dairen during the course of a conference which all the Japanese military leaders and General Haushofer, previously German Military Attaché in Japan, attended. In describing the possibilities of a war, General Haushofer stressed the element of surprise in Japanese strategy

The above kaleidoscopic survey of the period extending from 1931 to 1935, though necessarily sketchy, illustrates how the various forces were working toward a climax. The careful cultivation by the Japanese of Siamese friendship which was to continue till the outbreak of hostilities, the growing dominance of the military, the China coup and infiltration, the skilful exploitation of Anglo-American vacillation and lack of determination, and the flamboyant disregard of any attempt to justify their imperialistic policy on the Asiatic continent—these are features which were writ large on the surface of the events which I have been covering. The constitution of Japan's body politic is such that a firm and aggressive front presented by the Anglo-American powers against Japanese imperialism would have resulted immediately in a compromise or a complete Japanese retraction. There has been and there is today within Japan a body of liberal sentiments which, if encouraged by such Anglo-American leadership, will again rise to the fore and establish a liberal government such as that with which a democratic China may co-operate in peace. So confident however were the Japanese that

the Anglo-American bloc would not arouse itself to action until they had achieved their purpose, they put forward the most feeble and ludicrous 'explanations' to justify their adventures on the continent. Those of us who have lived in Japan are aware of this Japanese diplomatic practice, and it is a moot point whether Japanese *Gaimusho* (Foreign Office) 'explanations' are ludicrously comical or exasperating. They are perhaps a bit of both. When the Japanese subsequently 'occupied' Timor island for the purposes of extending their air-line to this island, they laconically explained in justification that the extension had been arranged by the Japanese government to suit the convenience of tourists. A review of Japan's role in the Great War given in the earlier sections of this book, proves that Japan has never been at a loss to provide their military activities and aggressive imperialism with the most absurd rationalisations. Yet this policy of absurdity was never counteracted until December 7th, 1941, when the Japanese themselves precipitated the Pacific into war. This recourse to absurdity on the part of the Japanese has often left foreign diplomats flabbergasted, though the nature of their official position compelled them to regard the various *Gaimusho* explanations as a basis for negotiations. Whether the Japanese are facile experts in measuring the limits of the psychological make-up of the white man or whether they are utterly ignorant of the workings of the European and American mind is a consideration to which we shall attend in detail in a subsequent section.

REVIEW OF YEAR 1936

The high-light of 1936 was the February 26th incident (Japanese history especially of recent years is studded with incidents. The China war is still an 'incident' and possibly Japanese writers still refer to the

war as a Pacific incident) which proved to be the decisive turning point in Japan's career. A noted Japanese commentator explicitly stated to the present writer that it was only the February 26th revolt of young military hot-heads that made possible the China war—and he might have added, the present Pacific war. Since 1932 and the occupation of Manchuria, the military had firmly ensconced themselves in power but they were impatient with what they regarded as the leisurely course of events. They were impatient with the repressive influences of the more conservative elements of which Japan's body politic has never lacked. Ostensibly the coup was a failure; the rebels surrendered, and a number of them were executed and then lauded as national heroes. But the policy which they unmistakably exemplified in their actions, they left as a heritage to the Japanese nation.

The month that saw the attempted military coup, saw the publication of that now well-known book 'Japan Must Fight Britain' by Lt.-Cdr. Tota Ishimaru in which the range of Japan's strategic possibilities is subjected to a keen and penetrating analysis. It is perhaps one of the best documents available for the study of the workings of the Japanese military mind, but a curious anomaly is the emphasis that is laid throughout the work on the fact that Britain and not America is Japan's major national enemy. This was certainly not borne out by the facts as they were evident to observers in Japan. Though public feeling was directed more against the British than the Americans (whose former popularity cannot be discounted), it was recognised by sober and balanced elements in Japanese society that the United States was the power with which Japan would have to contend. Pacific negotiations were therefore conducted with the Americans and the main brunt of the Japanese attack was concentrated on Pearl Harbour. Nevertheless it is a curious reflection that the British appeared to raise the ire of the Japanese and were subjected to more inconveniences than the Americans. 'Japan Must Fight Britain' in common with all Japanese publications of a similar nature, foretold the course of the Pacific war with remarkable

accuracy. The author's significant comment however is that Australia would be 'dealt with.'

INCIDENTS ALONG MANCHUKUO-MONGOLIAN BORDERS

During January of the year under review innumerable clashes had occurred along the Manchukuo-Mongolian frontiers, where the atmosphere was extremely and constantly tense. In March, Stalin stated in an interview to Roy Howard, 'If Japan ventures to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and seeks to destroy its independence, we have to be able to help that Republic We would help that Republic as we did in 1921.' What precisely are the relations that govern the uncertain peace prevailing along the Russo-Manchurian border? This is one of the minor puzzles of the war to the consideration of which I would reserve a later section.

In February, the United States Navy had taken over control of Kure island west of Midway and strategically important as a cable station. In March, investigations regarding the possibilities of fortifying Guam were launched by the High Command of the United States Navy. On the 7th of the same month, a Japanese spokesman from the Embassy in Nanking declared that Japan would not countenance any loans or credits from the Anglo-American countries to China for the construction of railways in that country. America resorted to a display of armed force, as she had done three-quarters of a century ago when Commodore Perry sailed up Yedo Bay. 153 ships of the United States Fleet manoeuvred off the Panama Canal. Meanwhile the suspicious and cautious Russian bear had anticipated trouble, and a pact with Mongolia by the terms of which 'in the event of an attack on the territory of the U. S. S. R. or the Mongolian People's Republic by a third state, the governments of the U. S. S. R. and the Mongolian People's

Republic undertake immediately to consider the situation that arises and to take all measures that should be necessary for the protection and security of their territories.' Shorn of diplomatic flourishes and circumlocutions, Russia was switching on the red light, so that firebrands in Tokyo would be able to think twice before launching their adventures westward into Siberia.

Meanwhile Japan was cultivating relations with Siam (its key-position on the map is enlightening). In March 1936, a Japanese Economic Mission visited the country in order to survey its natural resources and consider the possibilities of their development with the aid of Japanese capital. The Siamese were assured of a market in Japan if they produced the appropriate crops on an export scale. The faithful Japanese press cudgelled their brains for 'facts' fictitious or otherwise in an attempt to make out a case for the economic inter-relationships between the two countries. The common religious basis of Buddhism was stressed beyond all proportion and luscious assurances of friendship were served up hot in the press throughout Japan. One Mr. Amar Lahiri was especially enterprising in this connection, though we may possibly be doing him an injustice in questioning his sincerity when he penned his enlightening articles on Thailand.

In May came further indications of the water-tight plans which the Japanese were preparing for *der tag*. Two large companies for the exploitation of Japan's possessions were founded—the Taiwan Development Company with a capital of 30,000,000 yen to operate in Formosa, and the South Seas Development Company with a capital of 15,000,000 yen to operate among the Japanese mandates in the Pacific. General MacArthur, principal Military Adviser to the Philippine government, had already sensed impending danger in these Japanese activities, and forthwith published a defence plan on the basis of an outlay of 80 million dollars over a ten-year period. Meanwhile the U. S. War Department announced plans to construct an air-base at Fairbanks in Alaska capable of maintaining 1,000 planes. In seeming retali-

ation the Japanese Navy refused to be a party to the Three Power London Naval Treaty signed on March 25th by America, Great Britain and France. The Japanese Army, not to be outdone in what was rapidly developing into an international rearmaments race, submitted proposals in June for the expenditure of 3,000 million yen for the requirements of the army over a six-year period. Japanese naval plans included the construction of what was claimed to be the largest destroyer and submarine fleets in the world. An announcement from the Navy Office indicated that a five-year navy programme (ending it is to be noted in 1941) involved the expenditure of 2,000 million yen and the replacement of four capital ships.

Amidst all this passively belligerent (as the Japanese would have described it) activity, *The Times* of London declared in June 1937, "Japan's geographical position and her economic structure entitled her to a lion's share of the China markets; but the lion's methods are not the best way to get it." The newly appointed Japanese Ambassador to London, Yoshida, was instructed by his home government to seek such a spirit of collaboration as had informed the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the *entente cordiale* being based on a mutual respect and recognition of each other's rights and interests in China. Primarily Japan desired the recognition *de jure* by Britain of the new state of Manchukuo, while she would be willing in reciprocation to recognise British rights in Central and Southern China. As stated in the House of Commons by Mr. Eden on June 25th, conversations were being held between the representatives of the two countries, and concrete results were anticipated in the near future.

INCIDENTS IN CHINA

On July 7th, the Lukouchaou incident set the stage for the second act of the Sino-Japanese drama. Addressing the House of Commons on July 19th, Mr. Eden declared: 'We have made it clear in both capitals (Tokyo

and Nanking) that if there is any way in which His Majesty's government can contribute to a solution they will be pleased to lend any assistance that may be in their power.' During the course of this shop-talk, came the machine-gunning of the British Ambassador to China, Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, while he was motoring from Nanking to Shanghai. A vigorous note of protest from the British government on August 29th elicited a reply from the Japanese authorities on September 21st, the latter having apparently carried out extensive inquiries into the incident. An apology was finally sent to the British government which received the communication 'with satisfaction' and regarded the incident as thereupon closed. This was the first of a series of indignities to which British citizens and subjects were subjected, the merry farce of lodging protests and lengthy apologies being enacted over and over again with monotonous regularity. In common with so many aspects of the Far Eastern drama, it is difficult to decide whether the matter is one of comicality or of tragedy. It is a judicious admixture of both.

In December, His Majesty's ships *Ladybird*, *Bee Cricket* and *Scarab* were bombed by the Japanese in the neighbourhood of Wuhu and Nanking. The customary note of protest resulted in an exchange of pompous communications after which the British government, whose anxiety to avoid friction in the East was evident, decided to close the incident. Although no compensation was forthcoming, the British government expressed 'satisfaction that the Japanese government have taken or are prepared to take the necessary measures to deal suitably with the officers responsible for these incidents and to prevent any repetition.' Meanwhile Dr. Wellington Koo had moved a resolution in the League's Far Eastern Committee requesting the denunciation of the Japanese violation of international law and to declare Japan an aggressor under Article 10 of the League Covenant. At the suggestion of Lord Cranbourne, the Secretariat set itself to prepare what was termed an 'impartial' historical survey which would be used as the basis of the League discussions.

1937 ended with the significant conclusion of the Siamese-Japanese pact. The Japanese were laying the foundations of their vast structure of offensive strategy which was to explode into prominence in December 1941.

Those of us with the slightest formal acquaintance with Japanese diplomacy are aware of their predilection for the expression of obscurity. Japanese politicians are capable of delivering an address for several hours without committing themselves to any definite and specific expression of policy. Much has therefore been said of the extreme difficulty of 'understanding' Japan's foreign policy following the second stage of the Sino-Japanese war in 1931. It would seem that the Japanese spokesmen in dealing with matters connected with foreign policy have intentionally cultivated the art of obscure expression. The year 1938 was featured prominently by this obvious anxiety on the part of Japanese politicians to 'explain' Japan's foreign policy, the said 'explanation' being followed by loud lamentations deploring the incapacity of the Occidental mind for the subtleties of Oriental thought patterns.... This irritating obscurantism on the part of the Japanese diplomats has invited the charge that the latter are nothing more than pompous hypocrites, attempting to disguise an obviously imperialistic and aggressive policy by a still more obviously simulated facade of rationalised obscurantism. The Japanese press was no less guilty in this respect, though their predominating feature was a more entertaining and less harmless propensity for manufacturing slogans and obscurantistic phrases such as 'New Order in East Asia' and its innumerable offspring including 'Co-prosperity Sphere'. It also played variations on the theme that the profundities of Japanese thought were misunderstood by foreign governments, and that all that was required was an 'understanding' of Japan's divine mission in East Asia, and everything in the garden would be lovely.

Such was the flamboyantly illogical line of argument adopted by the Japanese since 1938. This was also a year of mounting military, naval and aerial preparation

in the Pacific area. Even the most complacent elements were aware of the critical stage into which they were then passing. In January, Mr. Cordell Hull declared to the press that any suggestion on the part of other powers or the League to despatch military aid to China could not be countenanced by American policy. Both China and Japan were free to purchase such war materials as they required from the United States provided that they were transported to the war zone in vessels other than those of the United States. February saw the inauguration of the naval base at Singapore and the German recognition of Manchukuo. German-Siamese connections were strengthened by the decoration of several Siamese officials by the German government. Simultaneously the German press emphasised the growing influence of the Japanese in Siam and the proportionate decline in prestige of the British and French. General Chiang Kai-shek assumed dictatorial powers and a statement was issued expressing China's steadfast determination to pursue the war to the limits of her strength and resources until victory had been achieved. On May 10th, Japanese naval forces occupied Amoy, while German military advisers to China were recalled by the Nazi government.

By this time the Anglo-American attitude toward Japanese aggression in China had assumed a belated semblance of determined anti-Japanism, but the Japanese entry into Hankow and Canton and their refusal to take part in a session of the Mandates Commission and to render an account of the administration of the Japanese Mandates, provoked retaliatory measures in the form of Anglo-American credits to China, and the United States loan amounting to 25 million dollars. . . . The British government meanwhile considered the grant of £500,000 for the purchase of lorries required for operations along the newly opened Yunnan-Burma road. As though confident of the Anglo-American reluctance to resort to firm measures, the Japanese did not hesitate to pursue a policy of firm and unequivocal aggression. The upper Yangtse was closed to foreign shipping by Japanese naval officers, British, American and French protests (there was hardly

a morning when the press did not contain news of these feeble protests) failing to elicit any satisfactory remedial measures. On November 4th, the Japanese Foreign Office informed the world that it considered the Nine Power Treaty as obsolete, and that Japanese policy would be based on this obvious consideration.

In studying the ground covered, in an attitude of retrospective analysis, we are led to remark upon the startling similarity between the course of events which led to war in the East and those which led to war in the West. They are both observed to be the outcome of a vacillating policy, based on a myopic reluctance to face realities as they really were. The blundering ineptitude of Anglo-American diplomacy in the East is conversely paralleled only by the brilliant skill of the Japanese during the years which we have reviewed, in laying the foundations of their structure of offence. The steady infiltration of Japanese troops into China, the cultivation of diplomatic and economic ties with Siam, the move into Indo-China, the occupation of Hainan (temporarily according to the Japanese) and the many indignities to which they subjected the white man in China—by these means and innumerable others—they insinuated themselves into a position from which it was well-nigh impossible to launch an offensive without reaping immediate success.

Any consideration of Japanese military and political strategy involves an analytical examination of a period of several years such as that immediately prior to the outbreak of the war. It is only on the basis of a broad and general survey that we are able to gain some conception of the workings of the Japanese diplomatic and military mind, for the war since December 7th is but the logical and casual extension of the period of skilful diplomatic manoeuvrings which preceded it. It is only now, when the climax of war has been reached, that the tale of this Pacific tragedy may be seen in its entirety, as a well-defined and complete unit of history. We are able to trace the course of those various forces which ultimately converged at Pearl Harbour, and evaluate them at their proper

worth; we are able to view the whole course of those moulding influences objectively and immunise ourselves from the deflative tendencies of bias and prejudice; and we are able above all from such a perspective to view this pattern of history as an apocalypse of Japanese foreign policy since her emergence from the self-imposed seclusion of the 17th and 18th centuries. . . . The period which now remains to be covered, from 1939 to 1941 Pearl Harbour day, is one which requires to be studied with greater analytical care. Events followed events with breathless rapidity, the war in the West caused repercussions in the East—there was hardly a week when a note of uncertainty did not mar the individual's equilibrium as well as that of the Pacific. Matters were clearly converging to a crisis, and frantic attempts to deflect the course of events into safer channels followed one another rapidly as each failed more disastrously than its predecessor. Never had the Pacific countries passed through so harrowing a period of excruciating anxiety and vacillating hopes and fears; never had they lived their diurnal lives in so tense an atmosphere, a nightmarish succession of crises that came and passed within a hair's breadth of plunging the Pacific into war. These are aspects of our present study which are more appropriately treated in a context of analysis and evaluation, and we therefore defer them for consideration in subsequent chapters. In the immediately succeeding sections, and prior to the consideration of the period between 1939 and 1941 Pearl Harbour day, it is necessary to inquire into the workings of the Japanese government, and the nature of its political construction.

V

WHAT WAS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ?

ALTHOUGH it had become customary to describe Japan as a dictatorship it was at once evident to those who had the slightest acquaintance with the Japanese administrative machine, that such a simple and direct description was most unsatisfactory. Similarly it was realised that to place Japan in the category of dictatorship countries, on the basis of what could not be more substantial than an assumption, was unacceptable without appropriate qualification. What was not fundamentally realised was that Japan's body politic contained no single individual or body in whom or in which absolute power was vested. For the purposes of convenient classification, the attribution of dictatorial tendencies (on the lines of the Nazi model) to the Japanese government, was to be commended. Newspapermen in despatching their stories from Tokyo could not possibly be accused of erroneously applying the word 'dictatorship' to the Japanese methods of administration. But the fact remained that an appreciation of subtle distinctions in these matters could not overlook such over-simplifications. It must recognise that the Japanese government was a peculiar hybrid, confounding all political orthodoxies and defying the customary terms of definition. Such terms as 'fascism', 'dictatorship', 'militarism', though applicable yet provoke a certain sense of jarring inconclusiveness. They are recognised for what they are—terms borrowed from European patterns of political government, which have no inherent relationship with the underlying realities upon which Japan's government was founded.

In order to obviate confusion, it is best to define the term 'government' as used in describing the pattern of Japanese administration. By 'government' we under-

stand not so much a formal machinery of administration modelled upon patterns and structures imported from Europe by the Japanese, not so much administration moulded by the terms of the formal constitution, but the aggregate of those vast underlying forces and influences which co-operate in imparting form and substance to the political rule of the country. To declare that the military was in power was a puerile simplification which was not only not descriptive of the real state of affairs, but was palpably erroneous. Unlike Germany and Italy, where the whims and desires of a single individual are to be identified with the country's policy, in Japan there was no dictator and no dictatorial body. There was a diffusion of power among certain major component parts of the body politic, but their respective influences interacted and constituted a pattern of shifting forces within the body itself. The disposition of power among the various groups was therefore extremely fluid and unpredictable, and though internal friction and dissension among them evidently existed, they were not such as to threaten the unity of the body politic as a single administrative machine. While the Japanese government was characterised by unity, it lacked coherence. It was like the various component groups which in aggregate constitute the government, and to pieces of a jig-saw puzzle which being jumbled together in a box retains unity but lacks coherence. This realisation which sensed the presence of unity and yet was not blind to dissensions among groups the precise inter-relationships of which were vague and amorphous, was a source of constant bewilderment to foreign observers. It was in trying to ascertain the nature of relationships between the body politic and each specific group, and among the groups themselves, that we were able to grasp the realities underlying Japanese government. The façade of electoral government and democratic institutions, which Japan had adopted from Western countries, were no more than a coverlet under which a peculiarly and typically Japanese form of administration was functioning, and it was only in so far as we were able to claim familiarity with the terms of its functioning, that we might have justifiably con-

ceived with some measure of veracity, the future course of the war in the Pacific and the policy which would continue to inspire the Japanese nation.... We need hardly labour the point that our neglect—bordering almost on disrespectful negligence—of the foundations of Japanese politics, thought and culture, had caused us to enter into a war with a people and nation of which we knew nothing. Chinese philosophy has adjured us to understand the enemy, and it is probable that the Japanese are better understood by the Chinese than by the nationals of any other country—a fact to which we may partly attribute China's successful resistance to the invader. This is a point, however, which is appropriately considered later when we shall contrive to plot the future course of this strange and eventful drama of the East.

The Japanese government then, consisted of several groups all of which possessed certain measures of power according to the circumstances of the political situation, and none of which was supreme in a manner that is suggestive of dictatorial government. They were all interdependent, and though the body-politic which they comprised was constantly featured with internal dissensions and strifes, there was never an absolute collapse of the administrative machine, and none of the groups suffered eclipse or 'liquidation'. There was thus a constant balance of power, a balance which was at the best precarious, and at the worst provocative of sharp dissension among the various groups. Yet though lacking cohesion, their unity was never impaired, this almost paradoxical situation being due to the one constant factor in Japanese government—the person of the divine Emperor. He was the reservoir of all power, and theoretically the supreme ruler of the land in virtue of his descent from the Sun-goddess. He was the embodiment of power, the source from which his administrators derived justification for their actions. Only the dictates of political manoeuvrings and expediency and those of the prevailing political situation both national and international, governed the apportionment of power among the various groups. Periods of civilian government, seemingly democratic, were therefore punc-

tuated by periods of militaristic authoritarianism. One was never certain whether one was living in a country which aspired to democracy, plutocracy, aristocracy, theocracy or any other 'acy' with which the student of political theory may be familiar. There was constant conation—striving, hoping, manoeuvring—within the body politic, so that one was above all aware of a sense of critical uncertainty which was nerve-shattering and agonising to those who were unable to bear the strain. It was for this reason that Tokyo was regarded by American editors to have been one of the best training grounds for the foreign correspondent. A dose of Tokyo politics was enough to sober the most liquor-addicted newspapermen whom civilisation has so far evolved. One was vaguely aware that one was sitting on a smouldering explosive which might develop at the slightest provocation into the proportions of a volcano.

What precisely then were the various groups which were also the integral parts of the Japanese government? And what, as far as we are able to ascertain, were the relationships which governed their common co-operative endeavour?

THE EMPEROR AND THE COURT

The Emperor was pre-eminently the repository of power in its unapplied and raw condition. From his person flowed the power and justification with which prerogatives the various groups contrived to govern the country. He transcended all his subjects and was responsible only to his ancestors. Yet he was again not absolute; he was also subject to the limitation which a system of diffused delegation of power necessarily imposed. Although he appointed the Prime Minister the latter was recommended to him by advisers who comprised what might conveniently be termed the court group. This was a procedure which was sanctioned by custom and tradition against which, be

it noted, even the brute force of the military could not contend. But members of the court group—the Emperor's closest and personal advisers—were not selected by the Emperor but by those who had been traditionally provided to do so. Again the Emperor was not responsible for the acts of his individual ministers though he was always conscious of his duty towards his ancestors—a duty which involved the desire to maintain his reign in conditions of prosperity and national development. Around him revolved two major groups, the army and the navy, representatives of which enjoyed direct access to the person of the Emperor to whom they were solely responsible. A great measure of the power personified in the Emperor was directly, by tradition, delegated to the army and navy chiefs whose major duty was the defence of the country and in whose sphere of work the Prime Minister was not permitted to interfere. Thus the army and navy chiefs and the Prime Minister were the permanent categories into which power flowed from the Emperor, but there was nothing to prevent other minor groups claiming to operate in the name of the Emperor, and deriving justification and energy from his holy and divine person. Though propaganda manufactured for the consumption of the masses, hardly appreciates the distinction between the Emperor and his ministers, the belief has never wholly been abandoned that he was and is and continues to be a man of peace. His inability to interfere in the various policies which the groups within the political cell followed was no personal limitation of his own; he could not contend against influences which were not to be contended with. Besides his role was not in the dust and commotion of diurnal politics. If he was anything more than a figure-head and a reservoir of power, he was a factor which wielded a tempering effect on the more precipitate inclinations of his subordinates.

In the final analysis, it is obvious that the Emperor was nothing more effective than a figurehead or puppet, and he has therefore been represented as such by most writers on the subject. Yet as the repository of traditional power and as a symbol which was the embodiment of all that was

cautious and conservative and moderate, the Emperor's role as a tempering influence could not be ignored. Though the nation's policies were not initiated by him, he cast a subtle influence indirectly upon those that had been evolved by the various groups by which he was surrounded. Within this limited range the Emperor and his group of advisers contrived to impose some semblance of control upon the various component parts of the body politic, but a determined attitude adopted by the latter was more than sufficient to offset the influence of the Emperor and his court. This complexity of interaction, and pattern of conflicting influences were in a state of constant fluidity, and it is therefore futile to inquire into the specific source of any specific policy, or to ascertain its chief advocates. . . .

Surrounded by his group of court advisers the Emperor played a subtle and unobtrusive part in the government of his country. When he ascended the throne he was known to be a man of peace and desired above all to direct his country through the turbulent periods ahead into paths of peace and prosperity. There is no reason to accept the view that Emperor Hirohito had been transformed into a ranting war-lord. In September 1940, when the projected Axis pact with Germany and Italy was hanging in the balance, the meeting before the throne at which the momentous decision was to be made was prolonged over a period of three hours. Customarily these formal conferences were brief, and required merely the sanction of the Emperor in the form of the Imperial Seal, but the proposal that Japan should enter into a pact with Germany and Italy was one which the Emperor and a few navy leaders could not easily accept. Serious objections were said to have been raised but the influence of the military was overwhelming, and the only alternative to aggression abroad was trouble at home. . . .

The Emperor's court advisers consisted of carefully chosen officials who were selected by the Prime Minister of the day but were thenceforward permanent and irremovable except by the 'expedient' of assassination failing which

the Emperor was able to bring about their dismissal. It is significant that the four official advisers to the Emperor were the only high-ranking liberals in the official government of Japan—the Lord Keeper of the Imperial Seals, the Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Chamberlain, and the Grand Master of Ceremonies. The court group and the Emperor were mutually reflective of that sentiment of moderation and anti-militarism which is characteristic of them both. The unity of this group was obviously founded on the common responsibility of its members toward the Emperor whose only contact with the political world, national or international, was by means of his advisers. The latter had never been on a footing of amity with the fighting services, though their comparatively high official standing had not always saved them from the assassin's bullet. During the notorious February 26th incident when the younger military set attempted a coup in Tokyo, the then Lord Keeper, Count Makino, and Prince Saionji, the last of the Elder Statesmen or Genro, were attacked but managed to escape without suffering any injuries. The fact that they were the closest advisers and confidants of the Emperor failed to impress itself upon the military mind. No figure in the Japanese political world, with the exception of the Emperor, could consider himself safe while the various patriotic societies and political organisations were in existence. They constituted a powerful influence operating in the background and generally functioned in consonance with the established policy of the military.

The remarkably varied hierarchy of political hues and tendencies is brought into prominence when the dignified liberalism of the court group is contrasted with the fanaticism of the assassins' dens masquerading under the name of patriotic societies, and when the statesmanship of civilian cabinet ministers is weighed in the balance against the vitriolic army and navy chiefs. The court group was therefore composed of men who represented the last remaining strains of liberalism in Japan—men who had struggled for long to restrain the precipitate flamboyance of the military, but who were compelled by circumstances over

which they had no control to acquiesce in the inevitable. Marquis Koichi Kido and Tsuneo Matsudaira occupied the two key-posts of the Lord Keeper and Imperial Household Minister respectively, and it is significant that the military had been contriving strenuously through every means they were able to command to effect the displacement of Tsuneo Matsudaira. The then Minister of the Imperial Household was former ambassador to Washington and London—a fact which immediately caused hostile reaction from the fighting services; as the father of Princess Chichibu and therefore being related to the Imperial family, Matsudaira's position had been ensured, and the military had been compelled to tolerate his influence in patience. As the holder of the Imperial Seal and Seal of State, the Lord Keeper's position was one to which were affixed extremely heavy responsibilities. The seal was, in Japan, the only legal signature, and the Emperor's seal was essential as betokening Imperial assent to any law or ordinance. The official duties of the Minister of the Household included the administration of the vast Imperial estates and the management of Palace affairs. The Grand Chamberlain though titular head of the Palace staff played a more influential role in his advisory capacity to the Emperor than was superficially apparent. There is sufficient evidence of his undoubted importance by the mere fact that the February 26th revolvers flattered him by their aggressive attention. The various 'patriotic' societies which in aggregate constituted a force of considerable political strength, had never succeeded in establishing amicable relations with the Emperor's court advisers. It was therefore understandable that since 1931 when the Manchurian affair turned out favourably for the military clique in Japan, these societies of which the Black Dragon was the most notorious body launched a campaign of vituperative abuse against 'statesmen close to the throne'. Young military officers and orators mobilised from these societies of fanaticism publicly denounced the Emperor's closest advisers as traitors to the cause of the nation, and declared that the Emperor was being misguided by his advisers. As the February 26th incident showed the

Emperor's court advisers were in positions of deadly peril and it was to their credit that till the last they had contrived to deflect the course of events from the disaster of war. . . . But their influence was of a negative quality; all they were able to do was to postpone the evil day.

The signing of the Axis pact in September 1940 effectively brought speculation regarding Japan's neutrality to an end, for the terms of the agreement, though ambiguous, indicated that Japan had thrown in her lot with the Axis nations, and that it would be a matter of time before action would follow to suit the words. . . . Fifteen months elapsed before such action was resorted to by the Japanese—fifteen months of excruciating anxiety and vacillating indecision of the most agonising and tantalising nature. It was plainly observable that the governmental hive was in ferment. The army, navy, the Emperor and his court group, the cabinet, the patriotic societies and the various mysterious individuals who functioned as advisers to these bodies were pulsating with activity, and it was felt that a crisis was impending. . . . Yet Japan continued to sit on the fence and maintain a precarious 'neutrality'. Sections of the press, representing that class of Japanese society which continuously clamours for action, was vociferously demanding 'a determined policy' in the Southern Pacific. Agitations in favour of war were generated by jingoistic elements, and predictions by enlightened members (stimulated no doubt by the usual sixth) of the foreign correspondents corps in Tokyo placed Japanese invasions of Siberia and the Dutch East Indies as 'certain' within the following few weeks. And indeed it cannot be denied, as we study that hellish period of harrowing anxiety in retrospect, that the fluidity of the governmental pattern in those days was extreme, and the uncertainty thus evoked created the impression that a dramatic aggressive move was always imminent. . . .

Within the body politic there were forces which were still, at that late hour, struggling for peace in the Pacific, there were still elements which, cautious and calculating,

realised the perils which a war in the Pacific would involve. They were desperately striving to avert the oncoming catastrophe; they were playing for time with all the frantic anxiety of those who know themselves to be fighting for a cause that had all but been lost. . . . Politically, the matter reached a stage of finality with the signing of the pact with Germany and Italy, while militarily and navally, preparations were feverishly afoot.

The navy group though not predominantly evident in the political arena had nevertheless wielded considerable influence in matters of war and political possibilities of war. A most superficial scrutiny of the scope of the Pacific war discloses that it was the naval mind rather than that of the military which was the source of the enemy's grand strategy of campaign. The navy was unostentatious, silent and unassuming and extremely un-Nazi; it was less flamboyant, more calculating, more likeable, and characterised by a broadminded toleration which differentiated it sharply from the other fighting services of Japan. Though not less disposed to aggression, the navy group tended to be conservative and steady—a service on which the nation might depend during a period of crisis. When military revolvers occupied the streets of Tokyo, the navy sent ships to steam into Tokyo Bay, while navy blue-jackets, not soldiers, stood on guard outside the various government buildings. . . . When the revolt had dragged on for several hours, the Admiral in command sent word threatening to blast the rebels out of their positions.

When the final decision was made before Pearl Harbour, the navy's consent was solicited as anxiously as the Emperor's seal was sought after by the militarists (assuming that they ever did obtain it). When the Emperor reconciled himself to the inevitability of the conflict, his first duty would be to receive definite assurances from the navy chiefs that the navy was capable of waging the projected campaign to a successful conclusion. Without such assurances the Emperor would not willingly

yield to the pressure of the militarists, while the navy itself would not permit itself to be subjected to the hustling methods of the military. There was no love lost between the two services. . . . To illustrate when Admiral Yonai, a typical navy conservative, was called upon by the Emperor to form a cabinet, the army minister was summoned to the Palace and expressly ordered by the Emperor to co-operate with the Prime Minister. Significantly enough Yonai's government lasted for six months, and its downfall was caused by the action of the War Minister in presenting a memorandum to the Prime Minister urging that the nation required internal strengthening and a complete reorientation of foreign policy. It is of even greater significance that a plot against the Yonai government similar to that which had erupted into prominence on February 26th, 1936, was fortunately uncovered and promptly brought under control.

Though the ranks of the navy were thus not without liberal and conservative elements, it is erroneous to identify the possession of these attributes by this service with tendencies toward pro-Britishism in the slightest degree or indeed of pro-Americanism. The Japanese navy was a hard, realistic and determined service which had for long reconciled itself to the inevitability of a clash with the Anglo-American navies in the Pacific. The ratio of 5-5-3 which was decided at the Washington Conference was rankling in the hearts of young naval officers who were eager to display before the world the capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy. . . . It was considerably less expressive than the army, but it was no less addicted to the policy of southward expansion especially at the expense of the Anglo-American countries. If the army's expansionist programmes had not coincided with this prevalent mood in the navy, the latter would have withheld its support from any policy leading ultimately to the precipitation of Japan into the war. The navy however was willing to co-operate, especially in the South Seas, but it would be a party to such an enterprise only on its own terms.

While the army had been dabbling in political contro-

versies, laboriously clearing the way for the establishment of conditions favourable for the final 'show-down,' the navy silently but doggedly occupied itself with its preparations. Upon its shoulders it realised would devolve the main brunt of the pressure. The navy prepared on the basis of a realistic consideration of the facts and not on the basis of dreams such as that on which the power-drunk militarists might feed. The navy would not agree to render co-operative assistance unless and until it had prepared to the last detail, unless and until plans had been prepared to meet every possible contingency, unless and until every detail of the defensive structure had been carefully supervised. It would not be rushed—least of all by the impatient army, and it would not willingly allow the Army Command to interfere in matters that were predominantly naval.

The Japanese Naval Board consisted of a body of men who could not be more coldly self-seeking, calculating and scientifically thorough than they were during the last war. It was not inspired by vague thoughts of Japan's divine superiority;—that was soothing dope served out to the masses. Japan's little navy officers were capable of realising the realities against which they were contending, and of the difficulties which lay in their path. They were not of the nature to commit themselves to belligerent action without the precaution of coldly weighing the chances and convincing their analytical minds of the certainty of their advantages.... It has been estimated that only the conviction of the Japanese Naval Board in Tokyo that Japan's resources and strategic advantages were such as to favour a 75 per cent. victory, could have effectively brought the navy to participate in the most adventurous and perilous venture which Japan had undertaken. During the four years of war against China the navy was maintained on a war footing, it trained its fliers in China, but unlike the army it did not lose face. The army no doubt was also playing ball in China, sending fourth-rate troops, training them, and then withdrawing them for use in the greater fray to come.... This was the technique adopted by both services,—a technique

which served not only to impart realistic training to raw recruits but to throw dust into the world's eyes. Observers in China drew conclusions which were wide of the mark....

The navy's consent to participate in the Southern Seas venture was not the result of a flamboyant confidence in its strength and an underestimation of the Allied powers, but of a calm and realistic survey of the factors bearing upon the calculation. The whole course of the venture would have been mapped out, plotted out and thrashed out, every detail conceivable would have been foreseen and measures adopted accordingly. The General Staff realised that Japan was committing itself to a gigantic gamble, but it was determined to ensure that as many of the factors and advantages would be on their side before the first move.... When Pearl Harbour came, the Japanese Naval Staff was convinced that sufficient quantities of necessary war materials (scrap iron, oil, etc.) had been stocked, and that the ships, planes and men were in a condition numerically and qualitatively to withstand the strain that would be imposed on them. Such a conviction would not be an idle one; it would be based on a calculating study of realities and a conservative estimate of Japan's capabilities.

This survey of the application of the Japanese naval mind to the practical problems of war is illustrative of the psychological factors against which we were compelled to contend in the late struggle of the Pacific. The average Japanese naval officer presented a contrast to his colleague in the army in a manner that was startling and illuminating. The former was as likeable as the latter was hateable, and it was not merely the universal stamp of the sea that constituted the difference. The army had been based on German models and was indoctrinated with the virus of Nazism; its officers were walking embodiments of puissant Prussianism and were often a problem to foreign hosts and hostesses. Japanese naval officers, in refreshing contrast to this extreme fanaticism, manifested more human qualities, being more clubbable, easy and amiable

in the company of foreigners. They had seen the world beyond Japan and realised the necessity of co-operative internationalism; they possessed a greater and broader toleration and revealed evidence of their original British training. Frank in all matters other than those pertaining to naval affairs, broadminded and perfectly natural, Japanese naval officers had invariably been the favourites of diplomatic ladies in Tokyo. Yet it requires to be realised that these were the specific qualities which transformed the naval mind into a formidable and ruthless enemy, with all the concentrated strength of broadminded intelligence. It was rankling with the bitter realisation that Japan's navy was being compelled to remain inferior to the forces maintained by the British and Americans. But unlike the army the Japanese navy refrained from indulging in fanatical diatribes, and silently but determinedly concentrated itself on the task of self-development. To what degree it had developed, and what its ratio was to the fleets of the British and American powers, was a field of inquiry into which it is futile to venture. But it was the naval mind which was directing the moves on the Pacific chess-board, and it is to be admitted that that was a formidable realisation.

Being temperamentally so divergent in outlook, the navy and army had never been able to establish amicable relationships, and the consequent friction between the two services had been a constant source of anxiety for the Japanese body politic. But the mutual realisation of their common inter-dependence had resulted in a measure of co-operation sufficient to ensure successful operations. It is known however that in the occupation of parts of China, differences arose between the two services in regard to their respective rights of authority within the specified area. Often conflicting orders were issued by the army and naval authorities, and sharp clashes were unavoidable under such circumstances. Open dissension, however, was rarely encountered, for the paramount necessity of unity in the attainment of a common end was not absent from the minds of the army and navy chiefs, and there had been generated, more a

mutual attitude of contempt rather than that of hostility. The difference between the two was one of infinite gradations, and the Japanese tendency to avoid sharp breaks by effecting a compromise between the seemingly irreconcilable had been mainly responsible for the uncertain partnership that exists between the two services.

The army's political activities had been more apparent than real, and though its contention that it was independent of politics could not be accepted on its face value, the army's participation in political matters had been confined to furthering the interests of the militarists at the expense of the nation. The militarists had never wholly rid themselves of a profound admiration for the German war machine and though the period following the First Great War was one of extensive liberalism and constitutional statesmanship, a lurking respect for the German brand of militarism was inherent in the Japanese body politic. The rise of the industrialist and capitalist class and the harrowing conditions of Japanese peasantry, from whom the militarists mostly arose, brought about conditions in which Fascist seeds took easy root. The military could not but compare their sorry lot with the honour and respect that had been the due of the warrior class in old Japan; they felt that capitalist industrialism was not only depriving them of their rightful place in the nation, but was economically strangling the country. Democratic procedure, imported from Europe and though adapted to Japanese requirements, was an outmoded machine, wholly unsuited to the spirit of the times. Urgent decisions required to be made and made promptly, and the farce of democratic shop-talk was regarded with impatience and irritation. General Tojo expressed this attitude with precision when he declared: 'There is no use arguing. Put your decisions immediately into practice. If employees of any bureau cannot reach a decision, let the director decide. If he cannot, then let me do so. I can assure you that I will lose no time in deciding.'

Bitingly scornful of what they were pleased to term

the decadence of democracy, the militarists have not hesitated to advocate openly the adaptation by Japan of the totalitarian structure (as she really did in fact later). Since 1931 when their coup in Manchuria was successfully organised, their prestige at home rose rapidly, and they were not slow to exploit the advantages thus coming to them. Not a few of the older liberal statesmen and industrialists were complacently of the opinion that these military fireworks were to be identified with the inevitable exuberance of the young and that in the course of time they would suffer eclipse. This woeful misconception was paralleled only by the lethargic indifference of the democracies which had committed themselves theoretically to the policy of collective security. The military moreover were able to capture the imagination of the masses; it was able to feed them with stories of the 'inevitable' destinies of Japan and of its divine mission on the continent As though indicative of their expanding power the first military revolt occurred almost immediately following the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, while a second uprising, resulting in the assassination of Premier Inukai, occurred in May of the same year. The era of terrorism and assassination was then introduced and politics as an argumentative and persuasive force wholly divorced from the rude barbarism of military coercion was no more. The rise of the Japanese militarists was comparatively a recent occurrence, and previous to the Manchurian venture the military were a minor group within the Japanese body politic. It is a mistake to assume, as is so often done, the Japanese are by immutable nature a militaristic race or nation. As our survey of Japanese history in the first sections of this book has clearly revealed, there are no extant records of organised foreign conquest until approximately fifty years ago, and it is obviously not an act peculiar to a militaristic people to confine themselves in seclusion within their islands and develop a way of life which concerned itself with little things and made them things of beauty and was extraordinarily charming. Japanese history embraces startling contradictions which cannot be reconciled, if

indeed, they require any such reconciliation. It is justifiable to conclude that the rise of the Japanese military was not so much a manifestation of peculiarities inherent in the Japanese character, as the inevitable result of certain economic and social conditions prevalent in Japanese society. Nor can the matter be considered in isolation as purely a Japanese phenomenon; it was no coincidence that the establishment of totalitarian structures in Europe was paralleled in Japan with the steady diffusion of the militaristic doctrine of the fascist army group. The latter was bemused with the conception of a fascist totalitarian structure peculiar to Japan, and by means of which a 'Showa Restoration' could be effected. It was never explicitly explained what this restoration was expected to achieve, but one gained the impression that Japan had tired of Western ways, and that the discovery had been made that the said ways were not suited to Japan which had strayed from the path originally ordained by the gods.... Japan was therefore to be restored to the way of the gods, the Imperial Way, which would lead to prosperity and happiness. In imbibing Occidentalism, Japan had erred grievously, and it was urgent that it should abandon the dissolute habits which she had acquired and contrive to forge her way back to the path that would lead her to the cultivation of the Orientalism in which lay tranquillity and prosperity. Such was the fantastic credo enunciated by the military fascists, and such the methods whereby the youth of the nation were instigated into an unthinking acceptance of the nationalistic militarism which was being skilfully generated throughout the country.

Groups other than the military within the Japanese body politic had singularly failed to realise the extent to which the military were capable of going to achieve their fantastic and fanatical ambitions. Certain it is that the liberals and democratically inclined monstrously underestimated the menace of the militarists since the Manchurian incident. They all wished for peace in their time, and members of the Emperor's court group, whenever confronted with possible trouble at home, permitted the

militarist hot-heads to expend their useless energies in conquest abroad. Conversely we may note in exoneration that the army received the mass support of the nation, and especially of the youths who were ever willing to revolt against their elders, in the name of 'progress' and 'new orders'; liberal sentiments and democratic procedures which had never been deep-rooted in Japanese political soil, were feeble and not powerful enough to counteract the spreading virus of fascism. . . .

It was a doctrine characteristic of narrow minds narrowly educated. It was characteristic of the mannerless revolt of the peasantry from whose ranks the military were recruited. It had nothing of the quiet dignity with which the Japanese Naval Board was conducting the campaign over the vast expanse of the Pacific. . . . Twenty years ago the military was controlled by the Elder Statesmen or *Genro*, a powerful group in an advisory capacity to the Emperor; with the rise of the German state and the establishment of the Nazi and Fascist regimes, economic and social conditions encouraged the development of a malignant militarism. Restraining forces were weakened and enfeebled, and militarism suddenly enjoyed a new-found freedom. It promptly ran amuck in 1931, and had been doing so since. . . . The army was indeed the most troublesome group in the body politic and it was the most dangerous, but the assumption that it was omnipotent must be appropriately qualified. The Japanese political system regarded with disfavour the precipitation into prominence of any single group or person; it was a co-operative and co-ordinating body and as such did not facilitate any dictatorial dominance. It was characterised by extreme fluidity and its baffling uncertainties were features with which the newspaperman in Tokyo was made familiar within a week of his taking up his assignment at this nerve-centre of Japan's political world. Especially were we all conscious of this fluidity during the crucial fifteen months during which Japan continued to sit on the fence following her handclasp with the Italian and German nations. The air was thick with predictions, and the press was seething with ominous threats and rumblings, while the

political arena was a confusion of belated activity.... Japanese statesmen continued to issue their enigmatic statements regarding the 'immutable' policy of the Japanese government. Expressions of hope from the liberals were punctuated with blood-curdling diatribes from the militarists and members of the various 'patriotic' societies. All Japan held its breath in anguish whenever the news-boys were heard approaching in the distance, their bells clanging with a note of increased urgency (Japanese news-boys have bells tied behind them, so that in issuing extras, they run through the streets attracting immediate attention). There was hardly a day during those fifteen months when the Japanese government need not have made its fateful decision, and yet exasperating silence was maintained while the hive buzzed and buzzed and we felt in our bones that the zero hour was approaching. The governmental hive was not occupied with the question of war or no war; it was too late in the day to consider that aspect of the matter. The signing of the tripartite pact had been preceded by an Imperial Conference—the seventh of its kind in the history of Japan. There the controversy had raged between the liberals and the Emperor on the one side and the so-called progressives and the militarists on the other, resulting in the victory of the latter. This had committed Japan to aggression. The fact that the confused buzzing continued within the governmental hive was due to the fact that 'der tag' had not been decided upon—the liberals advocated postponement of the evil day, meanwhile hoping that a change in the international situation would result in the abandonment of a belligerent policy; the militarists were impatient, especially when they realised that a golden chance was missed during the summer of 1940 following Dunkirk when the British Empire seemed to be on the verge of immediate collapse. For fifteen months the controversy raged. Possibly the Naval Board was not absolutely satisfied.... Nevertheless the liberals maintained a restraining influence to the last. Matters came to a head, the Konoye cabinet collapsed, and General Tojo, military firebrand *par excellence*, assumed premiership.

Those who appreciated the significance of these developments and had felt the reverberations of the internal dissensions which had been wracking the Japanese body politic with pain, realised that victory lay with the military, and that the establishment of the Tojo government indicated 'der tag' not many weeks hence. Three weeks later came Pearl Harbour, and the Pacific blazed with the fury for which Japan had prepared so long and which we had feared and striven so hard and valiantly to avoid

For the last decade Prime Ministers have been appointed solely on the basis of the hope that they might be able to control the military—a futile and pathetic hope, for when once they were launched on the road to foreign conquest and territorial expansion, mere words and gestures of protest were not only ineffective but provoked increased belligerency on the part of the military. The latter grew audacious as it perceived that the forces which were ranged against it were not united on a common front, both at home and abroad. For a short time while the forces of restraint and cautious conservatism continued to operate, the Emperor and his court group possessed co-operative powers without which the military would be placed in an embarrassed position. The extremely fluid pattern of Japanese government therefore remained intact. The Emperor and his court group, the army and navy, the cabinet and the various 'patriotic' societies buzzed in unison when the nation was confronted with a crisis and the various component parts of the government were not of one mind regarding the country's policy.

The predominant characteristic of this pattern of government was its reliance on compromise and the reconciliation of what may superficially appear to be irreconcilable. The various groups with its varying meeds of power derived from the figurehead of the government, the Emperor, strove for the supreme advantage of having their respective policies adopted by the government. The establishment of a cabinet in a manner such as to gratify the various contending parties was an extremely difficult

task. Cabinets therefore changed with bewildering rapidity during critical periods, when the pressure of the military was overwhelming. The latter whenever dissatisfied, were able to resort to the constitutional expedient of refusing to appoint a War Minister or to command the existing War Minister to resign, thus compelling the cabinet to resign *en bloc*. A Prime Minister of whom they did not approve was thus confronted with an impossible task if his relations with the military were not co-operative. In an atmosphere of compromise, a determined group would ultimately succeed in having its way with little or no opposition. That was the realisation which had been the motive force behind the military fascist movement the leaders of which appreciated that the liberal and conservative elements when confronted with trouble at home shrank from such a prospect and willingly surrendered to those with a positive and virile outlook. . . . Thus the February 26th incident in common with all other military revolts, though ostensibly abortive, culminated in a compromise which left the fascist military in positions of increased power.

It was only after much shifting of ground, much shilly-shallying and internal dissension that the liberal forces finally gave way to the progressives, and the suspense that was generated during this period of seething and mounting political friction was electrified with critical anxiety. Prince Konoye, the compromiser *par excellence*, contrived till the last to bargain with the military and appease them and persuade them to forsake the war-path. He cultivated what came to be known in Tokyo newspaper parlance as the 'diplomatic cold' which necessitated his confinement at home. These periodic colds were a feature of the political scene whenever the nation was confronted with an internal or external crisis and the various powers within the government were unable to effect an agreement. As a member of a distinguished family and of the Japanese aristocracy, Prince Konoye pursued a uniformly moderate course maintaining friendly contacts with the military, championing the cause of the poor, and yet seeking to restrain any movement which might cause

internal dissension. When the Axis pact was signed, it was related that Prince Konoye broke into tears of emotion and drank the toast to the new alliance in 'deadly silence.' To this day it is a matter of speculation whether they were tears of joy or sorrow. . . .

Prince Konoye's diplomatic colds have been the most enigmatic feature of his secluded political life, and they are of interest and value to us in so far as they cast an interesting light on the methods of Japanese government. Periods of political crisis when Konoye's restraining influences were being thrown in against the 'progressives' were marked with the 'colds' which Konoye affected to indicate his disapproval in a discreet manner befitting the ways of an aristocrat. Almost immediately following his assumption of the premiership for the first time in June 1937, Japan was confronted with a war in China where the militarists had been straining at their leashes ever since the successful accomplishment of the Manchurian coup. It has rightly been surmised that Konoye could not have foreseen this second conflict with China, and his confident assumption of the premiership while the country was approaching the critical hour in China, has been attributed to his ignorance of the fact that the militarists had set the stage for the second act on the continent. So soon as he grasped the significance of the buzzing that ensued within the governmental hive, he forthwith retired with a 'cold.' It was a Japanese aristocratic version of the biblical washing of the hands. . . .

Subsequently the fall of Hanchow into Japanese hands marked the end of the first military phase of the China incident and provoked the controversy as to whether or not the Japanese forces should penetrate to Chungking. Konoye was determinedly opposed to extended military operations, and the controversy raged furiously and rapidly. Immediately it was known in the morning's press that Prince Konoye was 'indisposed.' Those who were able to interpret these portents for what they were, realised that the governmental hive was active again. The most notorious and significant instance of

Konoye's periodic indispositions was during the early months of 1938 when the National Mobilisation Bill (the significance of which can now be fully appreciated) was before the Diet. This Bill provided the government with almost unlimited powers, approximating to absolute dictatorship. Prince Konoye had contrived to defend constitutional government and was violently opposed to any pattern of government suggestive of the Fascist and Nazi regimes. . . . The military however had unreservedly urged the passage of the Bill, but in the absence of Prince Konoye the Premier, the prospect of a government defeat at the Lower House was not impossible. The debate was being waged with might and main, and it was not long before members of the government realised that the defence and passage of the Bill could be effected only by the personal intervention of Prince Konoye himself. They accordingly urged the latter to forsake his bed and assist the cabinet through the crisis. . . . Konoye was reluctant and indeed indifferent, but he was a man of peace, a compromiser, who shunned disputes and dissensions and internal political schisms. At the eleventh hour, when his government was on the verge of collapse, he entered the Lower House and urged the passage of the Bill, assuring Diet members that the powers which accrued to the government would be used in the interests of the country and that they would not be abused in the manner of the fascist dictatorships. Diet members were satisfied. They believed Prince Konoye, as they would have believed no one.

During the fifteen months of sitting on the fence, Japan was more than once on the verge of precipitate action, and the governmental hive was therefore in a continuous state of turmoil and confusion. Konoye and his colds and indispositions were a constant feature of the political scene, functioning in the nature of a political thermometer of which foreign correspondents made unreserved use. In 1940 especially the atmosphere was indisputably tense, and the governmental hive was buzzing with particular intensity, the bone of contention being Japan's policy toward the Dutch East Indies. The pro-

gressive and militaristic groups advocated instant action, while the restraining influences urged that negotiations for economic privileges would be not only safer but would pave the way for improved commercial and economic ties. Konoye supported the moderates and resorted to his bed.... And the moderates emerged temporarily victorious.

Konoye's capacity for compromise and assuming diplomatic colds at the critical moment was especially evident during his preoccupation with the establishment of the New Political Structure—a totalitarian machine to which Konoye had agreed at the behest and pressure of the military fascists. Such difficulties and obstacles as were confronted in the course of Konoye's directorship of the New Structure with groups and parties that could not reconcile themselves to the provisions of the totalitarian scheme, afforded much scope for Konoye's colds and indispositions by means of which he cajoled the various contending group parties into some measure of agreement and compromise. It was indeed in this capacity for effecting compromise that Konoye's political power lay, and it was in so far as he could urge the liberal elements within Japan's body politic to reconcile themselves to the inevitability of military fascism that he was of value to the latter. Prince Konoye could not identify himself with any one group; he was, as befits a compromiser, independent in his outlook. Yet he was an assured moderate and liberal who was compelled by circumstances beyond his control to adopt a policy of appeasement toward the progressive militarists who were more than willing to create trouble at home if their wishes were not complied with.... He was thus concerned not so much to defend the last ramparts of liberalism in Japan, as to steer the clashing groups into the fields of compromise and play for time and peace while these could be obtained. Retiring to the seclusion of his bed-chamber he would study the raging scene and suggest a compromise which when once accepted, would mark his 'recovery' from the diplomatic cold. The military and liberal groups therefore appreciated his powers and generally resorted to his

bed-chamber whenever they were unable to effect a settlement. They appreciated the fact that Konoye was the only aristocrat diplomat who was capable of retaining the unity of the Japanese body politic by effecting a co-operative compromise among the various contending groups. Although it is to be admitted that Konoye's passion for compromise led him unjustifiably into the hands of the military fascists, and that his policy was founded on appeasement, we must try to appreciate the extent to which the Japanese diplomat, whatever his party or political leanings, views with horror the possibility of an open dissension at home. Faced with the alternative of expansion abroad and dissension at home, the liberals have invariably selected the former, and regrettable though this was for the cause of democracy, the decision was and is perfectly understandable. The limits of Konoye's capacity for compromise were reached when in October 1941 his cabinet resigned *en bloc*, and the military firebrand General Tojo assumed premiership. By this time the military required little in the way of compromise with the various liberal groups that had maintained a feeble resistance. The stage was set, and all opposition to the dominant military group in so far as regards Japan's foreign policy, ceased almost immediately. The rapidity with which the Pacific drama was drawn towards the climax may be adduced from the fact that in slightly over a month's time, the Japanese had launched their grand offensive.

VI

THE YEARS 1939, 1940 AND 1941

STRUGGLE BETWEEN MODERATES AND EXTREMISTS

WITH some knowledge of the workings of the Japanese government, it is possible now to consider the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the war, and describe the critical struggle that ensued within the confines of the Japanese body politic. The period from 1939 till the outbreak of the war has been described as one of the most critical in Pacific history.... So suffused with electrified tensivity was it, that the slightest incident or development in the political scene was immediately charged with significance. It was a restless, turbulent, seething period of unrelieved anxiety....

Much of this anxiety was due to the fact that the nation was unaware of the struggle which was being staged within the government. It was clear that the country was rapidly approaching a crisis, and evidence of this was accumulating thickly. Yet the nature of the crisis and the course of the internal dissension were shrouded in mystery. The Japanese man-in-the-street sensed that restraining forces were struggling with difficulty to curb the flamboyant activities of the military fascists, but he had and still has no conception of the governmental drama that was being staged during those days of vacillating uncertainty.... The Japanese are not given to criticise their betters, and if they suspected that the nation was being driven along the path of destruction and war, leading to Pearl Harbour, it was a suspicion that remained unexpressed. They are moreover extremely susceptible to emotional propaganda, and the doctrine of a 'new order in East Asia' and of Japan's divine mission

in China was received with enthusiasm and puerile credulity.

It was noted that the exigencies of the war in China had resulted in an unprecedented degree of solidarity within the ranks of the government, a solidarity suggestive of and bearing a striking resemblance to a totalitarian structure. On the home front the complete co-ordination of all economic, political and cultural fields of national life was effected. Most significantly indicative of this national co-ordination was the national mobilisation campaign which according to the provisions of Article 1 means 'the control and operation of human and material resources in such a way as to enable the State to give full scope to the efficient use of its strength for the realisation of the purposes of national defence in time of war, including the occasions of incidents or affairs which differ little from war in results, which may not be called a war as a matter of policy, but one which is virtually the same as war.' It was not so much the war with China, but the dominance of the fascist temper of mind and the need for control, which facilitated the emergence of this totalitarian structure. The government was, of course, in possession of dictatorial powers, and it was the skilful, persuasive tactics of Prince Konoye that enabled the government to survive the critical situation in the Diet during the passage of the Bill. And Konoye was acting the role of a compromiser in consonance with his policy of effecting a co-operative understanding between the moderates and liberals on the one part and the military fascists on the other.

In a pamphlet issued by the War Department, it was explained that the Mobilisation Law enabled Japan 'to control and operate her entire personal and national resources to the fullest possible extent, in order to enable her to demonstrate her national power most effectively for her national defence in time of emergency. . . . to supply her army and navy with the vast amount of war materials they require in time of war, to secure smooth economic co-operation for the stability of national life, and at the

same time to demoralise the enemy on the battlefield as well as on the economic and propaganda fronts.' 1938 marked the first major step toward the establishment of a totalitarian structure in Japan. The moderates and potential liberals, though still committed to the thankless task of restraining the military, were already, in the interests of peace and compromise, acceding to the persuasive requests of the military. The latter realising that they could not precipitate matters while the temper of the masses was uncertain, skilfully contrived to rationalise and legalise their actions by using the liberal statesmen as their intermediaries and agents. Prince Konoye had in this manner completely played into the hands of the fascists, and his pathetic little struggles which he maintained till the end are symbolic of the lack of unity and determination which brought about the eclipse of the democratic elements within the Japanese body politic.

Coincident with the emergence of a totalitarian structure, or the basis of it, the function of the various political parties deteriorated into complete subordination to the government. It was claimed that the crisis of the China war necessitated the preservation of unity, and a guarantee by the Minseito and Seiyukai parties that they would support the government through the period of the crisis. The composition of the governmental machine provided for internal dissensions and conflicts but the political parties were regarded with disfavour, as they generated disunity, democratic indecision, and corruption. It is a curious anomaly that while the totalitarian structures as understood in Europe facilitated rapid decisions and forthright actions, the Japanese brand of totalitarianism was afflicted with the essentially Japanese system of group government. Group government is *par excellence* an extremely slow method of government, and sitting on the fence was a feature of the Japanese governmental machinery to which fascist totalitarianism had been compelled to reconcile itself.

Party opposition and politics were therefore considerably curtailed following the application of the

National Mobilisation Law, but they had not suffered the complete eclipse which befell them subsequently, and they yet retained the vigour and individuality to oppose the suggestion of the reactionaries that the parties should be abolished and a single party established at the centre. The fascists were recommending the reformation of the parliamentary system of Japan, evoking considerable criticism and denunciation from the political parties and liberal constitutionalists. The finest display of party opposition was that occurring during the passage of the National Mobilisation Bill, but for all effective purposes party government was impossible under the then existing circumstances, and the Premier's task devolved essentially into one of achieving the greater centralisation of power for the execution of the war in China.

To this end two important committees were created, occupying an extra-legal position in the government—the Five Ministers Committee or Conference, consisting of the Premier, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy and Finance; and the Four Ministers Committee consisting of the Premier, and the Finance, Home and Education Ministers. The first body was concerned with the regulation of matters related to China and foreign policy and the second with problems bearing upon the general mobilisation of the nation. The Five Ministers Committee was the more important of the two, corresponding to the British war cabinet established during the World War for the purpose of co-ordinating the various departments of the government.

No sooner had the establishment of these two new centralised bodies been effected, when the hand of the military was again evident in the extensive reorganisation campaign launched by Prince Konoye by which the cabinet was subjected to an overhaul unprecedented in the history of Japanese home affairs. The net result of this new movement was the inclusion in the cabinet of many military uniforms. Any sense of finality which this reorganisation created was completely nullified by the cabinet crisis provoked by the China Board issue. Early

in the year the plan for the direction of China affairs by a special agent had been considered by the Prime Minister. The Foreign Office promptly registered its opposition to this scheme, Mr. Koki Hirota, the Foreign Minister, claiming that the establishment of such a body could be tolerated only if it were placed under the control and jurisdiction of the Foreign Office.... The resignation of Mr. Hirota and of the subsequent minister, General Ugaki, who as cabinet counsellor had originally supported the establishment of the China Board and who as Foreign Minister opposed it, was reflective of the state of carping nerves into which the various political forces and influences had deteriorated. Both Koki Hirota and General Ugaki, though describable as 'liberals' in inverted commas, were certainly not of the extremist sect, and their opposition to the establishment of the China Board represented the view widely held that the board was a bureaucratic instrument by means of which the army was contriving further to insinuate itself into positions of power within the government. It was contended in reply that the peculiar nature of the relations between Japan and China confounded the orthodox capabilities of the Foreign Office personnel, and that in the cultural, political, and economic spheres an organ like the China Board would be more effective than an agency used for customary diplomatic relations between States. The China Board indicated the desire of the Japanese government to re-orient its relations with China on a basis distinct from that which normally obtains between States. With their peculiar aptitude for vague terminology, the Japanese termed the new Sino-Japanese connections as a 'bloc' relationship, which flavours of the now more familiar co-prosperity doctrine.

Several weeks of indecision and fence-sitting preceded the final establishment of the China Board on December 17th. It was to function independently of the Five Ministers Committee and determine such policies as were connected with the settlement of the China incident. The board consisted of the Premier as president, and the War, Navy, Finance and Foreign Ministers as vice-

presidents, and Lieutenant-General Heisuke Yanagawa as director-general. The activities of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company were placed under the supervision of the board, and the cultural, political, economic and the technological relations between the two countries were included in the province of the new board.

The position of the Foreign Office in this arrangement was clarified by a compromise, whereby relations with powers vis-a-vis China were declared to be the special preserve of the Foreign Office. The establishment of several centralised bodies, and the application of the National Mobilisation Law brought Japan to a shadow of such totalitarianism of which she was capable within the confines of her national political structure. These measures toward centralisation of power and control were a direct consequence of the war in China, and an attempt was made in the form of the China Affairs Board to reorganise Japan's relations with China on a new 'bloc' basis. Such a policy of integration involved the subordination of the various political parties, and although they were yet not completely eclipsed, their influence in the sphere of directive politics was lessened in proportion to the degree of totalitarianism that was infused into the country's political structure. Japan's dominant preoccupation with China and her incursions military and otherwise into that country inevitably led to delicate and complicated entanglements with the various powers possessing 'interests' in the Pacific-China region. Coincident with this clash with foreign interests was the realisation that Great Britain provided the financial basis and encouragement on which the Chungking government founded its resistance to Japanese aggression.... The feeling against Great Britain was intense, while relations with other European democratic powers deteriorated with alarming regularity and finality. Japan's policy in China could not be reconciled with the policies of the various European powers or with the common desire of the latter to respect the integrity of China and to refrain from military and economic activities not conducive to the

welfare of the Chinese people. Diplomatic relations between Japan and China were severed when the 'incident' had swollen to the proportions of a major conflict, the Japanese unequivocally stating that with the occupation by Japanese troops of Nanking, the Chinese government was reduced to the status of a provincial regime.

Throughout the year American, British and French representatives continued to lodge protests at the Japanese Foreign Office on matters affecting their interests in China, but suspicious hostility was unmistakably aroused when on February 5th the American, French and British Ambassadors in Tokyo delivered identical notes to the Japanese government, requesting the immediate clarification of the latter's attitude toward the construction by Japan of capital ships exceeding the 35,000-ton limit imposed by the London Naval Conference of 1936. The Japanese government declared that it could not see its way to disclosing the details of the navy's reconstruction programmes, and that the foreign powers could be assured of Japan's steadfast policy of non-aggression and of its non-deviation from its original resolution not to embark on a naval construction race.

Meanwhile the Japanese press, buttressed by the efforts of the government's propaganda machine, launched a campaign of insinuating anti-Britishism. For reasons which are even now far from clear, the Japanese masses were extremely susceptible to governmental influences calculated to generate anti-British feeling. Such propaganda rang the changes on the central theme that the British were the chief suppliers of arms to the Chiang government, and that the British government was at the very least affording diplomatic support to the Chiang regime. While Britain was by no means the only or the chief supplier of war materials to China, it could not be denied that Hongkong was the main channel through which the supplies were passing into Chinese hands. The critical tone of the British press moreover and the periodical protests lodged at the Japanese Foreign Office by the British Ambassador appeared to impart substance to

the view that Great Britain was intentionally and wilfully obstructing Japanese plans and programmes in China. British complaints that her interests in China were being damaged were lodged in the form of a series of cases for which the British government sought redress and compensation. The delay and diplomatic shilly-shallying in dealing with these cases increased the tension between the two countries, and the realisation that a crisis would be precipitated caused Premier Konoye to reorganise his cabinet. The installation of General Ugaki, a 'moderate', at the Foreign Office paved the way for the Ugaki-Craigie talks in the course of which the Japanese Foreign Minister gave his personal attention to the problems provoked by Anglo-Japanese relations in China. The conflicting theses of the two governments resolved themselves ultimately as the British contention that Japan should fulfil her reiterated assurance that she would not interfere with British rights and interests in China, and as the Japanese contention that British complaints were based on inevitable inconveniences directly resulting from hostilities which were of a temporary character, that it was accordingly in Britain's interest that a speedy conclusion of hostilities should be sought, and that Britain could contribute to such a conclusion and the re-establishment of peace by refraining from rendering assistance to the Chiang government. As though to condition the effectiveness of this argument General Ugaki contrived to deflect temporarily the current of public indignation from Britain to France, but the public unfortunately has never been partial to a volte-face of this kind and General Ugaki was confronted with the accusation from all quarters of political opinion that he was 'truckling to Britain'. His assumption of office coincided with an anti-French campaign in the Japanese press, the gravamen of the various charges being that the French were assisting the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Japan's emphasis on the French aspect of the China question was as much a gesture warning other European powers, as a means to facilitate Anglo-Japanese negotiations. It is an eloquent commentary on the situation that both the Italian and German military

and aviation missions at Hankow were recalled, and the export of German arms to China was directly prohibited.

General Ugaki's sincere hopes for a settlement with the British government evaporated by the time the British, French and American governments delivered identical notes requesting the Japanese authorities to open the Yangtse river to navigation. The establishment of the China Affairs Board to which General Ugaki had registered his protest and the unpromising nature of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations, provoked the Foreign Minister to resign, his successor being Mr. Arita who had formerly been Foreign Minister in the Hirota cabinet which had negotiated the Japan-German Anti-Comintern Pact. The solidification of Japan's relations with China was paralleled in the field of foreign relations vis-a-vis China by an attitude of determined resolution from which Prince Konoye derived the inspiration for his famous statement of Japan's China policy on November 3rd. The Premier declared that Japan 'envisaged a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination among Japan, China and Manchukuo in the political, economic and cultural fields'. China he declared 'had been sacrificed to the imperialistic ambitions of other powers' thus evolving a situation which 'Japan recognises as requiring transformation'.

Previous to this statement the United States government had addressed a note to the Japanese government demanding that discriminatory regulations and actions against American interests and citizens in Japanese occupied territory be discontinued. Although the contents of the note were not made public till the end of October, the Japanese press perhaps on the basis of what cannot but have been more than inkling, launched a vitriolic campaign against the Nine Power Treaty, declaring this document as obsolete and inapplicable to the specific conditions prevalent in East Asia. With the clarification of Japan's policy toward China as enunciated by Prince Konoye the reply to the American note reflected the firm tone of determination which charac-

terised the Premier's statement, and the mounting feeling against the Nine Power Treaty.... It was declared that 'inapplicable ideas and principles of the past' were unhelpful in the 'new situation fast developing in East Asia'. In December the Foreign Minister, Mr. Arita, informed foreign correspondents that the Japanese government considered the Nine Power Treaty as satisfactory in itself but that several of its clauses were inappropriate to conditions in the Far East. This cautious Japanese approach to the final denunciation and wholesale rejection of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty, this faint 'damning' which is typical of the Japanese diplomatic game, mirrored the course of events in Europe during the September crisis. The Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave it as the opinion of his government that the disturbances in Europe were directly due to the instigations of the Comintern and that as Japan considered herself as allied with any anti-communistic bloc, she would be willing to afford Germany and Italy every encouragement and assistance necessary for the counteraction of the Russian menace.... That the Foreign Office required the Germans to interpret this statement as indicating Japan's approval of the Nazi policy toward the Western democracies, was made unequivocally evident by the conclusion of a cultural pact between the two countries on the 18th of November. Commercial agreements with Italy and Germany on a tripartite basis including Manchukuo, and the formal German recognition of the latter State, made possible the greater unification of the anti-Comintern and the anti-democratic bloc.

The fact of the Anti-Comintern Pact generally ensured that Japan's relations with the Soviet Union were extremely delicate though the periodical border clashes were most decidedly not. In spite of the heavy emphasis on anti-communism, the year 1938 was free from any Soviet-Japanese diplomatic clashes which had marred the political landscape in former years. This curious anomaly has been attributed to Japan's closer relations with Germany and Italy not so much as anti-communistic

(though of this there was sufficient evidence) but as anti-democratic. Japan's relations with the democracies vis-à-vis China was deteriorating with regularity and such attempts as that of General Ugaki to readjust the situation served only to accentuate the incompatibility of the Japanese and foreign China policies.

From the standpoint of the military the Soviet-Japanese relations reached a difficult stage when between July 11th and August 10th severe clashes occurred in the neighbourhood of Changkufeng. Heavy firing, and the bombing of Korea by the Russians, threatened to develop the localised incident into a minor battle. Both sides suffered heavy losses, including a large number of tanks and planes, but a truce was called on August 11th, while diplomatic negotiations in Moscow between Ambassador Shigemitsu (now Foreign Minister) and Foreign Commissar Litvinov arranged that Soviet and Japanese forces should remain in such positions as they occupied on the midnight of August 10th. A mixed commission of two Soviet representatives and one Manchurian and one Japanese were nominated for considering the border problem. The Russian suggestion that a neutral arbitrator be present was rejected by the Japanese. The thousands of border clashes that occurred along the Manchukuoan frontiers, though spasmodic and localised, culminated in the Nomonhan battle of September 1939 the results of which immediately sobered the military fascists in Tokyo. It was estimated that Japan lost 17,000 men and an unknown number of tanks and guns during this conflict and it was widely rumoured in Japan (the story leaked out despite strict censorship) that the Japanese military was shocked by the strength and skill displayed by the Soviet forces. The conjecture was made at that time, and lately confirmed by Mr. Joseph E. Davies in his book *'Mission to Moscow'*, that the Japanese had engineered the incident to feel out Soviet power in that region. The results were extremely sobering, and the uncertain peace that prevailed along the Soviet-Manchurian border may be attributed in part to Japan's uneasy realisation and appreciation of Soviet strength.

If the Japanese so desired, there was an annual source of provocation in the November-December fisheries dispute regarding which both the Soviet government and the Japanese authorities created the impression that they were under a mutual obligation to irritate and obstruct each other to the limits of their diplomatic capabilities. Negotiations in regard to this matter were invariably made the basis of anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaigns throughout Japan, but settlements were effected before the issue could develop into serious proportions. Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, unlike those with the United States and Britain which powers she regarded with contempt, were influenced by an attitude of respectful hostility, which was increasingly evident following the Nomonhan battle, and Soviet prowess in the European field of battle.

Broadly the year 1938 was a period of consolidation in regard to Japan's relations with China, and the resolution, unmistakable and unequivocal, that come what may, Japan would not abandon her 'immutable' policy of establishing a new order in China. Her foreign policy was directed toward clarifying this situation, and of convincing the foreign powers that (a) her capacity to overcome the Chinese was undeniable, (b) that her capacity to deal with the Soviet Union, her one serious military rival in the area, was also undeniable, (c) that she was able to dispose of the rights and privileges and interests of foreign powers in China exactly as she saw fit, and that (d) she was willing to solidify her relations with Germany and Italy. (d) was a direct consequence, it will be observed, of the deterioration vis-a-vis China of Japan's relations with the democracies—a deterioration which was subsequently to develop into a complete severance of relations resulting in an armed clash. Inexorable influences and forces seemed to sweep men and states toward chaos and destruction. Since 1931 there was not a single deviation from the path of militaristic fascism which Japan had chosen. Circumstances and events helped every year to facilitate and not hinder the emergence of totalitarianism, and Japan's gradual but certain provocation of Britain and the United

States appeared to be inevitable as her cultivation of closer relations with Italy and Germany in Europe. Somewhere, sometime the die had been cast and the fate of the Pacific had been then sealed; all the frantic gestures and fussy activities of statesmen and politicians and wire-pullers were of no avail, as the various economic, political and psychological forces of which we were at best only faintly aware, bore the Pacific nations and states into war....

THE YEAR 1939

The foundations of a continuous deterioration of relations with the democracies, and a proportionate cultivation of closer ties with the totalitarian powers in Europe, were the basic result of Japan's reorientation of relations with China. A recklessness characterised Japanese diplomacy during the first half of the year which appeared to reflect the virtually stagnant condition into which the military situation in China had deteriorated. Widespread agitations for a military alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis swept the country, the masses being inspired to this state of political and nationalistic fervour by the skilful streams of propaganda organised by the various patriotic societies of which the most notorious was the Black Dragon, headed by white-bearded Mitsuru Toyama, accounted to be the most powerful private citizen in Japan.... This unmistakable Japanese tendency to align herself with the Axis and to assume a determined stand in regard to the democracies, provoked the latter to certain retaliatory measures later in the year. A certain unity and co-ordination of action was indeed to be noted in Anglo-American diplomacy during the course of the critical months ahead. This was only natural in view of Japan's steady gravitation toward the Axis camp, and her uncompromising attitude toward repeated Anglo-American attempts to arrive at an understanding vis-a-vis

China and territories contiguous to this country. 1939 was undoubtedly the open sesame to that dark, malignant period of futile hopes and vaporous dreams, a mad and fantastic stretch of Pacific history in which the gods seemed to take a hand in the direction of affairs and against whose decisions men clamoured protests in vain, and in which the very laws and regulations of diplomatic behaviour appeared to be in a state of suspended animation.

THE HIRANUMA CABINET

In what has been described as one of the swiftest political changes in Japanese history the year opened with the appearance of a new cabinet, headed by Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma. Though once considered to be one of Japan's staunch fascists Hiranuma has been the subject of an almost Pauline conversion the thoroughness of which may be gauged from the fact that he was singled out for an unsuccessful attempt on his life in 1940. The progressive hotheads considered Hiranuma's 'revolutionary' ideas as pale and spiritless, and had accordingly contrived to remove him from the political scene. Emperor Hirohito hearing of the attempt on the life of this venerable gentleman immediately despatched a basket of fruit, indicating Imperial approval of his continuous presence in this world. A bottle of red wine would have symbolised Imperial regrets that his liquidation had not been effected.

Hiranuma in common with not a few of his breed has been sobered by the realisation that the excesses of the military fascists with whom he had originally identified himself, would inevitably culminate in a disaster for the country. His revolutionary tendencies were of a milder and more calculating variety, suggestive of a certain mystical fabianism; he had nothing in common with the ranting, jingoistic and insolent bravado of the fascist elements. He had been founder and chairman of the

now defunct 'Japanese Imperialist Alliance' (the Kokuonsha party, the abolishment of which was ordered following the bloody February 26th massacre)—a body which declared itself 'anti-democracy' and dedicated itself to the momentous task of 'protecting the national spirit.' The tide of military revolution was so thorough and swift that Hiranuma found himself unable to maintain his political balance; he was left far behind with the sobering and disquieting realisation dawning upon him that in aligning himself with the ultra-fascists he had backed the wrong horse.... He had supported extremism without appreciating the consequences of such a policy and the dangers that it involved. He had been a bitter opponent of the London Naval Treaty, and had served in committees which had dealt with important issues bearing upon Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty, and the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. His record was undoubtedly reactionary and his relations with the 'Japanese Imperialist Alliance', which was suspected of having fomented the uprising of February 26th, 1936, placed him in an extremely embarrassing and anomalous situation. As the founder of this political society consisting of 400,000 members including high military and political leaders and having thoughtlessly committed himself to reactionary extremism, Baron Hiranuma could not extricate himself from his extremist entanglements without seriously estranging his relations with his former fascist colleagues.... On the basis of his reactionary record it was generally expected that he would expedite Japan's development into a fascist totalitarianism, and contrive concomitantly to bring about closer co-operative relationships with the Axis powers in Europe. Although Prince Saionji, the last of the Genro, and adviser to the Emperor, placed obstacles in his path Hiranuma assumed the premiership from his position as president of the Privy Council. This he was able to do on the strength of the February 26th revolt which had successfully placed the military in power. It was accordingly extensively conjectured that Hiranuma put-

atively the arch-fascist of Japan would immediately pave the way for the absolute fascisation of Japan's political structure. This view was apprehensively considered in liberal circles, while the military fascists waited expectantly for the fireworks which Hiranuma's early activities had promised and suggested. To the chagrin of the latter the discovery was made that Hiranuma was one of those not uncommon politicians who do not practise what they are pleased to preach. . . . Vested though he was with power, Hiranuma adopted a cautious attitude toward the proposal that Japan should forthwith align herself with the Axis powers. This issue was repeatedly brought before his cabinet and the Premier without thought for consistency and the embarrassment of his former fascist colleagues threw his weight against the proposed alliance. The Baron was an idealist who could not bring himself to reconcile the realities of revolutionary extremism with the principles of the vague mysticism of Oriental philosophy to which he was addicted. Newspaper correspondents were often startled by the beautiful vagueness with which he couched his announcements to the press. 'All reforms in Japan,' he declared on one occasion, 'should be carried out with the true traditions of the nation, and any revolutionary change must conform with the immemorial Imperial Way.' 'No dust,' he stated, 'should be allowed to becloud the radiance of the Imperial Way, and what I call dust is represented by liberalism and individualism which are both opposed to the traditional customs.' As befits an idealist he was given to meditation and in the intervals of his official duties he would surround himself with priests and mystics and chant *sutras* while the drums maintained accompaniment. . . . Confronted with the dross of diurnal political realities the Baron was helpless; he realised with misgivings that the extremism that he had preached would involve minor and major tragedies if put into effect—tragedies which in common with the liberals he regarded with horror and distaste.

Such was the remarkable figurehead that formed the first cabinet of the year on January 6th, 1939. Although, the various political parties had suffered a

certain degree of suppression, their positions vis-a-vis the Hiranuma government were slightly improved. Both the Seiyukai and the Minseito parties were represented in the new cabinet, but the significant point evoking widespread attention was the retention of Prince Konoye in the government as minister without portfolio. In his first official declaration of policy Premier Hiranuma expressed his desire to maintain Japan's attitude toward China in accordance with the principles enunciated by his predecessors, and intimated that he would preserve some of the administrative machinery created by Prince Konoye such as the Five Ministers Conference and the China Affairs Board.

Hiranuma's assumption of office was immediately followed in the political world by persistent rumours of the creation of a single national political party. These rumours had prevailed off and on during 1938 but Hiranuma's administration appeared to impart to them a fresh lease of life for they were revived with vigour and emphatic persistence.... The conception of a single party to supersede the Minseito and Seiyukai was in consonance with the totalitarianism towards which Japan was steadily deteriorating. Both the fascists and the liberals were confounded when Premier Hiranuma explicitly declared that he would pay the closest personal attention to the political parties, and as though with the express purpose of dispelling rumours, representatives of both the main political parties were included, though in minor positions, in his cabinet. The military fascists were disposed to create trouble as was suggested by the disappearance of Mr. Seihin Ikeda, Minister of Finance in the Konoye cabinet. The business and financial world placed a rare trust and confidence in Mr. Ikeda who commanded respect for his sound economic principles, but these characteristics were not such as to endear him to the military. Differences of opinion in regard to financial retrenchment and the invocation of Article 11 of the National Mobilisation Bill inevitably led to a clash between Mr. Ikeda and the Navy and Army Ministers. In the ensuing reorganisation Baron Hiranuma, the mystic

and bogus fascist, was called upon to fill the breach. . . . The measure of the Baron's caution may be adduced from his retention not only of Prince Konoye but of Mr. Ikeda who was subsequently named head of the Price Commission, an organisation that was destined to play an extremely important role during the course of the year.

The innumerable cabinet changes that featured this period of tension and critical anxiety were generally accepted with bored equanimity, for it was widely recognised that new cabinets did not betoken new policies. Hiranuma's cabinet was therefore appropriately described as 'a mere shuffle of cards.' Fundamentally Japan's policy vis-a-vis China and foreign powers appertaining thereto was 'immutable' as Japanese Foreign Office spokesmen were disposed to describe it. The expansion of Japanese influence on the mainland and the construction of a war-time economy in Japan, this latter possibly involving a totalitarianism which would necessitate closer ties with the Axis powers in Europe, constituted the main principles of Japan's basic policy, and the various cabinet changes resulted in no deflection from this central and determined course. Japan had committed herself to a policy of expansion and there could be no turning back at this juncture; there was unanimity on this point. It was only as regards details and methods that differences arose and clashes between the various component groups of the body politic led to the periodic cabinet reshufflings.

Throughout the period of Prince Konoye's administration the Prince wished to surrender his post, for he had accepted the premiership as a compromise when Hayashi's blustering tactics toward the Diet in the spring of 1937 had created a rift in governmental administration. He was, furthermore, unaware that the second stage of the China war was immediately in the offing. . . . He would have resigned his post if he could have done so without incurring the criticism and odium that attach to premiers who resign their office during national emergencies; Prince Konoye bided his time and devoted him-

self with praiseworthy zeal to the responsibilities which the war with China had imposed on the government. Despite his deepest aversion to the China campaign and the corollary of military dominance at home (indicated by his diplomatic cold), he allowed himself to be persuaded by the fascists into an attitude of reluctant co-operation. It was only his political ability which made possible the passage of the National Mobilisation Bill during the 73rd Diet meeting in 1938. Difficulties made by Foreign Minister Ugaki in regard to the China Board question and the pressure that was brought to bear on him for closer ties with Germany and Italy, compelled Prince Konoye to withdraw from the political scene. Strained relations with Britain and the United States were a clear forecast of the complications that lay ahead, and Prince Konoye realised that his peculiar political abilities were more effective behind the scenes than on the forefront of the political stage. The fall of Hankow and Canton into Japanese hands brought the China affair to a new stage, and afforded Konoye the desired pretext for his resignation.

Baron Hiranuma as Prime Minister portended a swing to the 'right', though in this respect, as we have already noted, disappointment and surprise were the reactions in liberal and fascist circles alike. In spite of his caution his reactionary record could not be lived down, and the measure of control by the fascists to which Hiranuma was voluntarily subject, ensured that the infusion of totalitarianism into the government body politic should not be impeded. The 74th session of the Diet provided no obstacles, though it was not so much the strength of Hiranuma's cabinet as the comparative weakness of the Diet that enabled the government to emerge unscathed. Of the members of the government it was noted that Admiral Yonai and General Itagaki, Navy and Army Ministers respectively, were the most forthright and ingenuous. The greatest attention was directed toward the curious example of political miscegenation instanced by the affiliation of the reactionary Toko-kai and the Social Mass party, the former being represented by the late

Mr. Seigo Nakano, the incorrigible firebrand, and the latter by Mr. Isoo Abe, for long the leader of the liberal elements in the country. This conjunction of extremes was indicative of the pressure to which anti-totalitarian bodies were being subjected, and of the curious Japanese predilection for compromise. Mr. Isoo, confirmed liberal that he was, could not bear to precipitate dissension and internal strife, and sacrificed his liberalism at the altar of political necessity. Basically both Mr. Isoo, Prince Konoye and all of this calibre were first Japanese and then liberals.

AGITATION FOR ALLIANCE WITH AXIS

In April further evidence of the pressure which the fascists were actively generating was revealed by cabinet reshufflings, resulting in the appointment of General Kuniaki Koiso as Minister of Oversea Affairs and Mr. Haruichi Tanabe as Minister of Communications. The former was an ardent nationalist who advocated the emigration of Japanese to the Asiatic mainland, and his appointment was due to the strong support which the army provided him, while Mr. Tanabe had been formerly associated with the Prime Minister in joint political activities revolving around the Japanese Imperialist Alliance Society. Commenting on this latest reshuffle, newspapers in Tokyo were unanimous in agreeing that 'new forces' had emerged on the political stage, and that these forces were responsible for the new campaign almost immediately launched for the conversion of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance. With General Koiso within the inner ranks of the government the fascists could be assured that the campaign for the alliance would effectively reverberate throughout the political structure of the government. Nor were their expectations in this direction disappointed, for the campaign advocating a military alliance with Germany, resulted in a series of important discussions among the

key ministers of the cabinet. The governmental hive began to buzz with activity, and although the Prime Minister in a statement on May 28th stressed the rather ambiguous point that Japan was independent both of the democratic and totalitarian ideologies, it was known that considerable political activity was in progress behind the scenes. . . . Conferences, ostensibly on the European situation, debated this question with unremitting persistence while Prince Saionji, adviser to the Emperor, received detailed reports of the proceedings through his secretary Baron Harada.

The projected alliance with Italy and Germany received its main support from the fascist militarists whose representative General Koiso laboured indefatigably for the cause, but the liberal and conservative forces were yet in positions of power and were far from susceptible to mere persuasion. The latter moreover were buttressed by the support of the navy which presented a cool front to the projected alliance, and the Privy Council the liberalism of which was always assured. That the alliance was considered a possibility was becoming increasingly widespread in official circles, as was made evident during the course of a speech by Tatsuo Kawai, the then chief of the Information Bureau, when he addressed members of a German Newspaper Mission to Japan. The Foreign Minister was engaged in a series of conversations with the German and Italian Ambassadors and was subsequently received in audience by the Emperor.

It was at this stage of the proceedings that the Japanese political capacity for ambiguity and shilly-shallying uncertainty—which we have already mentioned as a characteristic of Japanese diplomatic strategy—became most irritatingly evident. Observers of the political scene were unable to ascertain with finality whether the forces of liberalism or fascism had triumphed in the clash of opinion concerning the military alliance issue. Far from clarifying the situation the Japanese sought merely to baffle outsiders by delivering cryptic remarks such as the one delivered by the Foreign

Minister somewhat contradictorily that while it was Japan's intention and desire to strengthen its ties with Italy and Germany, it was likewise determined 'to cope with the tense international situation from its own autonomous standpoint.' This double-edged statement (it was so conceived by foreign observers, though the Japanese were able to reconcile the two edges) was interpreted as indicating that the Japanese body politic was yet sitting on the fence unwilling and unable to commit itself to a final decision.

On May 20th, however, the announcement was made that Japan's attitude toward the European situation was decided though no clue to the nature of the agreement was forthcoming. The collapse of the Hiranuma government suggested that the wrangling within the inner circles of the government was continuing. In one of his periodical digressions into political theology Hiranuma informed pressmen that Japanese diplomacy was based on 'morality' and that considerations of immediate interest would not deflect Japan from what she conceived to be her duty. The following day however the Foreign Office spokesman declared that 'the crux of Japan's foreign policy lies in the Anti-Comintern agreement, directed toward the extermination of communism and it is our immutable policy to collaborate closely with Germany and Italy in the spirit of that pact. Japan is therefore exceedingly glad to note that Italy and Germany formed a powerful front by concluding the present treaty.' (Reference to Rome-Berlin military alliance.)

Equal stress was laid by official members of the government on the necessity of maintaining what was termed the 'autonomous standpoint' of Japan and on the importance of co-operating in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as distinct from a military alliance against the democracies. The various component groups of Japan's body politic were unable yet to arrive at a decision on so momentous a matter, and it was probably regarded as wiser to study the course of events in Europe prior to committing the country to any specific policy.

Hence the bewildering double-edgedness of the statements so facilely manufactured by Japanese statesmen, and the feeling among foreign observers that they were at a loss to understand what game Hirohito's top-batted, striped-trousered gentlemen were playing. . . . An extremely unenlightened section of the foreign community had it that Japan was bluffing, and though superficially there was much to commend such a theory, the fact that the governmental hive was throbbing with suppressed tension and uncertainty appeared to suggest with convincing finality that the internal dissension was very real and that the cause of it was no triviality. . . .

AMERICAN NOTICE OF ABROGATION OF TRADE TREATY

By midsummer the tension was at breaking point; the contending forces had exhausted their tactics, and a compromise could not, it appeared, be effected. And then, as by a malicious touch of fate came two bomb-shells, each one of which was disconcerting to both the liberals and the fascists. On July 26th, the United States served notice of its intention to abrogate the commercial treaty of 1911. This appeared to be a triumph for the advocates of the military alliance with Germany who immediately pressed forward their case on the basis of this new development, the result being yet another conference of key ministers to examine the European situation. The second bomb-shell placed the fascists in a position of extreme embarrassment on August 23rd when the German-Soviet pact was signed, and the Hiranuma cabinet, some members of which had urged the alliance with Germany and the official policy of which had recognised the Anti-Comintern understanding, was unable to survive the situation.

GERMAN-SOVIET ALLIANCE

The absolute transformation of the situation caused by Germany's hand-clasp with the Soviet Union, at the crucial moment when Japan had been on the point of throwing in her lot with the Nazis, was a temporary relief for the liberals and conservatives who had been restraining the fascist militarists. A series of important cabinet councils were held and a formal protest was lodged at Berlin expressing Japan's concern and indignation at Germany's rapprochement with Russia in contravention of the Anti-Comintern Pact. On August 28th Hiranuma's cabinet resigned *en bloc*, while the Japanese political world, sobered by the flabbergasting nature of the situation, listened with awe to Hiranuma's mystical explanation of his cabinet's resignation:

'A complicated and mysterious situation having freshly risen in Europe, it has become necessary for us to discontinue the policies for which we have hitherto been working and formulate an entirely new policy to cope with the situation.... This change in the situation will undoubtedly necessitate the introduction of some changes in what I as a humble subject have often submitted to the Throne for reference, and I feel extremely awe-stricken to have to trouble the Throne about the matter anew.'

The specific plans and policies which Hiranuma had so minutely and carefully considered and submitted to the Throne were never revealed, but they were evidently thrown out of gear by the new turn in the international situation.... Both the fascists and the liberals were immediately cautious again, and the issue of whether or not to establish an alliance with Germany, which had threatened to develop matters to a head, was relegated to the background at least temporarily during the aftermath of the first crisis....

Public interest in the projected alliance with Germany was perfunctory though the patriotic societies had contrived to arouse enthusiasm and support, but the general

attitude toward the matter had definitely cooled by the time Premier Hiranuma revealed that Japan was to confine herself for the time being to the provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was felt that the Hiranuma cabinet had committed itself to a policy of co-operation with Germany, and that the latter's sudden alignment with the Soviet Union made Hiranuma's position untenable. Following intense activity among military and cabinet leaders, and especially of Prince Konoye and Prince Saionji who received detailed reports of the course of events through his secretary Baron Harada, and the innumerable personal audiences which the Emperor granted to the Foreign and Army ministers as well as to Prince Konoye, and the buzzing that continued within the ranks of the Privy Council, the bomb-shell of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was a douche of cold water that was as sobering as it was embarrassing. The crisis within the camp had reached a stage of critical uncertainty, both parties striving with might and main—one consisting of the liberals restraining the extremists, and the other consisting of fascist militarists and nationalists urging the conversion of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance. Specific commitments may have actually been made, for communications with the Japanese Ambassador in Germany and the Italian and German Ambassadors in Tokyo were being constantly maintained. The uncertainty of government spokesmen suggested however that a decision had not been reached. Hence Hiranuma's mystical assurance that Japan belonged neither to the totalitarian nor to the democratic ideological camps. . . . Japan was 'autonomous'.

Whatever the reaction of the government to the German-Soviet pact, the nation expressed general indignation at this flagrant piece of Machiavellian opportunism, but the anti-German feeling that spread throughout the country was tempered with a sense of relief that Japan had not committed itself to the 'strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact'. The general tendency was to advocate a concentration of national effort on the establishment of a new order in East Asia which would involve the solution

of the innumerable problems which the China incident had evoked. The sting of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact resulted in a common desire to avoid the entanglements of European politics, and to pursue 'on a clean slate' Japan's own ends in East Asia. In a report to the Throne Hiranuma informed the Emperor of the desirability of scrapping the various formulas and policies which had been previously prepared. Reported cabinet decisions were to the effect that the possibility of denouncing the Anti-Comintern Pact was considered, and that the policy of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact would be 'reversed'. The German explanation for the predicament was that the exigencies of the tense situation in Europe necessitated a prompt diplomatic move on the part of the German government, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop expressing his regret that Japan could not be informed of this new development in time. Actual denunciations of the German *volte-face* were rare, and the reaction of the militarists was difficult to ascertain beyond the obvious assumption that they were as flabbergasted as the rest of the government. While diplomats unhesitatingly described this new turn in German policy as regrettable, the fascists assumed a sober taciturnity punctuated only by periodic assurances of the utmost vagueness that Japan would pursue her 'immutable' policy vis-a-vis the China incident. The net result of this latest development in Europe came to no more than a decision to adopt a policy of 'wait-and-see' which was but a variation of Japan's policy of sitting on the fence whenever confronted with a difficult situation. She had gone far on the path of totalitarianism, and her alignment with the Axis powers almost existed *de jure* if not *de facto*; she could accordingly not afford to sever such co-operative links as existed between herself and the Axis powers, especially Germany. Wait-and-see constituted therefore the most appropriate attitude, though the liberals and conservatives would have welcomed the complete abandonment of any policy holding the possibility of an alliance with the European dictatorships. A respite was nevertheless gained by the anti-totalitarian elements within the

Japanese government.

Meanwhile von Ribbentrop assured Ambassador Oshima that Germany desired to maintain friendly relations with Japan and that the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact would not fundamentally affect the co-operative nature of the ties which had been forged between the two countries. This smooth talk from the German Foreign Minister, however, failed to recommend itself to the Japanese press, a representative comment being that of the Tokyo *Nichi-Nichi* which stressed that Japan's China policy was based on the Anti-Comintern Pact and that German suggestions encouraging a Soviet-Japanese agreement were wholly futile. The paper urged that Japan should dedicate herself determinedly to her task in China, and that every means conducive to its accomplishment, irrespective of ideological considerations, should be carefully considered. But it could not be disguised that Japan's duties in China were fundamentally opposed to the Soviet Union, and a reconciliation between the two countries was accordingly impossible. Concluding that the Anti-Comintern Pact had been grossly violated by the German government, the paper vigorously advocated an 'independent policy' but by far the most interesting suggestion advanced by the *Nichi-Nichi* was that the Japanese government had been fully informed of the German-Soviet pact, and that the ensuing activity and diplomatic dissension within the ranks of the government were to be directly traced to this fore-knowledge. This conjecture is permissible for the realisation on the part of the Japanese government that a German-Soviet rapprochement was impending would have afforded the issue as to whether or not Japan should align itself with the Axis powers a fresh lease of life. And this issue though ostensibly shelved, was left hanging in the air, while the Japanese government waited and saw. . . . The militarists' case was slightly weakened and the position of the liberals correspondingly strengthened, and the stage was therefore set for a continuance of the struggle.

THE ABE CABINET

When Premier Abe mounted the political rostrum, it was sadly realised that for all the activity and diplomatic fuss Japan's intentions in the future were still unclarified. The Pacific world was compelled to guess and fear and conjecture in the dark.... Confidence inspired by ignorance staunchly put forward the view that Japan was bluffing and that her commitments in China would deter her from any precipitate action against the democracies. The outbreak of the war in Europe elicited the following from the new Premier: 'In the face of the European war that has just broken out, Japan intends not to be involved therein; she will concentrate her efforts on the settlement of the China affair'. Although this façade of neutrality appeared to buttress the contention that Japan would not permit the situation in Europe to influence her activities in China, it was obvious to the more penetrative observer that she was still waiting and seeing and sitting on the fence.

To add to the confusion the new Premier was a political dark horse whose diplomatic antecedents threw no light on the possibilities inherent in the new cabinet. His name had been formerly associated with that of General Ugaki, constituting a faction which had formulated plans for the reorganisation of the Japanese army system, but the Abe-Ugaki army policies were subsequently superseded by the politico-metaphysical doctrines of the Araki-Koiso school which is still paramount today. Abe was later member of the Supreme War Council, but his singular freedom from any political affiliations which presumably prompted the far-seeing Prince Saionji to recommend him to the Throne, enabled the new cabinet to launch their administration on an entirely new and renovated basis.

In attempting to steer clear of the political hang-overs and residual difficulties inherited from the Hiranuma administration, Abe was attempting the impossible. Japan's policy vis-a-vis China could not but

be an extension of the various commitments made by his predecessors, while the problem of the government's attitude toward the Anti-Comintern Pact was as yet unresolved: In his first press interview Premier Abe remarked. 'It requires further study to decide whether the Anti-Comintern ties should be kept alive or be entirely cut off or some better formula be found to replace them. . . .' From which it was gathered that the Japanese body politic was still unable to arrive at a decision.

The appointment of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura as Foreign Minister was a concessional flourish on the part of the Japanese body politic to ease Japan's foreign relations, especially those with the democracies, which were extremely strained. The complete abandonment of an alignment with the Axis nations was not considered, though the attitude of the Abe cabinet towards the democracies far from fostering amicable relations, yet recognised the need for a more balanced outlook. At a time when the fisheries dispute with the Soviet Union had reached a most acute stage culminating ultimately in the Nomonhan clash, to which we have already referred, Japan's mission of establishing a 'new order' in China, now in its second year, inevitably affected Japan's relations with the democracies adversely. During January the Japanese government received three notes from the British, French and American governments with reference to the Japanese 'new order' in China.

KONOYE'S NEW ORDER DOCTRINE

Referring to Prince Konoye's well-balanced and not ill-considered idealisation of Japan's activities in China, which remains to this day one of the best announcements of Japan's policy and from which there has been no official deflection, the British note pointed out that 'His Majesty's government are at a loss to understand how Prince Konoye's assurance that Japan seeks no territory

and respects the sovereignty of China can be reconciled with the declared intentions of the Japanese government to compel the Chinese people by force of arms to accept conditions involving the surrender of their political, economic and cultural life to Japanese control, the indefinite maintenance in China of considerable Japanese garrisons, and the virtual detachment of China from Inner Mongolia. . . . For their part, His Majesty's government desire to make it clear that they are not prepared to accept or to recognise changes of the nature indicated, which are brought about by force. They intend to adhere to the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and cannot agree to the unilateral modifications of its terms.'

The attitude of the American and French governments were identical and the unanimity thus gained by the democracies in their expression of disapproval was disconcerting to the Japanese. The Japanese Foreign Ministry reacted harshly to this gesture replying that it could not agree with the views contained in the British, French and American notes and that the terms of the Nine Power Treaty were not to be regarded as either perpetual or sacrosanct. Prior to the bomb-shell of the Soviet-German pact, when a military alliance with the Axis powers was being urged, it was noticeable that every move by the democracies expressing indignation at Japan's policy vis-a-vis China was countered by open acclamations for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Hitler's speech describing his intentions in Europe was favourably commented on by the then Foreign Minister Arita, while the Tokyo press welcomed the sagacity and foresight revealed in Hitler's references to the situation in the East, interpreting them as indicating Germany's approval of a military alliance between the two countries. Meanwhile the death of Hiroshi Saito, the popular Japanese Ambassador in Washington (the old order was verily passing) and the United States President's graceful and skilful gesture in sending his ashes to Japan on board a cruiser of the United States navy, contributed much to a relaxation in American-Japanese relations, but the feelings against Britain which occupied the position of

Japanese enemy No. 1 were evenly maintained in spite of the hesitations and uncertainty of the government's attitude toward the possible alliance with Germany. Japan wished to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact and if possible to strengthen it, for as Foreign Minister Arita stressed the only real obstacle standing in the way of the establishment of a new order in China was the Soviet Union.

ANTI-BRITISH DEMONSTRATIONS

In May relations between third powers in China and Japan deteriorated rapidly, the immediate cause of the dissension being the concession question at Amoy and Shanghai. The spokesman of the Foreign Office was extremely forthright in this matter, declaring that 'the objects of Japan's actions is to place the sovereignty of China under Japanese control.' The presence of enemy elements within the concessions therefore necessitated the despatch of Japanese troops for the purposes of mopping-up operations. By this time anti-British feeling throughout the country had been fanned into the most serious proportions, the 'patriotic' societies being especially busy in this connection. Placards denouncing the British government and anti-British demonstrations outside the British Embassy in Tokyo, and in the principal towns and cities created an atmosphere inimical to the conduct of negotiations.

Police cordons were thrown round the Embassy and British consulate officials in heavily populated areas such as Osaka requested the police for adequate protection against irresponsible hooligans. These requests were ignored or peremptorily refused. In spite of the heightened feeling cases of actual physical assaults on British citizens were extremely rare, though pressure of an unpleasant nature was to be introduced later when Anglo-Japanese relations had become intolerably acute. Mean-

while as the *Japan News-Week* appropriately pointed out, the wave of emotional fireworks that swept the country was at variance with the spirit of Yamato Damashii. Resolutions of the most vitriolic nature by municipal councils, prefectural assemblies, and ordinary associations were hardly likely to affect either the British delegates or the British public except to arouse their ire and stiffen their attitude. The imposition of the Tientsin blockade and negotiations in connection with the incident ushered in a period of painful anxiety and dreariness, for it was obvious that the divergence of views among the negotiating powers was such as to preclude the possibility of any agreement or understanding.

Though the immediate cause of the Japanese blockade of the British concession was the British refusal to surrender four Chinese to Japanese authorities who believed them to have been implicated in the murder of the Tientsin branch manager of the Federal Reserve Bank and the customs officer in the British concession, the Japanese action was the result of an accumulative series of grievances provoked by a direct clash of interests with third powers in China. The dispute which was monotonously prolonged over a period of a year was aggravated by the wholly irreconcilable viewpoints of the negotiating parties. While the Japanese delegates obviously desired to develop the Tientsin issue into one involving a general consideration and settlement of Anglo-Japanese differences vis-a-vis China, the British authorities wished to localise the affair and confine the negotiations within the limits of the actual conditions prevailing at Tientsin. The Japanese demanded that Britain should forthwith cease to render assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and to 'correct its conception' of the Japanese campaign for the establishment of a China new order.

that they refrain from such acts and measures.'

It was apparent that the British, distracted as they were by the situation in Europe, could not afford at that turbulent period to precipitate matters in the East, and were gradually giving way to the pressure which the Japanese were bringing to bear on them. Japanese army officials, possibly in appreciation of this fact, expressed their sympathy for Sir Robert Craigie in what they were pleased to term his 'predicament'. They implied that while the British Ambassador to a certain degree recognised Japan's obligations in the East the British government was regrettably obtuse, especially because it tended to base its policy on the 'faulty reports' of Ambassador Clark Kerr and his agents in China. This attitude was perfectly understandable, for British diplomatic representatives in China being more keenly aware of the extent of Japanese aggression, were also more obstructive than the British Embassy in Tokyo. The British negotiators were dealing not so much with the diplomatic class of Japanese politicians, as with the fascist militarists to whom understanding and sympathy and co-operative goodwill are symptoms of weakness.

In spite of Chamberlain's assurance before the House of Commons that the concessions so far made by the British government did not constitute a modification of British policy in China, the general impression both in the United States and Britain was that important advantages had been gained by the Japanese, and considerable interest was therefore attached to the forthcoming consultations regarding the disposition of the Tientsin silver.

The Japanese representatives had requested the transfer of 14,000,000 yuan in silver specie which was held by the Chungking government in the British concession in Tientsin, to the provisional government at Peking. It was generally assumed in view of the British concessional flourishes to the Japanese regarding the military issue bearing on the Tientsin problem, that the difficulties presented by the silver problem would not be easily surmountable, and that the British attitude to this aspect

of the conversations would be accordingly less conciliatory. Somewhat contradictorily, Mr. Ken Harada of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office stated at this stage of the proceedings that it was not the intention of the Japanese government to persuade the British government to change its China policy. Such a change, he declared, would be entirely voluntary and could not be subjected to forcible measures. While Japan recognised the fact of the century-old British connections and influence in China, the situation and conditions in this country had been completely transformed and readjustments were therefore necessary. Foreign correspondents attempted to reconcile this statement with the previous declaration to the effect that Japan demanded the cessation of British assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime.... To reconcile the irreconcilable has ever been the problem with which foreign diplomats and foreign newspapermen were constantly confronted.

Conversations on the Tientsin silver problem provoked the resumption of anti-British demonstrations, deputations from which were permitted to enter the British Embassy and deliver their vitriolic sentiments to patient Embassy officials. Meanwhile rumours of the removal from his post of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to China, were categorically denied by the British Embassy. Apparently some sections of the Japanese public not far removed from the fascist militarists were indulging in wishful thinking.... Requests by the British government that Colonel Spear, British military attaché in China, who had been arrested as a spy by the Japanese military authorities, should be released, were ignored, and the tension thus engendered permeated the scene when the Tientsin economic conversations were launched.

Although initial optimism was expressed by both British and Japanese spokesmen, obstacles were encountered almost immediately. The Japanese case was to the effect that (a) the circulation of the fapi currency (of the nationalist government) in the British concession

adversely affected the maintenance of peace and order in North China inasmuch as it is prohibited in areas under the Peking provisional government, and provided financial aid for Chinese bandits who disturbed the peace of North China; that (b) the silver specie held in the British concession belonged to the North China regime and should therefore be used as the 'financial foundation' of that area.

The British reply was that the silver specie held in the British concession belonged to the Chungking government inasmuch as the nationalisation of silver was carried out in 1935 on the basis of the plan submitted by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, and that the said silver specie being in the basement of the building of the Communications Bank when the British government rented the structure, the latter recognised the silver as belonging legally to the Communications Bank. It was while negotiations on this discouraging basis were being conducted that the first bomb-shell of that eventful month of August precipitated another crisis in the Pacific drama. This was the sudden abrogation of the America-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Whether this dramatic move was calculated to a nicety by the Roosevelt administration and announced at the critical moment cannot of course be ascertained, but its effect upon the Japanese cannot be overestimated. Rightly or wrongly the Japanese press interpreted the move as an 'intervention' on the part of America, which would bolster up the British case at the Tientsin parleys. . . . It was not long indeed before the hitch in the Anglo-Japanese silver negotiations was attributed to the United States, and what had hitherto been an anti-British sentiment flamed into one which was directed as much against the United States.

Renewed demands for a military alliance were launched by the fascists and nationalists, so that the country was inflamed with demonstrations against the democracies and in support of the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy. These exhibitions reached a

high emotional pitch when the second bomb-shell temporarily shattered the ranks of the militarist nationalists. Entangled in delicate negotiations with the British at Tientsin, the abrogation of the commercial treaty with the United States, the serious clash with Soviet forces at Nomonhan; and the sudden conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, left them in a state in which they were painfully aware of the necessity of proceeding with greater caution in the field of foreign relations.

Although it was significantly stated by the spokesman of the Foreign Office that the abrogation of the treaty with America and the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact would not affect the course of the Anglo-Japanese parleys on the Tientsin silver question, the satisfactory termination of these negotiations may in part be attributed to the anxiety of the Japanese to re-orient their foreign relations and policy on a more cautious and stable basis. . . . It was not until several prolonged negotiations had been held, however, that the following agreement was reached :

- (1) For the maintenance of law and order within the British municipal area, arrangements have been made for closer co-operation between the British and Japanese authorities for the suppression of anti-Japanese terrorist activities and for the co-operative supervision of dealings in arms and of all publications and public gatherings. Unauthorised wireless communications will be suppressed.
- (2) Of the silver and bullion now in the Bank of Communications in Tientsin, a sum equivalent to £ 100,000 sterling shall be set aside for relief work among famine sufferers in North China. The balance is to remain under joint seal of the British and Japanese Consuls-General until the two governments agree on other arrangements for its custody. . . .
- (3) The British Municipal Council will place no difficulty in the way of the use of the Federal

Reserve Bank currency within the British municipal area. . . .

Such were the turbulent background-events when the Abe cabinet established itself following the resignation *en bloc* of the Hiranuma government, the main feature of its policy being to concentrate the country's efforts on the settlement of the China affair, and to recommence its foreign relations 'on a clean slate' necessitated by the almost revolutionised international position. With the Nomonhan and Tientsin problems satisfactorily if temporarily solved, the Abe cabinet was faced with the task of readjusting relations with the United States, for the latter's abrogation of the treaty had brought matters to a head at a period when the government was undecided as to what its future policy should be. Though the agitation for a military alliance with the Axis powers had diminished considerably as a result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, the controversy on this issue continued to rage within the inner circles of the government. The wait-and-see policy was thus the only temporary expedient adaptable in the circumstances, and the Abe government accordingly sat on the fence, waited and saw, and attempted to readjust relations with the United States. The outbreak of European hostilities afforded Premier Abe the opportunity to confirm Japan's neutrality and determination to hold herself steadfastly to the settlement of the China incident, but the abrogation of the trade treaty with America caused a disturbing flurry among Japanese commercial and governmental circles, and the necessity of arriving at an understanding with the Roosevelt administration was fully appreciated. Though an outward calm was simulated by both commercial and official circles, the determined attitude of the United States, as contrasted with the concessional and conciliatory policy of the British in the Tientsin case, led to the widespread fear that the expiration of the trade treaty in January 1940 would immediately be followed by embargoes on American products essential for the maintenance of Japan's military activities in China and for her well-being at home.

For the first time in her provocative career on the Asiatic continent, Japan was confronted with a firm and uncompromising stand of undisguised opposition. With the war in Europe yet in its initial and therefore uncertain stages, Japan was still committed to her wait-and-see policy and could not therefore afford to permit a further deterioration of her relations with the United States. What flabbergasted the Japanese authorities was the astonishing haste and abruptness of the American action which was not preceded by the customary consultations and negotiations. Much speculative wonder was aroused as to what had provoked the United States government to the drastic measure of abrogating a trade treaty at that specific time and under such circumstances. The spokesman of the Foreign Office admitted frankly that he was at a loss to understand the American action, but it was widely surmised that the following reasons if not wholly at least in part were responsible for the new development in American-Japanese relations.

The abrogation of the trade treaty was considered mainly as—

- (a) a retaliatory move for damages sustained by American citizens in China and as a gesture of the United States government to indicate that it would not align itself with Great Britain in recognising the existence of the 'new situation' in East Asia, and
- (b) a domestic political move on the eve of the presidential elections to win back some of the popular support which President Roosevelt had lost as a result of the unpopularity of the neutrality act.

There was indeed much to substantiate the view that American government circles regarded the abrogation of the trade treaty as a design to indicate clearly to the Japanese government, that the United States did not intend to accept the application, to American rights and interests in China, of the terms contained in the Anglo-Japanese agreement concluded as a result of the Tientsin

parleys. Japan's undisguised intention to throw in her lot with the Axis nations, prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact and the flamboyant disregard of American protests in connection with her rights in China, in conjunction with America's sympathy for the under-dog (China) and her inability to appreciate the politico-mystico 'divine' intentions of the Japanese new order, were cumulatively effective in arousing American sentiment against the Japanese. The result of the Tientsin parleys had been most unsatisfactory from the American viewpoint and the Roosevelt administration was probably aware of the advantages of following up the Soviet-German non-aggression pact by bringing to bear on the Japanese government further pressure in the form of the Japan-American treaty of commerce and navigation. The situation in Europe was such that swift action was necessary to avert in the Pacific the catastrophe that had befallen the European continent. To counter-balance this weight of anti-Japanese feeling, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the consequent declaration of neutrality by Japan following the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, encouraged the hope among American circles that a fundamental readjustment of American-Japanese relations was not impossible.

An alignment with Germany on the part of Japan which had been conceivable and probable prior to the Soviet-German pact was now regarded as impossible, while conflicting interests in China precluded any Anglo-Japan understanding. Japan's neutrality was inevitable, at least as a temporary expedient. The danger lay in the assumption that her neutrality would be maintained indefinitely and that she would not ultimately commit herself to a specific ideological policy vis-a-vis China and the conflict in Europe. For the present however the American abrogation of the trade treaty persuaded Japan of the necessity of proceeding with caution. Japanese spokesmen referred to the desirability of opening new negotiations for a treaty more in keeping with the conditions that prevailed in the East, and suggested that the American action had afforded both countries in the

Pacific the opportunity to renew their trade relations on a new and more appropriate basis.

Stress was laid by Mr. Tatsuo Kawai, spokesman of the Foreign Office, on the fact that the Japanese government had no intention of demanding the recognition by the United States of the new situation in the Far East. Though America's latest move could, it was pointed out, be interpreted as hostile to Japan, the Japanese government appreciated the opportunity afforded for the conclusion of a new treaty based on the realities of the situation in the East. Rumours about an American embargo on arms shipments to Japan were waived away by Mr. Kawai as 'not surprising', for as he explained, imports of such materials had been reduced to such a degree that a complete ban would not affect Japan's position.

The authoritative *Asahi* stated in an editorial on the abrogation of the trade treaty that Japanese authorities had fully expected the American move, as the subject had been heatedly debated in Congress and private quarters. Measures to meet the situation had therefore, the paper continued, been in all probability devised by the Japanese government. It was however noted that the American action was not so much a pro-Chiang gesture or merely an anti-Japanese sanction as the result of a policy which sought to replace old understandings with new ones as the situation in the East was in a state of constant flux. Senator Pittman's bill for sanctions against Japan had been postponed till the next session of the Congress at the request of the administration—a move which appeared to suggest that the Roosevelt administration had not committed itself to an absolute anti-Japanese policy, and which was consonant with the policy of international peace and removal of trade barriers enunciated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

While the Japanese press did not and could not avoid the disagreeable fact that the abrogation of the treaty could be interpreted as pro-Chiang, anti-Japanese and that its authors did not intend that a new treaty should be prepared before the expiration of the old one, emphasis

was laid on the desirability of actively seeking to readjust relations with the United States. Neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary Hull, as the American-owned journal the *Japan Advertiser* pointed out, had given any evidence of their intention to support the various proposals for embargoes on shipments to Japan.

That the Japanese press reflected the attitude of the government was made immediately evident by the appointment of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura to the post of Foreign Minister. A more suitable appointment could not have been made, for Nomura was not only a popular and respected figure in Japan but was held in esteem in the United States as an able man of sound, moderate views combined with a forceful personality. As *Domei*, the Japanese semi-official news-agency, stated 'the Admiral is well qualified to carry out an effective policy, particularly toward the United States, which will form the most important factor in Japan's diplomacy in view of the present international situation confronting this country.' In the United States Nomura's appointment was regarded with approval, and was generally accepted as a gesture on the part of the Japanese government indicating its desire to effect an early and final settlement of differences between the two countries.

NOMURA-GREW CONVERSATIONS

Admiral Nomura achieved prominence by his masterly handling of the delicate questions provoked at the time of the Shanghai incident in 1932. The situation was then packed with dynamite and certainly would have exploded in clumsy hands, but the consummate tact and understanding with which Admiral Nomura conducted negotiations and generated an atmosphere of co-operative friendship earned him the respect not only of his own countrymen but of the Americans. Relations between American and

Japanese naval officers in Shanghai were never before on so friendly a basis, and it was thus most fitting in view of Nomura's success in his relations with Americans that he should be selected for the intricate task of reviving relations between the two countries into a more healthy condition.

Though his ability was undoubted, Admiral Nomura was the recipient of an unpleasant legacy from his predecessor in the form of a series of innumerable protests which had been lodged at the Foreign Office by the American Ambassador. Grievances and protests against Japan vis-a-vis China were too numerous and defied any classification beyond that suggested on broad lines. These categories were first, problems touching upon the open door principle as formulated in the Nine Power Treaty and upon the specific treaty rights which America enjoyed in China; second, those problems bearing upon the injury suffered by American persons and property as a result of military operations; and third, problems respecting humanitarian reasons such as the alleged bombing of non-combatants and cities of no military importance (this latter though extraneous to the American position in China was an important factor in conditioning American policies toward Japan). Of these problems several achieved prominence (hit the headlines both in Tokyo and America) and caused considerable flurry among the guardians of American-Japanese relations. Formal protests and threats and gestures piled up at the Foreign Office and resulted only in eliciting formal replies of a most unsatisfactory nature. It was not until the abrogation of the trade treaty and the establishment of the Abe cabinet with Nomura as its Foreign Minister that a specific and determined attempt was made by the Japanese to deal with American protests. As the *Japan News-Week*, an American journal published in Tokyo, ironically (the Japanese are immune from and not susceptible to Occidental irony) stated.... 'since last summer there has been a remarkable decline in the number of incidents in China affecting Americans and their property.' The closure of the Yangtse river to

commercial shipping, the sinking of the American gun-boat *Panay* (which created a furore throughout the Pacific), and over 232 cases involving American rights and interests in China, had a cumulative effect on the American attitude toward Japan, and it was accordingly obvious that Nomura's term as Foreign Minister was not to be lightly assumed.

GREW'S ADDRESS BEFORE AMERICA-JAPAN SOCIETY

The undaunted Admiral however unequivocally expressed his determination, in his first public address, to concentrate on the task of bringing about a mutual understanding between his country and the United States. The return at this time of Ambassador Joseph Grew from his vacation in America was most opportune, as it forthwith led to a concerted attempt to reorganise American-Japanese relations on a more mutually satisfactory basis. The setting moreover was ideal for the now famous Ambassador Grew's speech before the America-Japan Society in which he outlined clearly the feelings of the average American towards Japan and the reasons for them. . . . Ambassador Joseph Grew was regarded as a sincere well-wisher of Japan, and the note of serious determination which characterised his speech succeeded in conveying to his distinguished Japanese listeners the degree to which Japanese-American relations had been estranged. The preparatory statement that he was speaking 'straight from the horse's mouth' was characteristically American and it was appreciated as indicating that his words carried the full weight of the authority of his home government. It was indeed generally known that important portions of the speech had been prepared at Washington during Ambassador Grew's sojourn in the United States where his 'vacation' had been used to good purpose. The America-Japan Society had for long

functioned as a sounding-board for the announcement of important aspects of Japanese and American policy, and the choice of this platform for Ambassador Grew's momentous speech was accordingly a most appropriate one.

Grew's task was not as easy as might have appeared at first sight, for the object of the Roosevelt administration was not so much to antagonise the Japanese (this was to a certain degree necessary and unavoidable) as to convey to them America's serious view of the situation in the East and of her determination not to tolerate conditions which would be inimical to American interests and rights in the East. It was desirable furthermore to stress that the United States was willing to arrive at an understanding on any reasonable basis, but that she would not be cajoled into an acquiescence in prevailing conditions. The careful and skilful clarification of these points were judiciously blended with assurances of his friendly attitude toward Japan where "he had spent seven years and which had become a second 'home' to him and his family." These words though spoken in absolute sincerity nevertheless functioned diplomatically as an introductory 'softener' to the impact of his main thesis towards which he expanded.

Pointing out that it was incumbent upon him as an ambassador to report faithfully such observations as he had made in his home country he continued:

'It is probable that many of you are not aware of the increasing extent to which the people of the United States resent the methods which the Japanese armed forces are employing in China today and what appear to be their objectives. In saying this I do not for one moment wish to imply that the American people have forgotten the long-time friendship which has existed between the people of my country and the people of Japan. But the American people have been profoundly shocked over the widespread use of bombing in China, not only on grounds of humanity but also on grounds of the direct menace to American lives and property.

accompanied by the loss of American life and the crippling of American citizens; they regard with growing seriousness the violation of and interference with American rights by the Japanese armed forces in China in disregard of treaties and agreements entered into by the United States and Japan and treaties and agreements entered into by several nations including Japan.

'.... Not only are the American people perturbed over their being arbitrarily deprived of long-established rights, including those of equal opportunity and fair treatment, but they feel that the present trend in the Far East, if continued, will be destructive of the hopes which they sincerely cherish of the development of an orderly world. American rights and interests in China are being impaired or destroyed by the policies and actions of the Japanese authorities in China. American property is being damaged or destroyed; American nationals are being endangered and subjected to indignities. If I felt in a position to set forth all the facts in detail today, you would, without any question, appreciate the soundness and full justification of the American attitude.'

Emphasising that contrary to the supposition prevalent in Japan the people of America had not been swayed by propaganda, whatever its source, and that the American belief that Japan's new order in China would involve the abolition of American rights and privileges in that territory, and would be inimical to the establishment of an orderly Asia, Grew urged that the Japanese people were not aware of the extent to which America had continued to tolerate the indignities inflicted on its citizens and the injuries inflicted on its possessions and rights....

This masterly marshalling of unpalatable truths in a frank, unhesitating and constructive manner, was appreciated as much by the Japanese press as by Americans throughout the Pacific. As was pointed out such an exposition of the fundamental truths would do much, in fact, would do all, to clarify the situation, and allow the two countries to grapple with the basic problems with

which they were confronted. The *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi* commended the speech as characteristically American, and rightly implied that the Japanese would have been incapable of such a bare recital of unpleasant and disagreeable details. Nevertheless, the paper urged that the Japanese government owed the Americans as much as it did its own peoples, a no less frank and fearless appraisal of the Japanese case in China. The Japanese people became conscience-stricken at the thought that the activities of their military forces in China had led to misunderstanding between Japan and America, and that injury had been inflicted upon the latter. When the *Panay* was sunk by Japanese airmen, Japanese of all classes called at the American Embassy in Tokyo expressing their regrets and offering monetary gifts much to the embarrassment of the American officials. These gifts amounted to £1,000,000 which sum was subsequently used for philanthropic purposes and for the restoration of historic sites bearing upon American-Japanese relations... This spontaneous manifestation of penitence of which the Japanese public is capable has been a source of bewilderment and embarrassment for such foreign observers who attempted to ascertain where hypocrisy, if there were any at all (of this they could not be certain), ended and sincerity began.

If appreciation was expressed by the press of Grew's disarming frankness, reaction of a more hostile nature was not slow in setting in. Phrases such as 'anti-Japanese gesture', 'intimidating bluff', 'personal challenge' and so forth cluttered the reactionary press, while the army fascists aided and abetted by the patriotic societies, which commanded efficient propaganda facilities, aroused the masses to a pitch of virulent anti-Americanism. The reception to Grew's speech was clearly not favourable, and if the American authorities had banked on the possibility of a conciliatory and understanding co-operativeness from the Japanese, they had again as always, manifested a deplorable ignorance of Japanese psychology and the workings of the Japanese mind. The semi-official reaction to Grew's statement was contained in a statement

of the Institute of the Pacific, an organisation which numbered among its membership such personages as the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and Yosuke Matsuoka, former president of the South Manchurian railway. Its argument ran as follows :

- (a) Ambassador Grew should make a further study of the existence of a *de facto* war and arrive at a more realistic conclusion.
- (b) Americans forget that what they conceive to be peace, in reality, is nothing more than the maintenance of the status quo, namely, the perpetuation of the situation that permits satiated nations to remain so for ever, while the less favoured nations must be content with their present lot. Peace brought about by the maintenance of the status quo created by treaties under vastly different conditions from those prevailing today may be undesirable and impossible to maintain.
- (c) Damages to American lives and property in China are regrettable, but it must be remembered that hostilities on a large scale are actually in progress. American lives and property are exposed to the same risk and danger as those found in war-torn Europe.
- (d) Fear that American rights and interests in China will suffer fatally as a result of the war in China is ill-founded.

Already it was appreciated in knowledgeable American circles that the abrogation of the trade treaty and Grew's speech, however well intended and however completely in consonance with the tenets of Western diplomacy, were destructive of the peaceful and progressive ends which the Roosevelt administration had sought by their use. It was urged that America's discriminatory exclusion of Japanese immigrants from American territory, whether for economic reasons or on the basis of an assumed racial inferiority, should be

abolished or suitably modified, so that the inconsistency inherent in America's complaint of discriminatory measures against her by the Japanese in China, should likewise be removed. The *New York Sun's* well-known commentator contended that it was possible to recognise Japan's sphere of influence 'without impairing either China's integrity or Japan's economic opportunities'.

As it happened however, the abrupt abrogation of the trade treaty and Grew's speech (the tone of which cannot really be appreciated by Oriental peoples) made it absolutely impossible for Japan to reconcile herself to the American viewpoint without allowing what is to the Japanese a most repugnant concession—a complete loss of 'face'. This psychological factor was ignored or overlooked by the Roosevelt administration, with the inevitable result that the Japanese reaction was the very reverse of what the American authorities had expected. If the American government were then prepared for a 'show-down' in the Pacific, no harm would have been done, but it was the intention of the Grew-Roosevelt policy to seek the co-operative goodwill of the Japanese, and for the attainment of this end had selected a form of political pressure-cum-frankness-cum-friendly-gestures to which the Japanese reacted with suspicious hostility, and indeed could not react otherwise (from their point of view) without losing 'face'. The militarist fascists moreover were given the grist on which they could grind their mill.... They had suffered a temporary eclipse, but with the emergence of America with a policy which was cunningly interpreted as being 'highhanded arrogance', they were able slowly to insinuate themselves back into prominence. Stress was laid on the barren futility of diplomatic negotiations and mere use of words, and the need for 'positive action' and 'resolute determination' was dinned into the public by incessant propaganda. The outcome was that ultimately Japan reconciled herself in a mood of irritation, to her determined policy of establishing a 'new order' in China, regardless of the attitude or threatened measures of the United States. Though the prospect of meeting the treaty-less situation which

was due on January 26th, 1940, was intimidating, assurances were given in the Japanese press that provisions for such a contingency had been prepared.

DEFINITION OF JAPAN'S NEW ORDER

It was thus in an atmosphere of unpromising gloom that the series of Nomura-Grew conversations were launched, the outcome of which was the opening of the Yangtse river to commercial shipping between Shanghai and Nanking, and the realisation by both negotiators that the fundamental differences between the two countries were seemingly insurmountable. There was no doubt, there could be no doubt, in the Japanese mind that America had committed herself fully to the policy exemplified by the abrogation of the trade treaty and Grew's speech before the Japan-America Society. An American memorandum presented by Ambassador Grew unequivocally set forth the requisite conditions under which a new commercial treaty could be negotiated. The gist of the American contention was that discriminatory measures against American trade and interests precluded the possibility of any reciprocal trade treaties. It was furthermore, pertinently remarked, that the clarification of Japan's new order in less uncertain terms was desirable. Japanese descriptions of the new order were extremely ambiguous and in so far as they were subject to interpretation, were not in consonance with the activities of the Japanese in China. Assurances that the establishment of the new order would not involve the exclusion of America and other foreign powers from economic and political participation were not sufficient, in view of activities contrary to these assurances, to convince third powers in China of the good faith of the Japanese government. No detailed and explicit programme of Japan's new order had been prepared, and Japanese politicians' politico-mystical 'explanations' were vague enough and Japanese military

activities were definite enough, to compel foreign observers and governments to draw the worst possible conclusions. If Japan thus complained that her 'mission' was misunderstood, it was, as American Ambassador Grew implied, entirely due to her own shortcomings. If again, Japan, required the economic co-operation of the United States in the reconstruction of China and the establishment of the new order, it was surely in her own interests—the American argument ran—to refrain from the flamboyant disregard of foreign and particularly American rights and interests in China, and instead seek to cultivate a co-operative and friendly atmosphere conducive to peace and mutually profitable collaboration.

There was much to be said for the above argument, for in spite of the perpetual references to the new order in East Asia by both the Japanese press and diplomatic circles, the Occidental mind with all the goodwill in the world was unable to grasp the new doctrine beyond the diplomatically embarrassing suspicion that the 'order' was but a cover for territorial expansion and economic exploitation. What could be made of the statement issued by the Institute of the Pacific that 'the new order in East Asia envisages a situation permitting participation in East Asia in moulding the future destiny of the world on the basis of complete equality with the West. In so far as they are compatible with this objective, the rights and interests of all third powers will be fully and adequately respected',—what could be made of this vague flourish, when American protests about personal injuries and property losses and outstanding issues remained unanswered and ignored, and when Japanese military activities continued with unabated vigour and undiminishing threat to American interests and rights? Where did sincerity end and hypocrisy begin?

'On the contrary,' the Institute declared, 'we welcome the co-operation of Western nationals in the future up-building of new Asia. We sincerely hope that our American friends will understand our real aim and co-operate in its attainment. This, in our opinion, will

contribute in the end to the consolidation of peace in the Pacific region.' Mingled with this simulated gesture of friendly co-operativeness, was an underlying fear of American embargoes following the expiration of the commercial treaty on January 26th. Repeated expression of the hope that a new trade agreement would be arranged before the fatal date, reflected the tension developing within the inner circles of the Japanese government. Though the opening of the Yangtse river 'subject to certain restrictions deemed necessary for maintenance of peace and order and for military operations' was acclaimed by optimistic elements as portending a radical readjustment of American-Japanese relations, the point was not worth labouring that major American grievances and outstanding issues between the two countries, were left unattended and unresolved.

Concrete demonstrations of goodwill as opposed to mere oratorical flourishes and well-intended phrases, and a concentration upon major issues as distinct from irrelevant minor ones, were primary conditions before the American government was willing to consider proposals for a new commercial agreement. Manifestations of co-operative goodwill were not forthcoming from the Japanese government which, though obviously perturbed at the thought of a treaty-less relationship with the United States, appeared to reconcile itself to the inevitable and disregard American protests and threats. This determined attitude was due in a great measure to the Japanese psychological reaction to American policy founded on Grew's address and the abrogation of the commercial treaty, but was also partly to be attributed to the growing conviction that the United States government would not commit itself to any provocative move following the expiry of the trade treaty in January. The Japanese always prepared to attribute to others the Machiavellian ingenuities of diplomatic bluff, were certain that America had gone so far and would not go further. It had in fact shown its hand. . . . There was a time when the belief was widespread that the Americans 'meant business', that the

Roosevelt administration was prepared to impose sanctions and embargoes and other economic measures and forms of pressure. Such threats were identified with the vitriolic Senator Pittman who urged the placing of an embargo on the exports of war materials to Japan; simultaneously American naval movements in the Pacific appeared to buttress the contention that America was prepared to go further than the abrogation of the trade treaty, even at the risk of precipitating a Pacific war. If this belief had been carefully created and maintained, the Japanese would not only have made material gestures towards the improvement of American-Japanese relations (despite considerations of 'face'), but would certainly have reacted more favourably to American 'feelers' such as Grew's speech.

The Americans began to lose the advantages which they had won by their threat to follow up the expiry of the treaty with embargoes, by engaging in a controversy among themselves as to whether such measures should be resorted to or not. Powerful sections of opinion were staunchly opposed to any such measures, while the then Under-Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Japan Mr. William R. Castle argued succinctly and outspokenly against the application of an embargo. Senators, chambers of commerce, civic bodies and other organisations ranged themselves—for motives which were not difficult to ascertain—against any form of embargo. President Roosevelt and his immediate advisers refrained from identifying themselves with any extreme measure such as that advocated by Senator Pittman. The Japanese thus concluded that they could call the bluff. The appointment of Nomura to the post of Foreign Minister, the opening of the Yangtse subject to certain conditions which were never specified, the settlement of minor issues, and the consideration, for a time, of the appointment of Yosuke Matsuoka as Ambassador to Washington were all temporary and indefinite measures such as would be of no consequence or would be scrapped if in the course of time, the Americans were seen to be undecided as to their policy after the expiry of the trade treaty.

The Japanese sought a precedent in the Manchurian affair when the intimidation policy of Stimson was discovered to lack any effective sting as it was not buttressed by appropriate action. This, plus the psychological reasons which we have advanced, plus the indecision and strife within the inner circles of the government, made impossible any concerted attempt sincerely to re-adjust American-Japanese relations. Meanwhile as the deadline of January 26th approached with its contingent possibility of embargoes on essential war materials to Japan, the Japanese tended to adopt delaying tactics, in the hope that the United States would initiate negotiations of a more conciliatory nature or that the international situation might afford Japan an opportunity to resolve the problems with which she was faced.

Meanwhile the not over-confident Abe cabinet carried a handbag of no less irritating problems bearing on the home front. Bitter disputes within the Foreign Office over the establishment of an independent trade ministry, the problems of effective and equitable price control, acute shortages of certain goods, maldistribution, and the preparation of unprecedented budget estimates—these were not measures to improve the temper of the nation. To aggravate the situation, was the manifest inability of the Abe cabinet to arrive at an understanding with the United States (this was not surprising in view of the fact that such an 'understanding' involved the recognition by the U. S. of the new order), and its even more irritating and incompetent handling of the establishment of the new China central political regime under Mr. Wang Ching-wei. Stress was laid on the necessity of convincing the nation's populace of the magnitude of the task in China, and that inconveniences and sacrifices were accordingly necessary and inevitable. The Abe programme thus included the launching of a material mobilisation campaign, control of prices and production and seeking the nation's co-operation by dinning into them the specific reasons why hardships would have to be borne during the period that lay ahead.

Controversies on the abolition of the law guaranteeing

the security of government officials which the military favoured and the Privy Council opposed further weakened the fabric of the government. This was followed by Abe's futile effort to enlist the support of the political parties which since 1937 had been in a state of suspended animation. Mr. Chuji Machida, president of the Minseito party to whom Abe had offered a post, was unwilling to join an already considerably weakened cabinet with the 75th session of the Diet in the offing. Similar difficulties were encountered with other political parties, and it could not be disguised that Abe had suffered a blow to his prestige from which it would be impossible to recover. Demands for a party government, and the denunciation of the Abe cabinet for its lack of confidence and ability heralded the gradual eclipse of the government. Political circles anticipated a most lively 75th session, for the political parties though generally willing to support the government as regards its China policy were far from satisfied with the handling of domestic issues and of certain aspects of foreign relations, especially with Russia, Britain and the United States. Heated attacks were expected on the record budget, the reform of the taxation system and the mobilisation of materials. There was nothing to prevent a ruthless and critical examination of various commodity shortages and of the government's foreign policy.... Members of the Price Commission had already taken the Abe cabinet to task for what they deemed to be inadequate and incompetent policies. Generally therefore prognostications of the collapse of the Abe government were justified, as the magnitude of the political typhoon which confronted it was such as no government of a texture as weak as that of Premier Abe's administration could possibly survive.

The Japanese press took up positions for the onslaught on the administration and barbs of criticism flew through the tense political atmosphere. More serious however was the anti-administration campaign launched by political leaders inside and outside the Diet. A delegation supposedly representing 250 members of the Lower House presented the Premier with a resolution

urging that in view of the obvious incapacities of the cabinet it should forthwith resign office. The Premier stoutly maintained that he and his colleagues were committed to the task of bringing the China affair to a satisfactory conclusion, and he could not therefore but reject the delegation's request. Diet members and political leaders with whom the Premier's relations were estranged, accused the Abe cabinet of clinging to office despite its obvious shortcomings. The opposition was daily becoming intolerable, though the government continued to reaffirm its determination to bring about a happy ending to the China 'affair'.

A climax was reached when the customary New Year statements by various members of the cabinet, without exception, emphasised the difficulties with which the nation was faced, and called upon the nation to bear inevitable hardships willingly and extend co-operative assistance to the government. Premier Abe, perhaps unwisely, did not mince words, but declared without equivocation that the situation did not warrant optimism. Further sacrifices, he stressed, would be necessary, if the 'reconstruction of East Asia' was to be satisfactorily effected. This tone of pessimism by both the War and Navy Ministers, was followed by Finance Minister Aoki's statement which carried the doleful pessimism into an outright lament. To crown these solemn dirges was the announcement by the Commerce and Industry Minister, Vice-Admiral Godo, that no alleviation in the general shortage of commodities and materials could be foreseen, and suggested the possibility of even more stringent control of national economy.

To careful observers of the drama that was being enacted on the Pacific stage, and especially on the Japanese side, the sudden agitation for the removal of the Abe cabinet was significant. Ostensibly, the cause of the unrest was the unsatisfactory state of affairs on the home front, with a no less serious situation threatening foreign relations. Yet it required no unexceptional penetrative powers to appreciate the fact that elements within the

Japanese body politic were exploiting the Abe cabinet's weaknesses and shortcomings to effect its downfall for reasons other than those which aroused the masses and Diet members. Although since the Soviet-German non-aggression pact the Abe government had seemingly started 'on a clean slate', the original strife on the issue as to whether Japan should seek an alignment with the Axis powers or not, continued to simmer and fester behind the scenes. With the crisis in American-Japanese relations and increasing complications on the home front, certain elements which favoured a policy of 'determined action' were becoming impatient. The prolonged 'sitting-on-the-fence' policy which the cautious diplomats had adopted did not recommend itself to this progressive section of opinion. Extremists regarded with disfavour such moderate policies of the Abe government as the liquidation of the anti-Comintern Axis, non-interference with the European war, and the attempted readjustment of relations with Britain and the United States. A mere change in the personnel of the government was not powerful enough a measure to solve internal and foreign problems; but such a change could possibly lead to the adoption of policy more favourable to the ultimate conclusion of an understanding with the Axis powers. Negotiations with the democracies were unfruitful, and the methods used by the United States were regarded as provocative; it was time therefore—so the militarist fascists argued—to cease the futility of waiting and watching and forthwith seek to strengthen Japan's ties with Axis powers. Fundamentally, the struggle between the moderates and liberals on the one side, and the extremists on the other, was again being developed into a pitch of critical anxiety creating a situation similar to that immediately prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact. The alternatives which Japan had, were clear. Either a peace with China which would lead to the solution of all internal and external problems and which would involve the abandonment of the new order programme, and which would therefore be utterly impossible for the Japanese, or a determined attachment

to the policy of continuing the struggle in China regardless of consequences. The latter, as it would further estrange relations with the democracies, would lead to a Japanese alignment with the Axis powers.

The fascist militarists advocated the second policy; they had suffered a certain degree of eclipse following the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, and had accordingly surrendered the stage to a moderate cabinet headed by Abe. The diplomats had then adopted a policy of wait and see, and a tentative approach toward the readjustment of foreign relations had been made. These had turned out to be unsatisfactory and unfruitful. America had shown an intolerably hard hand, and negotiations were at a stalemate. The new order in China could not be abandoned; with the abrogation of the trade treaty American-Japanese relations could not be improved. The only way out, reasoned the fascists, was one of 'blood and iron'.

The liberals and moderates were opposed to any form of totalitarianism and disliked Nazi-fascism as much as they decried the precipitate methods of the militarists. They had fought the fascists against any alignment with the Axis, and had been on the verge of losing the political battle when the Soviet-German pact had saved them. They were inevitably committed to Japan's China policy and were not inclined to oppose it, but their cautious diplomacy favoured recourse to every method short of war which they feared would involve risks disastrous to the nation. They believed furthermore that Japan's interests, commercial, financial, political and cultural, could be best served by maintaining an attitude of co-operative friendliness with major powers such as Britain and the United States.

Such then were the rival factions, broadly considered, when the Abe cabinet was faced with a crisis in the new year of 1940—the year of the dragon according to the Japanese zodiac. By this time it was apparent to Abe, following a significant meeting with the War Minister General Hata who had previously contacted

members of the Supreme War Council, that the cabinet would receive a vote of no confidence when the Diet convened after the New Year holidays. Before the prospect of this supreme humiliation the unfortunate Abe's former resolutions and stubborn determination melted without further ado, and the resignation of his cabinet *en bloc* logically followed.

The governmental hive was immediately in ferment, as its various elements and bodies commenced buzzing with anxious activity. Political leaders and statesmen close to the Throne were feverishly manipulating their political strings, while the Pacific world and the world beyond, immersed as it was with the war in Europe, awaited with interest, the outcome of this seething confusion. Generally it was felt that a distinct tendency toward totalitarian fascism would be manifested in the new cabinet, and the name of General Hata was advanced as the next prospective premier. This guess in the dark however followed from the assumption that the liberal elements and the anti-fascist bodies such as the Privy Council were not powerful enough to maintain a staunch and determined front. Prince Konoye, President of the Privy Council, contacted Mr. Kurabei Yuasa, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, while the ubiquitous Baron Harada, secretary-reporter of Prince Saionji, adviser to His Majesty the Emperor, held conversations with both the above personages and with General Abe, and then trotted off to the aged and wise Genro with his findings.

THE YONAI CABINET

Although the fascists had effected the downfall of the Abe cabinet, they were yet not in a position to press for the establishment of a government displaying totalitarian fascist tendencies while men of the calibre of Prince

Saionji and Prince Konoye, and moderate bodies such as the Privy Council and sections of the navy and business circles, not to mention the Emperor himself, contrived to deflect Japan's course into the path of peace. Thus, it was understandable, though surprising to the majority of observers, that Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai was called upon to undertake the next premiership. It could not be doubted that the Genro (Elder Statesman or Prince Saionji) in conjunction with Prince Konoye and the Privy Council had exercised their traditional powers in preventing the establishment of an extremist premier at the head of the new government, and in appointing a moderate to counteract the increasingly fascist tendencies of certain sections of the body politic. As became evident subsequently Yonai's government was a mere superficial reshuffling of the cards, and a futile continuation and extension of the policies enunciated by Abe; if the exasperation of the progressive fascists had led to the downfall of the latter, the counteracting influence of the moderates placed Yonai as premier of the new cabinet. That was the essential point of the cabinet change, providing no transformation of fundamental Japanese policies in China and vis-a-vis foreign powers, but increasing the intensity of the extremists-versus-moderates struggle that continued within the inner circles of the government.

American and British reactions to the appointment of the new premier were more of relief than hope; it was recognised that a breathing space had at least been obtained, and that impatient though the extremists were to expedite matters, the Japanese body politic was yet reluctant to abandon the wait-and-see policy while the international situation remained in a state of unresolved confusion. Significance was attached to the Emperor's conversations with General Hata whom Hirohito had summoned to the palace, following the decision that he was to continue as the Army Minister under Admiral Yonai. It was reported that the Emperor demanded the full co-operation of the army in working with the new cabinet. This was a most unusual move on the part of

the Emperor, and threw some light on the extent to which the moderates (including the Emperor) feared that the militarist fascists might precipitate a crisis. As Navy Minister in the Hayashi, Konoye and Hiranuma governments, Yonai had distinguished himself as an extremely safe moderate—a seemingly paradoxical description which sums up the Admiral's political capacity.

Foreign comments generally expressed satisfaction that a moderate course would be pursued by the Yonai cabinet, but the reaction on the home front was far from completely favourable. The Emperor's plain hint to General Hata that the militarist faction had to accommodate itself to the requirements of the situation as seen by the Emperor's statesmen, was an open indication of the unwilling co-operation forthcoming from the fascist quarter. The Yonai government's decision to refrain from deviating radically from the policies followed by the Abe cabinet, placed the militarist fascists in a position identical to that which had provoked them to cause the collapse of the preceding government. Discontent was thus evident from the beginning, though the general public (always trustful of navy moderates) and business and financial quarters, were not slow to welcome the new cabinet. The Seiyukai and Minseito parties, the two major parties in the Lower House the members of which, for reasons other than those of the militarists, had brought about the fall of the Abe cabinet, extended positive promises of co-operative assistance to the Yonai government.

Non-involvement in the European war, independent relations with the Soviet Union for the settlement of Manchukuo border incidents and the fisheries dispute, and a friendly readjustment of relations with Britain and the United States—these were the essentials of the Yonai cabinet's foreign policy; in the domestic field efforts were to be made to stabilise prices, prevent inflation and ensure an adequate flow of supplies. The policies being identical to those of the previous cabinet, speculation was widespread as to which faction, the extremists

or the moderates, had benefited in the reshuffle of cards. While the Premier and his Navy Minister, Vice-Admiral Zengo Yoshida, were representative of what was understood to be the moderate clique, the fire-brands were adequately represented by General Kuniaki Koiso as Overseas Minister and General Hata as War Minister. The balance was being maintained, though dissatisfaction among the extremists was as pronounced as anxiety was paramount among the moderates. Criticism was also encountered from the Social Mass Party which regarded the new government as the 'camp of the status quo political parties.' Members of the Cabinet Advisory Board including extremists of the calibre of Nobumasa Suetsugu and Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, though requested by Yonai to remain in office in spite of the change in the cabinet, were reported to have refused unconditionally. . . .

The skilful moderation or compromise which Yonai's government maintained between the extremists and the liberals was illustrated in its decision to abandon the project for the establishment of a Ministry of Trade about which controversy in the Foreign Office (under Nomura) had contributed to the weakening of the Abe government. The opposition of over one hundred officials of the Foreign Office had led to an unsatisfactory compromise. Foreign Minister Nomura had attempted to champion the views of the Foreign Office at a cabinet meeting but had been over-ridden by the vigorous support which Aoiki afforded the new Trade Ministry which could not be distinguished from a totalitarian control of industry, trade and economy and of all such administrative machinery bearing upon production and distribution. At the time surprise had been expressed by the press that the Abe cabinet had the temerity to incur the displeasure of the Privy Council whose hostility to all innovations smacking of totalitarianism was well-known. The suspicious anger of the Privy Council had already been incurred on the question of the grant by imperial ordinance of greater powers to the premier. This measure, the totalitarian origins of which are

obvious, had not been submitted to members of the Privy Council for their approval, and its sanction by His Majesty the Emperor had evoked emphatic protests from the Privy Councillors. The latter rightly maintained that they ought to have been consulted, and that the new Imperial ordinance extending the power of the premier was not necessary as he already held authority superior to that of other state ministers. Explanations by the Abe government why the Privy Council had not been consulted and why the extension of the premier's existing powers was necessary for the application of the provisions of the National Mobilisation Law, had been brushed aside as unsatisfactory by the Privy Council. Further critical opposition by the latter body was restricted by the fact that the Emperor had already sanctioned the new measure.

The abandonment or 'shelving' of the Trade Ministry project by the Yonai government reflected as much the practical interests of Mr. Ginjiro Fujiwara, Minister of Commerce and Industry, who represented the industrial and business circles of the country, as it did the moderation and anti-totalitarianism of Yonai and his moderate colleagues. For the rest the statements of individual members of the new government were nothing more than a repetition of the usual formula. Readjustment of relations with America, especially in connection with issues pending between the two countries, and the pursuit of the seemingly evanescent and elusive 'understanding' with foreign powers including Britain and Russia were,—declared Foreign Minister Arita—the fundamentals of the new government's policy. Foreign observers who were apt to accept political gestures and labels at their face value, were already crowing with sickly optimism, the impossible Mr. Chamberlain referring to the 'improvement' in the Far Eastern situation, during the course of a speech before the House of Commons.

Nothing of an extremist or anti-extremist nature could be expected from a cabinet such as that of Yonai which was to function more in the nature of a stop-gap,

than in that of a government with a fully established and oriented policy. This was due to the controversy that continued to rage within the inner circles of the government regarding Japan's policy vis-a-vis the European war. The uncertainty which prevailed over the European war fronts, no less than the power of the contending factions, produced a stalemate which could not be described as other than a policy of wait-and-see. For it was felt—and rightly—that revolutionary changes in the international situation would afford Japan the opportunity to align herself finally with one or other of the world's ideological camps. Secluded isolation, and an exclusive concentration on the task of creating a new order in China, were obviously impossible courses, though they were optimistically advocated by those whose craving for peace had blinded them to the realities of the situation. So long as Japan committed herself to her much-advertised new order in China which obviously incurred the displeasure of the democracies, so long was it inevitable that a clash would occur in the Pacific. . . . She could not afford to adopt a permanent wait-and-see policy while one or other of the belligerents—either the Axis powers or the democracies—emerged victorious and powerful, to challenge Japan's incursions in China and Manchukuo. A decision had perforce to be made, but the making of decisions, especially momentous ones such as that which confronted the government during the period under survey, is a prolonged and controversial and difficult process prolific with possibilities which cannot be predicted.

The Yonai cabinet was the latest stop-gap while the moderates attempted to restrain the impatient military fascists who were fiercely attacking those elements which regarded any form of totalitarianism with the greatest repugnance and alarm. As an indication of the heightened tension prevailing throughout the Japanese body politic, came the vigorous interpellation of courageous little Mr. Takao Saito during the Diet session. Seldom before had the Diet and the nation been thrown into such a confused uproar as that which followed the stinging criticism and inquiry of Mr. Saito into the avowed objectives

of the China campaign and of the new order in East Asia. His caustic comments and frank tone of exasperated disapproval pierced the political atmosphere with the pungency of unrestricted outspokenness unparalleled in the history of Japanese domestic politics. His speech was in the best traditions of parliamentary debate and criticism, and though the sentiments which Mr. Saito, as a member of the Minseito party, voiced, were representative of an enlightened section of the public, the degree to which he had exercised 'freedom of speech' could not be tolerated by the government. Saito's interpellation was deleted from the records, and excluded from the newspapers, while his conduct was referred to the House Disciplinary Committee. The Minseito and other political parties in the ranks of which reverberating disturbances were caused, appeared to express disapproval not so much of Mr. Saito's comments as of the manner in which he had made them. No denial of the validity of his criticism was forthcoming, but it was felt that Mr. Saito's conduct was most un-Japanese and that a more discreet and indirect channel of criticism could have been employed to better advantage. Army pressure resulted in the expulsion of Mr. Saito from the Diet, but this little, hard-hitting Japanese won a place for himself in the heart of every foreigner in Japan—and probably in that of many a Japanese as well.

ASAMA MARU CASE

With American-Japanese relations in an unspeakable condition, the deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relationship was hardly unavoidable. The course of events, maliciously and deliberately favoured the emergence of incidents in which the interests of Britain and Japan were diametrically opposed. The announcement in December 1939 by the British government that all German exports carried by neutral vessels would be seized had elicited a vigorous protest from the Japanese,

and the stage was therefore set for a major issue which would precipitate matters between the two countries. . . . Such an issue arrived in the form of the *Asama Maru* case when a British cruiser stopped this vessel approximately 35 miles off the Japanese coast, and removed twenty-one German passengers alleged to be technicians attempting to return to Germany. If it had been the policy of the Chamberlain government to provoke the Japanese into a state of indignant emotionalism, and afford the country the opportunity to alienate itself from the democracies and join the Axis, it could not have chosen a better course than the removal of the Germans from the Japanese vessel in Japanese territorial waters. Apart from considerations of international law the intricacies of which are immaterial to the point at issue, that is British policy in the East, there was every reason to interpret the British action as another singular manifestation of bungling.

Britain had already committed itself to a policy of conciliating Japan, and being immersed in problems of a more immediate nature in Europe, had appointed America as her watch-dog in the Pacific. Having once displayed her inability to adopt a strong stand against the Japanese the Chamberlain government could ill afford at that time of the day to indulge in bouts of what was termed 'determined action' under circumstances that were extremely irritating to the Japanese.

The whole nation was unanimous in denouncing the British action as an insult to Japan and as a flamboyant example of high-handed behaviour which ill accorded with the concessional flourishes at the Tientsin parley. The most elementary knowledge of Japanese psychology would have precluded such a fatal error, merely for the sake of a party of Germans, and which later involved yet another British concession to the Japanese. It was not so much that the Japanese were particular about legalities bearing upon international law (though much controversy regarding this point was provoked), or that they were anxious that Hitler should have his technicians

back. The source of their indignation was the realisation that the British had acted without respecting the sensibilities of the Japanese peoples, and without studying the situation from the point of view of the Japanese. That a Japanese vessel should be challenged and stopped a few hundred miles from Japan by a British cruiser, was sufficient to convince the masses of the 'antagonistic and unfriendly' attitude of the democracies. The master of the Japanese vessel was reprimanded for not having communicated with the Navy Office in Tokyo and disregarded the British challenge; controversies and protests and demonstrations and emotional fireworks swept the country like waves of lightning. The Chamberlain government had verily put its foot into it. . . .

For weeks enlightened elements, British, American and Japanese had been contriving to effect an understanding—and now to the delight of the military fascists—an unwise move brought the edifice to the ground. The American government with its abrogation of the trade treaty and Grew's speech, and the British with their *Asama Maru* blunder, were palpably employing methods which Perry had originated when he opened up the Japanese islands to foreign trade slightly less than a century ago. Such outworn methods as the display of force or the more modern and characteristically European technique of diplomatic pressure, were not gestures to which the Japanese would react favourably. President Roosevelt was later to arrange American naval displays in the Pacific in the pathetic hope that Japanese policy would thus be affected. The precise effect of these methods, as foreign observers in Japan apprehensively realised, was to drive the Japanese into the hands of the Nazi-fascists and make them underline their determination to pursue the course which they had selected.

Whether the commander of the British cruiser acted on his own initiative or not is a matter about which it is futile to speculate. It is noteworthy that the British government was quick to appreciate the blunder that had been committed. Prominent men throughout Britain

expressed regrets while Prime Minister Chamberlain declared ' . . . nothing could be more distressing to us than that there should be in the minds of the Japanese people or the Japanese government, any idea that we had deliberately or intentionally exercised our belligerent rights as we see them, with want of courtesy or want of consideration for the Japanese people.' Unconfirmed reports stated that Ambassador Craigie tendered informal regrets for the incident, but the mischief had already been done. Fascist organisations and patriotic organisations commenced making capital of the affair, arousing the feeling of the masses against the democracies and stressing that the destiny of Japan necessitated an alignment with the Axis powers.

Negotiations between Ambassador Craigie and Foreign Minister Arita, though not as protracted as the Tientsin parleys, were nevertheless initially handicapped by the Japanese demand that the twenty-one Germans should be delivered to their care. This, the British government was unwilling to do, but the regrets which British official spokesmen had expressed, no less than the assurance of Chamberlain 'that the last thing we want to do is to affront the self-respect of a friendly nation with whom we want to live in peace', contributed much to alleviating the situation. When once the Japanese were assured that appropriate regrets had been tendered by the British government, they were not eager to complicate matters for the sake of a handful of Nazis. . . . Nine of the twenty-one Germans were returned and the incident was regarded as closed. Anti-British rumblings appropriately encouraged and stimulated by the patriotic societies, continued throughout the country. If a crisis had been avoided, also nothing had been done to improve relations between Japan and the democracies.

AMERICAN POLICY EXAMINED

Meanwhile the expiration of the treaty of commerce and navigation between America and Japan on January 25th brought relations to breaking point. Doubts as to whether the U. S. government would follow up the abrogation of the treaty with embargoes and economic pressure were replaced with a conviction that these measures would be resorted to and the Japanese attitude resigned to all eventualities. Both the expiry of the trade treaty and the *Asama Maru* incident gave the extremist elements in Japan the opportunity to insinuate themselves into positions of greater power, from which vantage ground, they were better able to conduct their campaign for the introduction of a totalitarian structure and the alignment of Japan with the Axis powers. The sweeping successes of the Nazi armies in Europe and the collapse of the Anglo-French front in that theatre of war, had far-reaching effects upon the course of the controversy within the Japanese government. . . . It was increasingly obvious that in the absence of any positive and concerted move to improve American-Japanese relations, the course of events would automatically lead to a situation in which the establishment of totalitarian militarism would not be preventable. Enlightened elements on both sides of the Pacific were energetically striving to effect an understanding, but the confinement of diplomatic activity to the issuing of statements regarding 'immutable' policies and principles, and the lodging of protests, provided no ground for the re-establishment of negotiations. The extinction of the trade treaty gave rise to a situation in which the American application of embargoes was a constant possibility. The logical continuation of the Roosevelt policy as exemplified by the abrogation of the commercial treaty and Grew's address before the America-Japan Society, was the application of embargoes and a general resort to economic pressure. If recourse had been taken to these measures, the Pacific conflict would have been precipitated before December 7th, 1941. . . . Opinion in the United States

was divided and the Roosevelt administration had by this time appreciated the fact that a 'firm and determined' policy far from evoking a favourable Japanese response, would unquestionably stimulate irresponsible elements to press successfully for an alliance with Germany and the Soviet Union. The necessity of adopting a cautious attitude was furthermore borne upon the Roosevelt administration by the overwhelming successes of the Nazi armies on the European continent. The United States could not afford to antagonise Japan while the Nazi menace continued to expand across the Atlantic....

These considerations, buttressed by the urgent pleas of those who had dedicated themselves to the cause of the preservation of Pacific peace, prevented the imposition of embargoes. To a certain degree the effects of the expiration of the trade treaty were nullified by an executive order at Washington on the basis of a presidential proclamation of 1872 by the terms of which Japan had been granted exemption from extra custom duties and other levies. These palliatives though commendable and springing from motives which are beyond criticism, were even less likely to win over the Japanese to a conciliatory understanding. The British it will be observed had started by making concessions and then—in the *Asama Maru* case—adopted a resolute stand, which was again subsequently abandoned in favour of a reconciliation. The American government, provoked to action by the unsatisfactory nature of the response—or lack of response—of the Japanese government, regarding American rights and interests in China, created the impression that it meant 'business' by abrogating the trade treaty and instructing Ambassador Grew to give expression to a few home truths in unequivocal language. Having committed itself to such a policy however, nothing could have been more derogatory to the interests of the democracies than the abandonment of the original stand and the adoption of a more conciliatory attitude. These bouts of alternating policies of determination and conciliation, the one arising from exasperation and other

being inspired by fears of precipitating a crisis for which the democracies were not prepared, resulted in a Japanese reaction of suspicious hostility. A more consistent policy either of conciliation leading up to a gesture of determined finality, or of staunch resolution from the first, would have deflected the course of events in the Pacific into a course the outcome of which might have been less disastrous than that of December 7th, 1941

Not a few sections of opinion in America and Japan had reconciled themselves to the inevitability of a conflict, on the basis of the realisation that Japan's new order as she conceived it practically, as contrasted with her theoretical conception of it, took no cognisance of American and third power rights and interests in East Asia, and that the viewpoints of the United States and Japanese were irreconcilable. Either America must abandon her interests in the East which was unthinkable, or Japan must confess her inability to establish her new order which also was no less impossible. Other more hopeful elements urged with unremitting zeal and unflagging patience, in an atmosphere of mounting hostility on both sides of the Pacific, that a *modus vivendi* at least was possible between the two countries. The complexity of the situation was due to the divided opinion in both America and Japan, both countries maintaining irresponsible elements which advocated a 'show-down' and a policy of 'blood and iron' irrespective of the consequences of these flamboyant measures, and both countries were not without a saner section of society which advocated the exploration of every avenue short of war for the achievement of a solution of the basic problems. Statements reflecting these shades of opinion on both sides of the Pacific were hurled across this stretch of water, while patriotic societies in the East and anti-Japanese agitators in the West raised the mobs in both countries to a fever of antagonistic emotionalism unparalleled in Pacific history. American and Japanese officialdom meanwhile maintained a helpless silence, not committing itself beyond the platitudinous formula that readjustments were being sought. . . .

Although a deadlock was thus reached in American-Japanese relations, both countries had yet failed to determine their final attitude toward the European war. But the lightning successes of the Nazi armies and the increasing possibilities of the war expanding beyond the confines of the European continent clearly necessitated that both America and Japan should clarify their stand. While the former was wracked with dissension between the interventionists and the isolationists, the latter similarly harboured a gigantic strife between the moderates and the extremists within the inner circles of the government. Japan could not continue to wait-and-see and sit-on-the-fence. The world-shaking expansion of fascist power in Europe, and the almost continuous deterioration in the relations between Japan and the democracies, favoured the case of uncompromising elements in Japan that an alignment with Germany and Italy should be sought and a totalitarian structure established at home. To the aid of the extremist forces came German 'technicians' and journalists with elaborate propaganda equipment, the gist of their argument being that the United States was hostile to Japan, and that her various forms of pressure constituted an obstacle to the establishment of Japan's new order in Asia. The infiltration of Germans at this stage into Tokyo was a marked feature of the tense and dramatic situation into which the Pacific was drawn. That they were exploiting the difficulties with which America and Japan were faced was obvious and that the moderate forces were, as a consequence, weakened became even more obvious. Frantic efforts were still made to bring about an eleventh-hour settlement—urgent pleas being addressed to the American government—by Americans—that as a gesture of goodwill and friendliness, the long-standing injustice of the Immigration Act of 1924 by which the Japanese were not accorded racial equality, should be rectified. Such a move it was declared would generate an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. . . .

On the American side, the appreciation of the Nazi menace from across the Atlantic, resulted in a marked

'softening' of the American attitude toward Japan, and the cautious avoidance of any statement or act which would prove provocative across the Pacific. These fluctuations in policy were futile, and deepened the suspicion that had already been aroused. The patriotic societies furthermore were adept in attaching sinister motives to the most innocent of American announcements or diplomatic flourishes, and the anti-Americanism of the Japanese masses was never allowed to flag. All the ills and sacrifices and inconveniences and obstacles and troubles which the patriotic societies could discover were attributed to American and British diplomatic villainy and hostility toward anything and everything Japanese.

The situation in Europe and to a lesser extent conditions prevalent in the East caused America to embark upon an extensive rearmament programme which involved the increased fortifications of Guam, Midway and Wake islands. These moves however were not meant and not received as intimidating, for on the political side, the Americans studiously endeavoured to convince the Japanese of their anxiety to avoid complications in the East while the course of events in Europe was becoming increasingly a source of critical anxiety. Thus, while Premier Yonai assured the Japanese public that they had nothing to fear from the American navy, Senator Pittman in surprising modification of his previous attitude, declared that his projected embargo resolution was not an unfriendly gesture toward Japan in so far as it did not constitute a statutory embargo but merely empowered the President to impose such a measure if subsequent events recommended it. On the Japanese side, there were unmistakable symptoms of the government's willingness to negotiate a new trade treaty, the Japanese government going so far as to provide Ambassador Horinouchi with a draft *modus vivendi* which was reportedly submitted to the American government for consideration. No material results could be expected from such a move for the Americans were determined that the problems directly arising from Japan's activities in China claimed priority attention, and that their solution constituted a necessary

preliminary to any negotiations for a commercial agreement. By this time however it was evident that these moves and counter-moves were nothing more than diplomatic flourishes, testifying not so much to a mutual desire to effect an understanding, as to the fatalistic helplessness which gathered over the Pacific like a threatening pall. . . .

Apart from the very real differences and obstacles that precluded the possibility of an understanding between the two countries, negotiations were so conducted that neither side was now in a position to commit itself to a far-reaching gesture without incurring a loss of 'face'—that most embarrassing Pacific affliction. The course of the European war was furthermore absorbing the interest and attention of both Japan and America, and both were accordingly conscious of the approaching inevitability of arriving at a decision in regard to their respective policies toward the war in the West. Foreign Minister Arita thus stated that any change in the status of the Dutch East Indies as a result of the conflict in Europe would be a matter of serious concern to the Japanese government. In its reply to this 'feeler' the German government issued a thinly disguised invitation for Japan to intervene in the Pacific and 'absorb' the said islands, and though viewed in retrospect, such an 'invitation' appears blatant enough, there could be no doubt of its effect during the tense period when the dramatic onrush of the Nazi forces, the deterioration of American-Japanese relations, and the major controversial issue between the moderates and the extremists, were developing into an emotional intensity that was very near breaking point. . . .

PRESSURE FROM EXTREMISTS

In the meantime Yonai had been closeted with the Cabinet Affairs Board, ostensibly discussing matters bearing upon Japan's establishment of a new order in East Asia, and her policy towards third powers vis-a-vis

China. The only indication of the trend of these discussions was the statement issued by the War Minister who declared truthfully that the situation both at home and abroad did not warrant optimism and that Japan should concentrate upon the 'establishment of impregnable defences'. The results of the conferences were subsequently communicated to the press as the general agreement that a stronger war-time economic structure should be founded. Following up this decision the governors of the various prefectures conferred with cabinet ministers on matters regarding Japan's national power, price control, commodity shortages and general problems bearing upon the strengthening of the nation's economic structure. By this time General Nobuyuki Abe, former premier, had left for Nanking as a newly-appointed 'ambassador' to negotiate a basic agreement with Mr. Wang Ching-wei, then acting president of the new national government of China. These structural changes in Japan's national economy and the abrupt acceleration of Japanese efforts to found a Chinese national government betrayed the impatient forces and influences that were seething beneath the normal façade of calm government and administration. The clarification of the U. S. government's attitude toward the Dutch East Indies, that the *status quo* should be maintained, and towards the new Nanking government, that recognition would not be accorded it by the United States, provoked suppressed and hidden forces to emerge in a particularly virulent form.

Pressure was undoubtedly being brought to bear upon the Yonai cabinet by elements favouring the establishment of a totalitarian structure at home, and an alignment with the Axis powers, and no less certainly, Yonai and his colleagues were attempting to counteract these influences—though more in the nature of a brake to such precipitate policies than in that of a positive anti-extremist front. As Navy Minister in the Hiranuma cabinet Yonai had clearly demonstrated his liberal views by staunchly opposing the conclusion of a German-Japanese military alliance, but the rapidly changing

international situation, the difficulties of the campaign in China, and the futility of negotiations with the United States; urged the extremist elements to the realisation that Japan could not now continue to sit on the fence and play an idle part in the world's political and military drama.... Postponement and evasions of the fundamental issue—whether or not Japan intended to ally herself with the Axis bloc—only tended to increase the problems and difficulties with which Japan was already confronted. With fatalistic ease the extremist faction and the patriotic societies declared that a clash with the United States and Britain was inevitable, as Japan's new order and Anglo-American interests could not accommodate each other, vast as the Pacific was; it was therefore in Japan's interests that they advocated a 'determined and firm' policy such as would, once and for all, clarify Japan's position vis-a-vis the democracies in the Far East. Such was the argument reflecting the extremist faction, and no doubt the German fifth column organisation which had established itself in the capital city, and occupied itself by manufacturing subtle propaganda for strengthening the case for a German-Italian-Japanese front against the democracies. Mention indeed was made in the press that the Nazi ambassador was exceeding his rights by making statements favouring the extremist faction in what was clearly at that stage a domestic issue.

SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT

Commentators had already predicted the fall of the Yonai government—the last stop-gap before Japan would commit herself to a definite policy. Demands for the establishment of a single party ostensibly for the double purpose of strengthening Japan's international position, and to expedite the liquidation of the China affair, indicated that extremist camp was gathering its forces for a headlong onslaught upon the liberal-moderates within the country. The sponsors of the single party movement

triumphantly declared that Prince Konoye had expressed his willingness to organise the new political body, but it was evident that Prince Konoye's motives in partially agreeing to extend his co-operation in the construction of the new single party, were other than those for which the extremists were working.

The internal situation within the inner circles of the government had become acute, and the vigorous advocacy by the pro-totalitarian elements of a fascist structure at home and an alignment with Germany, could not be countered other than by a compromise. Recourse was made to Konoye whose capacity for compromise and reconciliation was well-known and to which we have already referred. The respect and influence which he commanded among the nation's masses and in political circles, fully qualified him for the task of heading the new party structure, and—as the extremist fascists calculated—assuage prospective opposition from liberal quarters, and suspicion from the people. Konoye's motives were governed by the realisation, firstly, that the extremists could not be restrained further without incurring the risk of grave internal disturbances within Japan's body politic, and that therefore a compromise was necessary and inevitable ; secondly, that this compromise could most fittingly be in the form of an agreement for the establishment of a single political party approximating to a totalitarian structure. The latter, if controlled by himself, would preclude an absolute totalitarianism, and he would moreover be in a position to introduce certain features of political administration which he personally favoured. And the establishment of such a unified structure could be deflected to serve Japan's task in China and rigidly control the chaotic economic conditions at home, rather than to pave the way for an understanding with the Axis powers.

KONOYE CABINET

When once it was known that Konoye had, for reasons which could not be fully known, reconciled himself to the necessity of founding a single political party, all potential opposition to such a scheme was immediately nullified. Konoye, the nation felt, and the liberals hoped, knew what was best. . . . Initially Konoye cautiously intimated that he was unable to commit himself in any way, while he was yet engaged in preparing the plans of the new structure. In his interview to the press the Prince emphasised that the term 'new political party' did not precisely express the fundamental conception of the movement and its promoters, and suggested that 'new political structure' would be more in keeping with the principles underlying the projected political programme. The totalitarian flavour of the first title was obvious, while the second was vague enough to stand for any one of any number of 'new structures'. This elasticity of definition was characteristic of the Japanese tendency to favour vague expressions capable of being interpreted in any way appropriate to prevailing circumstances. Although a mass of explanatory literature was produced since the inception of the new political structure, few Japanese were able to describe it in explicit and unequivocal terms, and it remained for a Japanese diplomat to deliver an intelligible address on the new structure.

Konoye was at pains to stress that the new body would not be contrary to the spirit of the Japanese constitution, and that it would not involve the abolishment of the Diet. "The motif of the new structure," declared the Prince, "is the unification of the Supreme Command, the legislative and the administrative departments of the government and the people at large in order that they can merge into one to reach their goal. In other words, it means the revamping of national ideas and the reorganisation of the entire nation."

So soon as it was finally decided that Prince Konoye was to play a major role in the construction of the new

political party, there was a general movement on the part of existing parties to get on the band-wagon. The dissolution of these parties was a necessary preliminary to the launching of the new organisation, and it was natural that there should be a certain degree of political manoeuvring and grabbing of favourable positions. No one wished to be left out in the cold. . . . A few parties such as the Minseito failed to disband immediately, preferring to watch the trend of the movement and ensure that the new party was going to be all that its promoters professed. Premier Yonai and his cabinet, the dissolution of which was confidently predicted, significantly played no part in the new party deliberations; Admiral Yonai was still the embodiment of that spirit of catholicity to which a Tokyo journal referred when it wrote 'Of all the branches of the government, with the exception of the Foreign Office, it might well be said that the Japanese navy has a truly international outlook. . . .'

With the resignation of Prince Konoye from his post of President of the Privy Council, active measures in connection with the launching of the new party were undertaken by its sponsors. This was a momentous period in Japanese domestic political history, for the conception of a single, all-embracing political party had been advocated in multifarious forms during the last nine years. And the fact was therefore widely realised—or more appropriately *felt*, as it was more a matter of the feelings than of the intellect—that with the establishment of a single political party at the centre, inspired by the initial successes which totalitarian powers in Europe enjoyed, marked the entry of a new phase in Japan's short and meteoric modern history, and by the same token marked the passing away of a period in which whatever its defects a 'liberalism' of a kind had prevailed.

Meanwhile considerable agitation urging the abandonment of the non-involvement policy of the government and the conclusion of a military pact with the Axis was being created by the patriotic societies, while the sudden behind-the-scenes flurries among political sections favour-

ing the particularly violent hue of foreign policy advanced by these societies, led Japanese newspapers to comment significantly upon the decision of General Shunroku Hata, Minister of War, to consult the Premier regarding possibilities of 'closer ties' with Germany and Italy. This was the first definite intimation of the weakening fabric of the Yonai cabinet, and predictions of its collapse which had been made earlier, were again re-emphasised among political circles.

The tense atmosphere that swirled over the capital city of Tokyo awakened in the nether regions of the foreign correspondent's abdomen the feeling which he might normally expect if his posterior were attached to the mouth of a volcano. . . . He was conscious of the far-reaching effects of the decisions which were being hatched within the inner circles of the government; for all his light and pleasant flippancy he could not be unaware of the drama that was being enacted at this centre of Pacific diplomacy. The collapse of the Yonai government, if it did not mean war, would certainly mean that Japan had chosen the path of 'blood, iron and thunder'.

Konoye's emphasis that the new political programme envisaged a political structure rather than a political party, and his initial hesitations, followed by his declaration in early July that he was yet unable to assume leadership of the movement, substantiated the view that Konoye's attempted compromises with the fire-eaters were leading him into difficulties. The latter were pressing for a totalitarian party absolute, fashioned on the European models of which they were so enamoured. To this Konoye replied, 'I cannot participate in a movement if it is for mere changes in the existing political parties or a scheme for political power. . . .'

Fanatical nationalists among whom were Nobumasa Suetsugu, Toshio Shiratori, former ambassador to Italy, and Lieut.-General Hiroshi Oshima, former ambassador to Berlin (later re-appointed), clamoured in unison for a 'modification' of the non-involvement policy, and acclaimed Japan's right to participate in the 'construction

of a new world order' with Germany and Italy. The trend of political agitation may be observed by the fact that a new order in Asia had swollen to embrace a world order, and the terminology of Japan's spokesmen were subsequently such as to suggest that Japan's divine and holy mission involved the establishment of a universal new order to which the constellations would make obeisance. These were the conceptions to which the fiery imagination of the *League of Diet Members for the Attainment of the Objectives of the Sacred Campaign*, the *Peoples League for the Establishment of New East Asia*, and innumerable other cumbrously named organisations which styled themselves as 'patriotic', gave expression. The *League for Parliamentary Leaders for the Consummation of the Holy War* was another gathering of fanatics which was the spearhead and driving spirit of the new party project. Its success in persuading Konoye to assume leadership of the movement silenced much of the critical opposition which the new party programme would otherwise have provoked. Suspicious hostility was thus confined to business and financial leaders, and to liberal and naval circles of which Admiral Yonai was representative.

SIGNING OF TRIPARTITE PACT

In spite of the far-reaching transformations being enacted at home, and the increasing pressure that was being brought to bear upon the government by elements favouring an alignment with the Axis, Yonai's government continued to preach an 'autonomous policy' by the terms of which Japan would not incline toward any power totalitarian or democratic. She would pursue an independent course, committed to the major task of establishing a new order in East Asia. The enunciation, at this time, of what came to be known as the East Asia Monroe Doctrine by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hachiro Arita, was therefore most appropriate, and

appeared to clarify Japan's aims and objectives in East Asia. Mr. Arita's address was mainly concerned with the scheme which provided the establishment throughout the world of spheres based on racial and geographical distinctions, with one country designated as the stabilising force in each respective region. Earlier the President of the United States had intimated that any true application of the principles contained in the Monroe doctrine in any part of the world was to be welcomed, and the reaction therefore in the United States to Mr. Arita's 'stabilising spheres' was far from unfavourable. In so far as American rights and interests were not threatened any variation of the Monroe doctrine as applied to East Asia could be assured of American approval and even a certain measure of support.

Meanwhile the difficulties which had been anticipated for the Yonai government loomed into view with a sudden thoroughness which electrified the tension throughout the country. War Minister General Shunroku Hata, whose co-operation in the Yonai cabinet the Emperor had commanded, handed the Prime Minister a memorandum stressing the necessity of a change in the non-involvement policy owing to the transformation of the situation in Europe (the collapse of France), and proposed certain measures for the disposition of the China affair. Admiral Yonai immediately expressed his inability to comply with the War Minister's suggestions and pointed out that the latter was free to resign if he could not see his way to supporting the official and established policy of the government. General Hata presented his resignation on the spot, and at a conference of army leaders, it was decided that they would not accede to the Prime Minister's request for a new War Minister, thus leaving Yonai no alternative but to resign from his post. The Yonai cabinet's lukewarm attitude toward the Saito case, its non-sympathetic reception of the new party movement, its opposition to the army's demand for closer ties with the Axis, and its inability to handle China and domestic affairs in a manner such as to satisfy the army's impatience—these were

causes proceeding *pari passu* with revolutionary transformations in the international situation—thus generated a cumulative impact of disapproval which could not be borne by the Yonai cabinet.

With the collapse of the government, Japan reached the cross-roads and made a decisive turn. The liberals and moderates had acceded after prolonged opposition to the introduction of a more 'vigorous policy' which would involve Japan's alignment with the Axis powers. This concession to the militarist extremists centred on the acceptance by the moderates of the inevitability of a tie-up with Germany, but was far from indicating that the anti-extremist forces had as yet fatalistically resigned themselves to belligerent action. There was a nice distinction between selecting the war path and resorting to war, and if the moderates under tremendous pressure had acceded to the former they yet reserved the right and power to oppose the latter.

Conversations and consultations among the Emperor's advisers including the Lord Keeper Marquis Koichi Kido, Prince Konoye, Baron Hiranuma, Mr. Yuasa, Admiral Okada and a few others representing a new body of Genro or Elder Statesmen, resulted in Prince Konoye's receiving the Emperor's command to form a new cabinet. Prince Saionji, the last of the former Elder Statesmen, played little or no part in these deliberations and his death in November was symbolic as nothing else could have been of the new fascist era that had been ushered in, and the old era of liberal pseudo-democracy that had been hounded out.

Unlike former cabinet changes, the present one was brought about with a minimum of buzzing and governmental activity, for the indecision that had formerly prevailed in regard to the issue of Japan's alignment with the Axis no longer existed. Those who had caused the downfall of the Yonai cabinet knew what they were about and forthwith set about launching Japan on to the new path of 'blood, iron and thunder'. The only uncertain and puzzling factor on the political stage was Prince Konoye,

the new Premier. The nation's masses, the moderates and liberals and those who yet strove for the preservation of the peace in the Pacific, vested their faith in Konoye. Though a compromiser and capable of conceding much to the extremists, his followers knew that he would not compromise or concede unnecessarily, and that he would strive by means of his position as Prime Minister to avert war.

The three key-positions in the new cabinet were occupied by Lieut.-General Hideki Tojo as War Minister, Vice-Admiral Zengo Yoshida as Navy Minister, and the energetic Mr. Yosuke Matsunaka as Foreign Minister. With the formal investiture of the cabinet, consultations were immediately launched for deliberations upon the new government's revolutionary policies, the fact being obvious that the Konoye government would constitute a sharp break from the drab, vacillating normality of preceding cabinets. According to a statement by the Premier Japan's basic policies were to be as follows: Japan's full and unconditional acceptance of the principle of the establishment of a 'new world order', an unlimited expansion of national defences and a complete renovation of foreign policy such as would conform to the new situation in Europe. To facilitate the achievement of these objectives, a fundamental revision of the national structure was deemed necessary, and the new cabinet's activities following its assumption of office were therefore directed towards this end. The movement for a single political party which Konoye had termed the new political structure was thus merged with the government's projected revision and reorganisation of every aspect of national life. Politically, economically, socially, culturally and even in the field of religion, vast transformations were introduced, their common characteristic being a tendency toward centralised control and unified nationalism. The thorough efficiency with which the task of totalitarian unification was conducted excited as much the admiration as the apprehensions of the foreign observer. Hitherto the introduction of new government policies had been on a tentative basis, a compromise or a

stop-gap or a palliative which seldom affected the normal course of the individual's daily existence. The national structure movement however was obviously and definitely of a different calibre; no detail or sphere of activity was trivial enough to escape its attention; in every field of national endeavour it sought conformity to the government's basic policy of totalitarian unification under a single, directing body responsible to the Emperor.

PRINCIPLES OF NEW STRUCTURE

Towards the end of August Prince Konoye outlined the following points as basic to the new structure :

- (a) The basis of the proposed new national structure is the reorganisation of the people with the object of having the whole nation to assist the Throne in the conduct of state affairs.
- (b) There must be both a vertical and horizontal unification of economy and culture on a nation-wide scale.
- (c) There must be provision for the people to participate in the establishment of national policies.
- (d) The movement for the proposed national reorganisation cannot be a so-called political movement, and it must, therefore, not attempt to find expression in a single party for the nation.
- (e) The proposed national organisation must be of a permanent nature.

Secretarial staffs and a preparatory committee were appointed to undertake the preliminary work, and by the middle of September the foundations of the new structure were completed, and the permanent bodies consisting of the central headquarters with eleven departments and the Peoples' Co-operative Council, were

established. The former is the controlling agency, while the function of the latter is confined to an advisory capacity attached to the president of the central headquarters. The extremely political nature of the structure precluded the possibility of invoking the army's and navy's co-operative assistance, for the terms of the constitution do not allow of servicemen, not on the retired list, to participate in political movements. That the totalitarian movement received the army's blessings was however a matter about which there was no room for doubt.

During the last week of September the momentous decision which Japan's leaders had made following the collapse of the Yonai cabinet bore fruit in the form of the conclusion of a military alliance pact with Germany and Italy. This was the result, as we have seen, of a prolonged and bitter strife between the extremists and moderates which had reached its first crisis at the time of the Hiranuma administration and when the Soviet-German non-aggression pact deprived it temporarily of its driving impetus. The successes of the Nazi armies in Europe, and the failure of American-Japanese negotiations, buttressed by a subtle and penetrating Nazi fifth column propaganda, revived the controversy with added viciousness during the period of the Abe and Yonai cabinets. With the launching of the new structure movement and the growing strength of the extremist faction, the Yonai government found itself in an untenable position. Its resignation paved the way for the military alliance for which fire-brands had clamoured so long and so heatedly, and against which the moderates had struggled from concession to concession.

Although the announcement of the military alliance under the aegis of an Imperial Rescript was made with all the flamboyance and traditional formulae of which Japanese diplomats were capable, the news constituted a greater surprise to the Japanese populace than to foreign observers both in Japan and abroad. Japan's politico-ideological sympathy with the Nazi-fascists had for long

been suspected, and confirmation of this suspicion had been provided at the time of the Yonai cabinet's resignation. The arrival of Nazi chiefs and envoys in Tokyo and considerable activity centering on the German embassy had provoked much speculative wonder, the more so when a ban was imposed preventing newspapers from mentioning the presence of Heinrich Stahmer, Hitler's personal envoy, in Tokyo.

As was inevitable American reaction to the military alliance was cool and hostile, especially in view of the inclusion of the Article reading 'Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting Powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.' This Article was unmistakably directed against the United States which was then engaged in supplying Britain with the material assistance of which she was in dire need. American intervention in the European conflict could not be ruled out in spite of the activities of the isolationists, and the Article in question was presumed to be applicable if and when the United States entered the European war on the side of the democracies. In that event Japan would—it was believed—render Germany naval and military assistance by drawing America into a conflict in the Pacific. (A summarised version of the tripartite pact has been reproduced in the later sections of this work. The Imperial Rescript has also been included as representative of the character and tone of Emperor Hirohito's formal commands to the nation's populace.)

By this time many of those who had laboured for the cause of Pacific peace, ever since the first Konoye administration was confronted with the seeds of American-Japanese dissension, resorted to packing their bags and reserving cabins on vessels heading for home. The barren hopelessness of the situation was indeed only too apparent. Japan's alliance with Germany had finally

closed the door to any possible American-Japanese understanding, and the statement by Mr. Yakichiro Suma, the Foreign Office spokesman, that 'we have not abandoned hope for adjusting our relations with the United States, and are not changing our policy toward that country' was more incomprehensible than hopeful. How, in view of the alliance, Japan could continue to 'hope' for an understanding with the United States, was more than the foreign diplomatic and journalistic corps could pretend to understand. During the press correspondents' meeting with Mr. Suma at 9.45 in the evening of September 27th, the latter gentleman attempted to make himself understood to the eager group of newspapermen who had been summoned from their offices and beds and bars for this emergency conference. When asked if the treaty was aimed at the United States Mr. Suma replied in the negative and added that Japan 'has not abandoned hope of adjusting relations with other countries.' To the query whether the pact signified Japan's abandonment of the non-involvement policy, came the reply 'There is absolutely no change in our non-involvement policy as regards the war in Europe. Japan is not going to participate in an European war nor will she attack any country.' Much interest and significance was attached to Article 5, but requests for its clarification elicited the bland statement that the Article spoke for itself. Answering another query Mr. Suma stressed that the military alliance did not supersede the Anti-Comintern Pact, as the latter had nothing to do with the former. In concluding the conference the benevolently smiling Mr. Suma assured his audience that it was solely in the interests of world peace that Japan had allied herself with 'these great powers'.

It had formerly been pointed out by the penetrative American journal published in Tokyo, the *Japan News-Week*, that a Nazi-fascist alliance on the one part and an anti-Japanese embargo on the other, constituted two dynamite sticks, neither of which could be had without the other. An American embargo would, it was pointed out, precipitate Japan into the arms of the Axis, and an alliance between Germany and Japan, as it later turned

out, would compel the American government to retaliate by resorting to economic pressure and a general embargo. In expression of its disapproval and determination not to be deflected from the course which America had chosen, by the threat inherent in the military alliance with Germany, the American government immediately announced provisions for further material assistance to Great Britain, and the grant of a new loan to the Chiang Kai-shek government in China.

The official attitude of the Roosevelt administration was indicated by Under-Secretary of States Sumner Welles when he pointed out that the military alliance would not affect American assistance to Great Britain, and that so far as American-Japanese problems in the Far East were concerned, the American position was unchanged. He could not see any 'problem in the Far East which could not be peacefully solved through negotiation.' Much as American opinion was incensed by the conclusion of the German-Japanese military alliance, the Roosevelt administration realised that its failure to effect an understanding with Japan left no reasonable alternative but to maintain an attitude of passive non-attachment, as far removed as possible from resorting to extreme measures such as would precipitate a crisis in the Pacific. With the rapidly deteriorating Anglo-French position in Europe, the United States could not afford to indulge in gestures which would almost certainly be interpreted by Japan as hostile moves.

In Japan meanwhile there were signs which suggested either that the moderates had aroused themselves in a concerted attempt to avert a catastrophe or that the extremists were yet hesitating as to how far they should go or whether they had already gone far enough. The New Structure meanwhile was not progressing as smoothly as its sponsors wished, and much criticism was provoked on the score that the programme had not been adequately publicised, and was yet in an extremely ambiguous and vague form. So dilatory indeed was the structure in getting itself established and understood that a *League*

for Hastening the New Structure was launched, but the news was widespread that Konoye's opposition to any totalitarian single-party movement and his advocacy of a 'new political structure' such as would enable the nation unitedly to assist the Emperor, had aroused dissatisfaction among the extremist ranks. The latter understandably enough, sought to lay the greatest emphasis upon organising a single party as the controlling body at the centre, and requests to this end were therefore addressed to Konoye by fire-eaters, among them being Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto who won notoriety by shelling British gunboats, trading vessels, sinking the U. S. *Panay*, and machine-gunning the survivors—all 'by mistake'—urging that a 'simplification' of the structure was necessary.

In the course of his address before the Preparatory Committee Konoye replied 'As I have stated, the national structure cannot take the form of a political party, especially when it is led by the government. Neither can it be allowed to take the form of a single party system. This political system takes a 'part' and makes of it a 'whole'; it considers the State and the party as one and the same thing; it views any opposition to the party as a revolt against the State; it renders permanent the ruling position of one party, and of the head of that party as a permanent wielder of the power to govern. *No matter what brilliant results such a system may have reaped in other lands, it is not acceptable in Japan because it is contrary to the basic principle of our national polity of One Sovereign Over All. In Japan, it is the privilege of all His Imperial Majesty's subjects to assist the Throne and that privilege cannot be monopolised by the power of either a single individual or a single party.*' (italics ours)

The extremists were being compelled to pay the price of having Prince Konoye lead the new structure movement, for as the above statement clearly indicated, he was not prepared to complicate himself in any campaign approximating to Nazi-fascist totalitarianism. The innumerable conferences and discussions and the prolonged absence of any definite progress or explanatory announce-

ment, prior to the passing of the 8,000,000 budget for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, as the directive body of the new structure was labelled, led to sharp criticisms in the Diet. Premier Konoye was diplomatically 'ill' since the first week of February, and the Diet appeared to be dissatisfied with the arrangement that Baron Hiranuma, the Home Minister, should reply to the interpellations concerning the new structure and association. That freedom of speech and the right to criticise freely was not wholly lost, and that the critical broadside which members of the Diet fired against the Government was extremely caustic, were obvious deductions from the report that the House Disciplinary Committee was called upon during the session to maintain order.

Much of this dissatisfaction was directly attributed to the compromise which Konoye was again trying to effect between his national structure innovations and the absolutely totalitarian concept of a single party. The delays and hesitations arising from this compromise, and the disparity between Konoye's enunciation of the new movement's objectives and that of the extremists with whom the Premier was supposedly working in harmonious co-operation, created uncertainty of which the Diet was justifiably suspicious. While on the one hand a body known as the *Research Institute for the Totalitarian Campaign* was established, Konoye's remarks explicitly implied that the new movement had nothing in common with totalitarian party government. To confuse matters, responsible quarters expressed satisfaction that the movement was *not* absolutely totalitarian, which left foreign observers with the not very comforting conclusion that it was futile to try and understand that which could not be understood. Restless dissatisfaction was common throughout the Japanese body politic, for while the moderates were anxious at the thought that Konoye had conceded too much to the extremists, the latter were impatient at the leisurely manner in which the movement was moving, if indeed it was moving at all. . . . Considerable diplomatic activity and innumerable conferences and discussions among which was one

unprecedented meeting of a large number of important government officials, officers of the Army and Navy and the President of the Privy Council in the presence of the Emperor, in aggregate substantiated the view which was then gaining currency that the inner circles of the government were not of one mind in regard to which direction the movement should move. . . . Beyond a bare announcement of these meetings, nothing was disclosed of the nature of the deliberations in which the rulers of the country participated.

Meanwhile the irritating problems of the China Affair, economic problems at home, the launching of the new movement, its hesitating progress, the suspicious hostility it evoked, and the increasing tension with the United States, placed the Konoye cabinet in a position in which it was taxed to the limits of its strength. The most trying pressure which the Konoye cabinet in common with its predecessors, was compelled to bear was that generated by the interminable strife and dissension maintained within the inner sanctums of the government. Now that the tie-up with the Axis powers had been made, the issues about which differences arose were concerned the following points: (a) how specifically the tripartite pact was supposed to apply to Japan's international position; (b) whether or not it involved the distinct possibility of a Japanese recourse to war; (c) whether readjustment of relations with America was possible; (d) if war was inevitable was Japan in a position to wage it successfully against the two democracies; and (e) how far was the totalitarian structure at home to be pursued. These were very real and dominant problems about which there could not possibly be an easy and rapid agreement among the various groups of the Japanese government. Hence the innumerable conferences and meetings, and the conclave before the Emperor to which we referred in the preceding paragraph.

The vitriolic, forthright and ubiquitous Mr. Matsuoka as Foreign Minister had already commenced to make his presence felt by subjecting Japan's foreign diplomatic and

consular service to a thorough 'shake-up' and overhaul. Forty diplomatic representatives including 5 ambassadors, 19 ministers, 5 counsellors and 11 consuls-general were recalled, among them being the Japanese ambassador to America Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi. The Foreign Office spokesman Mr. Suma described the reshuffle as 'giving fresh air and ventilation—administrative ventilation to the diplomatic service.' Much significance was attached to the fact that most of the posts affected were those in Britain and the United States.

These far-reaching transformations and 'reshufflings' no doubt played a part in arousing the moderate forces to the realisation that unless an effective brake was applied to the precipitate policies which the extremists were urging, the consequences would be disastrous. The counter-pressure which was brought to bear on the latter resulted in a balance of power between the two factions, and the statements that were intermittently issued in regard to Japan's foreign relations reflected both extreme and moderate policies and not seldom a judicious blending of the two extremes. Equivocation of the most confusing variety such as the much-discussed statement by Matsuoka during the course of his first press interview that in the event of the United States entering the European war, it did not necessarily mean that Japan would ally herself militarily with the Axis, and that before Japan resorted to belligerent action, it must be determined whether or not Italy and, or Germany had been attacked,—ambiguous qualifications of this variety were attached to the tripartite pact. Similarly, in regard to Japan's policy toward America, both Matsuoka and Konoye continued to stress that although Japan's foreign policy revolved around the tripartite pact, they had not abandoned hopes of a readjustment of relations with the American government. In October 1940, after Japan had wholly or partly committed herself to the totalitarian camp and to the cause for which it stood, Konoye intoned. 'The fate of the Pacific area and the question of peace and war in the Pacific will be decided by whether Japan and the United States respect and

understand the stand of each other.' The more forthright Mr. Matsuoka aggressively declared 'American-Japanese relations are no more in a condition for a battle of words. Our words fall on deaf ears. It is not that American leaders do not understand Japan's aims, but they refuse to do so.' Referring to his appointment of Admiral Nomura as ambassador to Washington, the Foreign Minister toned down 'However, I have not lost hope. There is no such word as despair in the vocabulary of those in diplomatic harness. I firmly believe always that in dealing with other countries it is necessary to do one's utmost even to the last moment before rupture of relations. . . . the Admiral has been on very intimate terms with President Roosevelt from his youth. I actually prevailed upon the Admiral to undertake this difficult task in order that he may have heart-to-heart talks with President Roosevelt. . . . I want to impress upon the American President and Secretary of State Hull and other influential persons in that country that the issue between Japan and the United States concerns not only the two countries but the destiny of mankind.'

In spite of these statements, which appeared to reflect a desire to arrive at an understanding with the United States, it was evident that Japan's conception of an 'understanding' was a settlement conditional upon America's recognition of Japan's new order. Japan herself would not or could not modify her attitude, although she apparently entertained hopes that by adopting persuasive tactics America might be cajoled into accepting Japan's position in Eastern Asia. Nomura's appointment though hailed as proving Japan's desire to bring about a rapprochement with the United States failed to evoke much optimism at that late hour, and such last-straw possibilities of peace as were grasped by pacific peace-makers were qualified by the general realisation that Nomura, however promising his ambassadorial qualities, was being despatched to Washington in the role more of a salesman with Japan's new order in his bag, than of an envoy with liberal and unrestricted powers at his command.

Since the recall of Mr. Horinouchi from Washington, much conjecture had prevailed as to his successor, and it was noted that considerable behind-the-scenes activity which left most of the country guessing preceded the appointment of Admiral Nomura. The delay though partly attributable to the peculiar manner in which Japanese governmental machinery functions, was in large measure due to the widespread reluctance among political circles to undertake the task of readjusting American-Japanese relations. Meanwhile the fear had been expressed that the continued absence of a Japanese diplomatic representative at Washington at that delicate stage of the proceedings, would be construed by the Americans as suggesting Japan's unwillingness to effect, or indifference to, a Pacific settlement.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka brought all his persuasive powers to bear upon Nomura to persuade him to accept the sorry task. Significantly enough the Admiral's reluctance, as reported in the Japanese press, was due to his fear that his position would subsequently be compromised by events and developments 'in Japanese policy and action which would frustrate his chances of reaching a friendly understanding with the United States.' We realise now, as no doubt he does, that the sharp-witted old sailor's fear was not unfounded. Whether or not an assurance was made that Japanese policy and action would proceed in line with Nomura's conciliatory attempts at Washington is a point about which it is futile to speculate. But it is necessary to emphasise that the flamboyant nonsense of ignorant propagandists which seeks to attach to Nomura the stigma of insincerity and hypocrisy, is ludicrously absurd. There could be no doubt of the old Admiral's honest determination to strive for an understanding with America. That he had been convinced that some basis of hope yet existed was obvious, for he would not have otherwise accepted the task of seeking friendliness where only hostility existed. What this basis of hope was, as it was thrashed out by the prolonged diplomatic activity within the inner sanctums of the government, is an intriguing point which

will no doubt be ultimately revealed in Nomura's reminiscences—if ever they are published.

From the standpoint of simple ambassadorship, both Japanese and American circles were agreed that Nomura's qualifications were exceptionally appropriate, his personal friendship with President Roosevelt and his frequent contacts with American-Japanese issues, being factors in his favour. As Foreign Minister in the Abe cabinet he had conducted conversations with American Ambassador Grew and though the negotiations proved abortive, the co-operative atmosphere in which problems were then discussed, did much to ease the cruel tension.

Nevertheless commentators were unwilling to commit themselves to the opinion that an improvement in American-Japanese relations was immediately possible, the general attitude being subdued and cautious. The new ambassador whatever his capabilities could not be expected to produce rabbits from a hat, or effect any similar miraculous transformation in the Pacific situation. The most that advocates of peace on both sides of the Pacific could expect of Nomura was that he would tide over the crisis and create an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. These were preliminary essentials without which it was futile to grapple with differences existing between the two countries. Yet it could not be gainsaid that a realistic scrutiny of the situation made one fully conscious of the sharp divergences in outlook which prevented a compromise or a reconciliation.

While it was the contention of the American government that treaty rights in China should be recognised and respected as such, that American interests in that region should be safeguarded and preserved, and that the Open Door principle and the concept of equal opportunity were yet applicable, the Japanese founded their case on the politico-mystical doctrine of the new order in East Asia. When first publicised it was generally assumed that the doctrine was a formula of co-existence and co-prosperity applicable to the strictly Oriental trinity of

Japan, Manchukuo and China. With the outbreak of the European war however, and the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands, it subsequently became apparent that the new order in East Asia had been subjected to an expansionist process, for from what could be gathered from the far from definite statements of Japanese diplomats, the 'new order' was to embrace a vague region labelled the South Seas. Hardly had foreign commentators and journalists and diplomats reconciled themselves to this definition of the new order when it transpired that the order magnanimously included the whole of the Asiatic continent. The tripartite pact as the latest inspiration further inflated the much-distended doctrine by merging it with the new orders of Nazi-fascism in Europe, thus attaching a world-wide significance to something which had modestly started its career as a new order in East Asia. The contradictions between the soothing assurances of Japanese spokesmen, that American interests would not be jeopardised, that American co-operation was necessary for the establishment of the new order, and that Japan's sole concern was to apply the principle of the Monroe Doctrine to Asia, the contradictions between these and similar statements couched in politico-mystical language of the most ambiguous variety, and the action of the Japanese military in China, were only too apparent. A protest by the American government that an American concern in China was being ousted by Japanese pressure elicited the reply that Japan's purpose on the continent was to facilitate the creation of an Asiatic sphere of co-prosperity; a protest that American missionaries was ill-treated by the Japanese military drew forth the irrelevant comment that Japan sought the uplift of the Asiatic peoples; alarmed protests that Japanese military activities were extended more and more into outlying regions evoked the response that America 'misunderstood' the 'divine mission' in which Japan was engaged, and that it was this country's 'immutable destiny' to make the world one happy family and household.

Against these vague generalities and pious platitudes

the Americans were unable to make any headway. The plea was often advanced that America was not without sympathy for the establishment of a new order in Asia, so long as such an order was compatible with the preservation of America's interests and rights held by her through treaties with China. Japan's indifference to American rights and interests, and blatant neglect of the innumerable protests that were lodged at the Foreign Office, together with her tendency to align herself (finally completed in September 1940) with the Axis powers, served to create an attitude of suspicious hostility on the other side of the Pacific. American retaliation in the form of the abrogation of the commercial treaty, extended assistance to Britain, embargoes on certain commodities and materials, and the grant of loans to the Chiang-Kai-shek government, only poured more oil on the smouldering embers.

Irresponsible elements on both sides of the Pacific were continually harping on the necessity and inevitability of a 'show-down', provoking mass hysteria and making impossible or nullifying the effects of a calm and reasoned approach toward outstanding problems. In October the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (American) delivered the unnecessary and portentous announcement that the American fleet was prepared for action in the Pacific, and earlier in the year while peace-makers in both countries were striving with might and main to effect a reconciliation, reports genuine or otherwise that the American Commander-in-Chief had advised the President that the Japanese Navy could be destroyed within three weeks in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, aroused the Japanese masses to heights of emotional fanaticism Only an unconscious fear of the consequences of war in the Pacific prevented a rupture such as would have approximated to what in extremist parlance was referred to as a 'show-down.'

Japanese extremists had successfully exposed the 'bluff' tactics of the Roosevelt administration, and the belief became widespread that the United States would not resort to belligerent action, although it might or

occasion indulge in antagonistic flourishes and gestures. The peculiarities of the Japanese mentality are such that this discovery far from being hailed as advantageous to Japan, was publicised as proof of American 'insincerity'. Evidently, if America had there and then launched an attack, the Japanese would have been convinced of American 'sincerity'. In spite therefore of the not few shortcomings of the Roosevelt administration as regards its policy in the East, observers appreciated the exasperating predicament in which it was placed. Its inability to elicit detailed and specific data bearing upon the new order—(a) whether or not it accorded a place to foreign interests; (b) if so how much of a place; (c) what were the territorial limits of the new order; (d) how long and far would the 'sphere' continue to expand—left it with the alternative of embracing the conclusion that Japan's expansion on the Asiatic continent constituted a threat not only to mere economic interests in that region but to the security of America's position in the Western hemisphere.

NOMURA TO WASHINGTON

Such then were the fitful and feverish fluctuations of American-Japanese relations when Nomura was called upon to accept the mission to Washington. By that time, a general evacuation of American and British subjects and citizens was a contingency for which residents in Japan were prepared. Suggestions in the United States for an embargo on supplies of scrap iron and oil, and a ban on Japanese imports of raw silk and other commodities, revealed the degree to which American-Japanese relations had deteriorated. Placed against this setting only the incorrigibly optimistic could regard Nomura's mission as anything but a forlorn task. There was however a ray of hope inherent in the fact that Japan was taking the initiative, that Nomura, known for his broad sympathies and appreciation of the American point of view,

had been selected in spite of considerable opposition from extremist elements within the inner sanctums of the government, and that Nomura was apparently convinced that possibilities of a rapprochement still existed.

MATSUOKA'S ADDRESS BEFORE AMERICA-JAPAN SOCIETY

Prior to the departure of Admiral Nomura to Washington, what was accounted to be one of the most significant meetings of the Japan-America Society was held at the Imperial Hotel in honour of the new ambassador. Though neither Ambassador Grew nor the Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka could commit himself to statements which might possibly jeopardise Nomura's delicate mission, and in spite of the assuaging assurances of goodwill expressed by both spokesmen, one could not but be conscious of the irreconcilable nature of the two cases that were put forward. Matsuoka's address which was unfavourably received in the United States, and which effectively deflated all hopes of a successful Nomura mission, stressed that Japan intended to remain 'loyal' to her allies, and that consequently Japan's foreign policy would continue to revolve around the tripartite pact. Referring to the deterioration of American-Japanese relations the Foreign Minister declared '... the fundamental cause, let me be frank, is American misapprehension of Japan's aims and aspirations... Contrary to impressions current in America and elsewhere, Japan is not waging an imperialist war of greed and aggression in China... We are engaged in a moral crusade. We are endeavouring to initiate an era of enduring peace and unlimited prosperity, based on justice, equity and mutuality, in Greater East Asia where we firmly believe we have a great mission as the civilising and stabilising force. We stand for peace and order. We shut the door nowhere and to none. Any nation that desires to take a hand in

this great task is welcome. But., mind you, there shall be 'no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation' under the new order which we conceive. . . . We will not be induced to deflect from our settled course, whatever the pressure or whoever the detractor. This, in short is the basic attitude of my government.' Mr. Matsuoka in conclusion pointed out that the tripartite pact was more in the nature of an eirenicon than an aggressive gesture, that it was concluded in the interests of world, and particularly of Pacific peace, and urged America to think a thousand times before committing itself to a fatal move.

If there had been any doubt in the minds of members of American-Japanese Society as to the attitude of the Japanese government following the appointment of Nomura to the post of ambassador to Washington, they were dispelled by Matsuoka's succinct summarisation of Japan's policy. The Foreign Minister's address was nothing more than a masterly reiteration of the statements previously made disjointedly and severally by Japanese spokesmen, and was a characteristic example of the platitudinous and generalised moralisings to which they resorted whenever they were confronted with American and British protests. American Ambassador Grew thus confined his address to impressing the audience of the fact that the American government was guided in its policies by 'concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the persuasive garb in which such facts and actions may be dressed.' While on the one hand it was salutary to realise that Japan did not intend to modify its stand, irrespective of Nomura's appointment, there was on the other, the crushing disappointment of Mr. Matsuoka's reiterated emphasis on the tripartite pact. It was plain to the most uninstructed student of Pacific affairs that America's attitude to such a policy and the statement of such a policy could not be other than most unsympathetic. To those who had striven for peace on both sides of the Pacific the whole basis of Nomura's mission appeared to have been there and then undermined. By this time the critical and heightened tension was such that the feeling of agonising suspense and anxiety

which had hitherto been confined to those directly concerned with Pacific affairs was now equally shared by the American and Japanese peoples. In the streets, offices, bath-houses and markets references to Nomura's mission of peace were made in hushed voices, and the national consciousness on both sides of the turbulent Pacific became increasingly aware of the clouds of war that were gathering along the horizon. . . . Not a few Japanese whom one met in the course of one's daily life in Japan had reconciled themselves to the inevitability of a clash between the two countries, but they did not disguise the harrowing anxiety with which they viewed such a prospect. The China Affair had already imposed on their shoulders the extremely heavy burden of taxes, sacrifices, and decreasing rations, as well as the loss of one or more sons on the battlefield. There could not be any doubt whatsoever that, with the exception of a jingoistic, irresponsible section of Japanese society with mistaken notions of patriotism and nationalism, the vast majority of the Japanese peoples yearned for the peace which they had been denied for so long, and to so fruitless a purpose. There were in America as in Japan those helpless individuals who facilely referred to what they mellifluously termed 'the inexorable march of destiny' and refused to be convinced of the possibility or the desirability of preventing an outbreak of hostilities. But again, the vast majority of the American peoples, though unable to overlook Japanese military atrocities against American lives, property and interests, were nevertheless more concerned with the life and death struggle being waged between Germany and Britain on the European continent. There was thus a vast and fluid reservoir of sentiment favouring peace, and the tragedy perhaps is inherent in the fact that it was not harnessed directly to serving the interests not of politicians and armament kings and diplomats, but of the American and Japanese peoples.

BURMA ROAD ISSUE

Immersed though Japan was with problems affecting her relations with the United States, her policy toward Britain was no less aggravating. Falling back to the middle of the year 1940, we find that Japan had lodged a demand that the British immediately close the Burma-Yunnan road on which arms and munitions were being transported to the Chungking armies. What precisely were the motives of the Japanese government in injecting this new controversy into the situation when the Tientsin affair had only recently been satisfactorily settled, is a matter more for conjecture than dogmatic statement. The sudden finality with which the demand was made appeared to suggest that the militarist fascists had tried to provoke further trouble, arouse the masses at home against the British, and thus strengthen their case for a 'show-down' with the democracies in the Pacific. They therefore banked on their shrewd belief that the British would rather compromise than adopt a firm and determined stand; if by chance they *did* choose to maintain their policy of sending goods and materials to Chiang Kai-shek over the Burma road, it was precisely such an issue for which the extremists were waiting.

PRESSURE ON INDO-CHINA

It is significant that this manoeuvre was conducted almost simultaneously with the Japanese demand to the French Indo-China authorities (after the fall of France) that the despatch of military supplies to the Chungking government via the Yunnan-Haiphong railway should be prohibited immediately. French Indo-China was in no position to argue, and Japanese 'inspectors' were stationed at specific points along the railway route to ensure that the agreement was not violated in any way.

The Burma road issue however proved to be a more contentious affair, but curiously enough the dispute

whether or not the road should be closed was not so much confined to Anglo-Japanese negotiations as to various factions of the British government. Widespread protests both within the cabinet and from members of the Labour party, indicated that any absolute compliance with the Japanese demand was impossible. The British government was moreover not unmindful of the fact that further concessions to the Japanese would create an unfortunate impression in the United States. Conversely a point-blank refusal would precipitate a crisis, and this she could not afford to do. An agreement was thus worked out by the terms of which Britain arranged to close the Burma road for a period of three months, prohibiting the passage of arms and ammunitions, petrol, trucks and railway materials, Japanese consular officials in Rangoon and Hongkong maintaining co-operative contact with the British authorities to enforce measures for rendering the prohibition effective. Absolute disapproval of the agreement was expressed by Labour and Liberal circles in England, while the reaction in the United States was extremely unfavourable. The Secretary of State Cordell Hull forthwith issued a statement pointing out that the Burma road was an international highway and that as Japan had not declared war on China, she could not as a belligerent claim the rights of imposing a blockade. The United States, he stressed, viewed the closure of the road with the utmost disfavour. There could be no doubt however that political circles appreciated Mr. Winston Churchill's declaration that the closure of the Burma road did not mean the absolute cessation of British assistance to the Chungking government, and that she could not at that stage of the war, when she was engaged in a life or death struggle, afford to miss an opportunity of effecting an understanding with Japan. When the tripartite pact was subsequently signed by Germany, Japan and Italy, the British government retaliated by re-opening the highway. Meanwhile evacuation of non-combatants from Hongkong, Singapore, Penang and the Malay States, and the strengthening of British Far Eastern defences were noted as significant.

Voluntary evacuation however was confined to the 'panicky' crowd—the birds of passage unfamiliar with the ways of the East, businessmen and commercial kings with much to lose and nothing to gain, women and children. For the rest, China and Japan 'old hands', newspapermen, and British and American officials either shook their heads glumly or scoffed away with derision the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities. Yet they were vaguely conscious of sitting on a volcano, and in spite of unmistakable portents of trouble to come, they were strangely reluctant to pack up their bags and make tracks for home. . . . An overmastering urge, such as that the newspapermen only can fully know, to see the drama to the end, to be 'on the spot' till the curtain falls—this was the essence of the conglomerate of feelings, vague and undefined, which crowded in upon one during those days of critical and harrowing anxiety. Often one heard the painful plea 'Why don't they start, and have done with it?' And as often one noted periods of mystifying silence when one felt that a 'show-down' was imminent; yet the matter would drag on and on painfully, bitterly and so uncertainly. . . . Japanese friends made sympathetic noises and fervently hoped that Nomura would effect an understanding with the Americans. They came with presents and smiles and tearful regrets when the evacuees left and waved sayonara from the pier. *They*, it was obvious, knew nothing about it.

In the lounge of the palatial Imperial Hotel (one of the most satisfying and imposing structures built by Frank Lloyd Wright), members of the foreign community and the journalistic tribe foregathered to discuss the new structure, the shortage of drinkable liquor, who and what was evacuating by the next boat, and the queer mentality of the Japanese,—and of course—when, how and where precisely the Pacific war would start. Japan 'old-hands' were especially addicted to the theory, the origins of which are obscure, that the Japanese were forever 'bluffing'. Their eyebrows would shoot up in indignation whenever an innocent inquired when *they* thought of evacuating. Such a thought, the 'old-hands' intimated by their facial

expression, was anathema. Nothing at all would come of all this fuss, and if people were chicken-hearted enough to make for home, all the better in view of the food shortage....

ARREST OF BRITISH SUBJECTS

With the establishment of the second Konoye cabinet and the launching of the new structure movement, the 'patriotic societies', encouraged by the support of the army in this matter, initiated a nation-wide anti-foreign agitation. Simultaneously, Mr. J. M. Cox, Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo and sixteen Englishmen were arrested by the Japanese military police, and placed under immediate confinement. This was a skilful though not too wise move on the part of the militarist fascists, for the British retaliated by arresting prominent Japanese businessmen in London. Foreign communities in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe, where the principal arrests were made, buzzed with confused alarm, and the air was thickened with suspicious hostility. Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Premier Konoye, it was generally believed, were unaware of the arrests till the following morning when the Japanese news-papers published detailed reports of the round-up. It was felt that the extremists within the Japanese body politic were playing a bold hand in attempting to foment trouble between the two countries. Anti-British rallies, and public demands that Japan should align herself forthwith with the Axis powers and declare war upon the British Empire suggested that the mass hysteria being generated among the peoples was being brought to bear in the form of pressure upon the Konoye government which was then yet reluctant to establish co-operative relationships with Germany.

DEATH OF J. M. COX

Matters were brought to a head when M. J. Cox allegedly committed suicide by jumping from the third storey of the police building where he had been detained. According to the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, the authorities were in possession of documentary evidence sufficient for the conviction of Reuter's correspondent on charges of espionage. Although a series of accusations were levelled against Mr. Cox and the fifteen Englishmen, included in the first round-up, there was nothing to substantiate such accusations, and the tendency to inflate what was merely a spy scare into the proportions of a political issue, aroused the suspicion that the anti-British movement, far from being an end in itself, was being used as a means to ends which were more sinister. That the 'patriotic societies' such as the Black Dragon organisation headed by bearded Mitsuru Toyama were playing a vital role in this confusing farce was evident, for the clamour urging that the British should be hounded out of the Orient and that the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China should be included in Japan's 'mutual co-prosperity sphere' (which was the latest edition, revised and brought up-to-date, of the new order), was the sort of irrelevance at which they were undeniably adept. At their instigation, several Japanese Salvation Army officers were arrested, and in line with this action similar pressure was brought to bear upon foreign religious and educational and even commercial organisations throughout the Japanese Empire. Foreign schools were subjected to similar treatment, and Japanese branches of international organisations such as the Rotary, were compelled to sever relations with the main body and maintain an autonomous stand consonant with the 'spirit and policy' of the Japanese nation.

In spite of the flood of propaganda and vitriolic outbursts which was let loose upon the public on the basis of the arrests, the 'explanation' of the Japanese military police that J. M. Cox had leaped from the third storey of the gendarmerie building in Tokyo was decidedly 'thin', even

the Japanese being dubious that such melodramatic and Edgar-Wallish happenings could occur in prosaic Tokyo. The mystery which surrounds J. M. Cox's death to this very day is one which requires to be cleared up when the day arrives for the summing up of Pacific events. At the time of its occurrence however, foreigners and especially Americans and British with the remotest connection with journalism and commerce, went about their diurnal duties in constant dread of being apprehended by the military police. When once an arrest is made by the latter there is slight chance of averting imprisonment for an indefinite period while third degree questioning methods and investigations are being conducted. If the intercession of the embassy is secured immediately and contact is established with Japanese government officials the case may be prevented from passing into the hands of the military police, and a release may even be obtained from the civil police. But quick action is essential, and a delay of a few hours may be of fatal consequence.

Although vigorous protests were lodged by Ambassador Craigie it was noticeable that both the British and Japanese governments were disposed to adopt a calm and cautious attitude toward these incidents which were solely the result of irresponsible activities among the extremists in Japan. Neither the British nor Japanese authorities sought to complicate matters by developing the spy scare and anti-British movement into an issue of major importance, but it could not be denied that the fascists had gained their objective by generating widespread hostility and suspicious anti-Britishism among the masses. With a few exceptions most of the fifteen Englishmen who were arrested obtained their release after paying fines for using short-wave radio sets without a licence. The absurdity was even more pronounced when it was disclosed that not a few of the fifteen Englishmen were the most pro-Japanese Britishers in the foreign community. Some of them had even incurred the displeasure of general British opinion by advocating the recognition of Manchukuo, and certainly a prominent few had deliberately courted unpopularity by expressing extremely

pro-Japanese views in regard to the China affair. It was evident, however that the Japanese military police were not then concerned with the political opinions of those whom they arrested; they were concerned merely that they should be Englishmen, that they should be white, and that they should be representatives of the British community. . . . Being all three the unfortunate victims of the round-up spent a few nights of anxious discomfort before they were released. The treatment which they received was cotton-wool gentleness as compared to that meted out to foreign correspondents arrested in Tokyo.

The complications of the Cox affair however were such as to prevent any effective hushing-up methods which the Japanese are wont to employ whenever they feel that enough fuss has been made. Lord Halifax declared that the British government was wholly unable to accept the 'totally unwarranted assumption of Mr. Cox's guilt in view of his alleged suicide.' This was in reference to the Japanese contention that the progress of the 'investigation' had convinced the deceased of the certainty of his conviction, and he had accordingly done away with himself. The following note was produced as having been discovered on Mr. Cox's person after his leap from the room where he had been confined :

See Reuters re rents

See Cowley (the British consul) re deeds and insurance

See Hgk Bank (Honkong and Shanghai bank) re balance and shares in London

I know what is best

Always my only love

I have been quite well treated but there is no doubt how matters are going.

This note was obviously addressed to Mrs. Cox, and although there was much uncertainty as to whether it was genuine or not, investigations by the British Embassy appeared to prove that the handwriting was that of Mr. Cox, but that the last two lines had been tampered

with. A postmortem examination of Mr. Cox's body by a doctor designated by the embassy revealed thirty-five punctures, and a demand for an explanation lodged at the military police headquarters elicited the bland reply that injections had been given in an attempt to revive Mr. Cox after his fall. This was a most unsatisfactory reply in view of the fact that Cox's body had been picked up with hardly a bone intact, and injections could not then have been necessary. Nothing could however be gained by pursuing the matter further, and as most of those who had originally been arrested were released, no attempt was made to complicate the affair by lodging futile protests. The required anti-foreign and especially anti-British impetus had been achieved by the Japanese extremists, and a general movement for the expulsion of foreign influence and directive power in fields of national life such as religion, culture, education, commerce and social organisations, was set rolling with gathering speed and finality.

Although James R. Young of the International News Service had been arrested and jailed for two months early in the year 1939 and several other American correspondents were detained since then, the Japanese military police curiously enough refrained from arresting any prominent member of the American newspapermen's corps in Tokyo. This surprising and unexpected toleration was attributed not so much to a very understandable fear of precipitating a crisis in the Pacific, as to the simple fact that the mere arrest of journalists and businessmen could hardly contribute much to the already deteriorated and strained relations between the two countries. The British, it was felt, were yet capable of being provoked further without seeking to retaliate by resorting to any excessive measure. The Roosevelt administration however had already clearly intimated that further provocation would strain its toleration to the limit, and the extremists though certainly extreme were yet not extreme enough unhesitatingly to shoulder the responsibility of fomenting a crisis at that tense and critical stage of the Pacific story.

By this time, it was significant to note that swastika flags were a distinctly decorative feature of the anti-British and anti-American demonstrations, that German and Italian institutions, though obviously foreign, were not subjected to the pressure which was brought to bear upon Anglo-American organisations. Retail stores, schools, commercial concerns, newspapers, and various religious-social organisations were compelled to succumb to the pressure of the new reforms being applied throughout the country by means of the anti-democratic and totalitarian movement. The *Japan Advertiser* and *Japan Chronicle*, American and British newspaper respectively, which had for years reflected sound Anglo-American opinion in regard to Far Eastern matters, were merged with the *Japan Times*, the organ of the Japanese Foreign Office. Foreign members of the editorial staffs of these journals who had not given any specific evidence of their desire to participate in Japan's new order, were promptly dismissed, and a complete Japanisation and autonomous standpoint was effected. Non-essential foreign residents were compelled in these circumstances to take advantage of the evacuation arrangements and sail for home, but a not inconsiderable crowd of newspapermen slunk about the volcano's mouth till December 7th, 1941, when their curiosity was finally appeased, and their theories were unequivocally categorised as right or wrong.

NEWSPAPERS AND NEWSPAPERMEN IN TOKYO (WITH APOLOGIES)

As there appears to be widespread misapprehension in regard to English language journals in Japan, and the life of the average newspaperman in modern Tokyo, it is not inappropriate prior to picking up the thread of this chronological account, to cast a glance at that happy band of men and women who occupied front-line seats from which to witness and chronicle the strange and eventful drama of the Pacific. During the critical period under

survey there were three English language journals—the *Japan Advertiser*, the *Japan Chronicle* and the *Japan News-Week* under foreign management, while the *Japan Times*, an English language newspaper under Japanese management and associated with the Foreign Office, reflected the Japanese outlook upon the situation. Staff workers consisted of a happy combination of Americans, Britishers, Nisei (American-Japanese) and pure Japanese—and it has been widely acknowledged that the standard attained in journalistic work almost stands unparalleled in the East. Any casual student of things Japanese is at once made aware of the major role which these journals have played in moulding both foreign and Japanese opinion in regard to the affairs and problems of the Pacific, and although foreign journals (notably that courageous little sheet the *Japan Chronicle* the influence of which has been completely out of proportion to its circulation) have constantly clashed with the authorities, they have invariably succeeded in maintaining a steadfast policy of journalistic integrity, evoking willing respect from the Japanese themselves.

Contrary to popular opinion the publication of an English language journal in Japan is rarely obstructed by lack of technical proficiency or equipment. The Japanese are born newspapermen with a 'dash' and verve in their activities which are wholly their own. Their own vernacular journals with circulations running into millions, and the semi-official world-wide news agency *Domei* are indicative of the efficiency which they bring to their newspaper work. *Domei's* well-trained (special training colleges have been established) representatives are to be found in every corner of the civilised world, while the principal Japanese national dailies such as the *Asahi* and its rival *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi* maintain a floating staff of special correspondents and roving reporters overseas. In the transmission of news a great variety of methods is used, from pigeon carriers (along the China war fronts) to the most modern forms such as the radio-telephone, telephoto and other technical means with which they are continually experimenting. The *Asahi*

and *Nichi-Nichi* have maintained a sharp and exacting rivalry, and both journals, especially the latter have taken to publicity stunts on a national scale, sponsoring sports meetings and rallies and sending Japan-made planes on round the world trips. . . .

With the exception of one Japanese compositor on the staff of the *Japan Times* who set up his type by sight, not understanding any English, (Ripley inserted this in his 'Believe It or Not'), most editorial staff workers and compositors were well-trained veterans, not a few of them having been graduated from journalism schools in the United States. As most of the editors were moreover American the style and slant were reflective of the hand at the helm; the *Japan Chronicle* alone maintained the dignity and reserve appropriate to little England, but in its halcyon days this staunch journal gained a reputation for its forthright outspokenness. The *Japan Advertiser* was the principal American daily in Tokyo, among its subscribers being none other than His Imperial Majesty Hirohito, descendant of the Sun-goddess Amaterasu O-Mikami. . . . Its merger with the *Japan Times* in 1940 when the anti-foreign movement was at its height, brought to a close a brilliant and eventful phase of Far Eastern journalism. Mr. Wilfrid Fleisher its owner, publisher and editor until he was forced to sell out, may well be proud of the many scoops which are associated with the *Japan Advertiser*. News of Japan's Twenty-One Demands to China, and of the Anti-Comintern Pact, were ferreted out by *Advertiser* men, Mr. Fleisher himself being accorded the pleasure of having the news of the pact transmitted across to America before the official announcement. In 1940, Mr. Fleisher was approached by Mr. Toshi Go, presumably representing both the *Japan Times* of which he was president and the Japanese Foreign Office with the suggestion that the *Advertiser* sell out to the *Times*. The terms were undoubtedly attractive, for Mr. Fleisher received payments due to him in New York where a Nazi agent had been informed of the transaction. The evacuation of Americans and most members of the foreign community, the increasing

difficulties of maintaining a vigorous American viewpoint, the indirect pressure that was being brought to bear on all Anglo-American establishments, these, plus a shrewd appreciation of the advisability of 'clearing out' at the right time, caused Mr. Fleisher to accept the offer which the Japanese made to him. . . . Legend has it that as part of the agreement, Mr. Fleisher signed a statement declaring that he would neither broadcast nor publish any matter inimical to Japan. It is perhaps no reflection on Mr. Fleisher that upon reaching Manila, he broadcast an unmistakably anti-Japanese talk in the course of which he warned the Pacific of the impending danger. . . . This was undoubtedly due to the atavistic urge of the newspaperman to deliver the news; neither agreements nor laws can effectively curb his speech.

As a former newspaperman in Tokyo has pointed out, the foreign correspondent who was also invariably a member of one of the English language papers in Tokyo, was at once conscious of the feeling of solidarity and happy camaraderie that characterised the newspaper tribe. Although there was no organisation or social function which he could attend regularly and feel at home with members of his own profession, the bustling contacts at the Foreign Office, and Admiralty and other government departments generated an awareness of each other and a calm, unhesitating acceptance of each other that was not far removed from an unconscious clannishness. . . . The diplomats, missionaries, teachers and businessmen, being mostly men of affluence and stolidly reserved, would congregate at their staid clubs and institutions; your Tokyo journalist preferred not to have a permanent anchoring place.

Whereas in the old days, most newspapermen were staff-men in Tokyo, since the Manchurian incident, when Japan precipitated herself to the forefront of the political stage, the emphasis has been laid on foreign correspondence. It is customary among American editors to send out fairly experienced men to Tokyo to complete their training; the Japanese capital city being considered

to be ideal for this purpose. The annals of newspaperdom in Japan therefore are sprinkled fairly liberally with names of famous 'old-timers', such as Captain Brinkley, Morgan Young, Lafcadio Hearn, Frank H. Hedges, W. H. Chamberlain, Guenther Stein and other minor lights who have played their searchlights upon the Tokyo scene.

Although much hard work was undoubtedly done, the average foreign correspondent in Tokyo *appeared* to gravitate from newspaper office to newspaper office throughout the day, expatiating upon how 'he figured it out'. Usually however they are regular members of the staff of a local newspaper or they contribute articles on Japanese culture, or dabble in amateur dramatics for the foreign community, and read omnivorously. The forest of secondhand bookstalls in Tokyo is a veritable paradise for the Tokyo newspapermen when mails from home are irregular, and the month's consignment of books and papers fails to arrive.

Among the younger ones the study of the Japanese language was vigorously pursued, and it is now generally acknowledged that a fairly sound knowledge of the language is necessary if the correspondent's news service is to be worth much. The missionaries and university professors were the smart boys in this direction; they spoke the most refined and musical Japanese that ever was spoken. The journalist was much too distracted knocking about and for ever receiving impressions and registering them on the typewriter that he rarely achieved anything beyond a few vulgar phrases and snatches of Tokyo slang. . . . Not of course that there were not newspapermen with an excellent knowledge of the language, but language learning absorbs time, and time is one commodity of which pressmen never have enough. There is nothing that will so instantly melt a Japanese into glowing friendliness as Japanese well-spoken, with all the literary phrases and mannerisms and appropriate flourishes thrown in. . . . Even government officials behind counters who tend to be officious to the ignorant foreigner, melt before a torrent of eloquent Japanese, especially if

the latter is punctuated with bows that indicate grace, culture and dignity. No Japanese can stand such an assault.

And then there was that irrepressible habit of writing books. One could not point out a newspaperman in the lounge of the Impiti (Imperial Hotel) who was not then engaged in book writing or who had not woven plans of producing books on Japan that would 'explain it all'. Most of the authoritative and certainly graphic books, as distinct from the heavy cultural tomes that our professor friends have written, are due to the newspaper tribe, 'Japan Over Asia' by Chamberlain, of the *Christian Science Monitor*, 'Made in Japan' by Guenther Stein of the *News Chronicle*, 'Imperial Japan' and 'Japan Under Taisha Tenno' by Morgan Young of the *Japan Chronicle* are fairly representative of the wide field that has been covered, and the standard that has been attained. For an extremely literary or imaginative interpretation of Japan the professors and teachers have been especially distinguished though they have not been as productive as the professional scribblers.

Collectors of art objects were fairly numerous among the foreign community, a few affluent newspapermen with pretensions toward culture (*cultah*) indulging in the hobby with serious determination. The fascination of rummaging around the art shops and markets of Tokyo, eyes keen with the anticipation of lighting upon a rare piece, constituted a refreshing tonic to the jaded minded of the foreign correspondents rarely resting night and day from 'figuring out' what the latest Japanese political development signifies.... With occasional parties and social chit-chats thrown in, and attended as much for duty's sake as for pleasure's the lot of the foreign newspapermen in Tokyo was something to which he now looks back with sincere regrets....

The editing and publishing of an English language journal in Japan has been elevated to the status of an art by those who have experienced that interesting and adventurous process. As most foreign correspondents

in Tokyo with notable exceptions were highly critical of Japanese governmental policy, the problem was how precisely to get this criticism across without incurring the displeasure of the authorities. The *Japan Chronicle* often resorted to irony which the Japanese are incapable of understanding. One headline in that journal read 'Nanking Exterminated for Fifth Time'. Japanese officialdom was not perturbed. Irony however was not a weapon to which newspapers could regularly resort for there was the danger of the point being missed by the duller wits (and these are the majority) of the public. The consequence was that clashes with the authorities were a characteristic feature of the whole business of producing a journal in Japan. When subscribers failed to receive their morning paper they at once reconciled themselves to the assumption (usually justified) that the authorities had pounced again. . . .

Copies of the issue containing the offensive comment or item of news or photograph would be hurriedly recalled from the distributors, the editor, translator, publisher and printer or any one of them, would be summoned to the police station and there the honourable rumpus would commence. Profuse apologies on one side, barking anger on the other; innumerable bows and assurances that the lines would be toed in the future, and threats that the paper will be suppressed. So the fracas proceeds. . . . Since the outbreak of the China affair the Japanese authorities have been issuing a stream of bans, and they have become extremely sensitive to comment only faintly suggestive of criticism.

Photographs of members of the Royal Family if marred by the slightest blur constitute an 'offence', an insult to His Imperial Majesty. A written apology is demanded, the photographer is summoned and given a lecture on his lack of patriotism, the printer is similarly admonished, and after much discussion and prolonged negotiations, the powers-that-be are finally appeased, and the sorry company troops home to the office. The writer recollects one photograph taken by a news

agency man while the Emperor of Manchukuo (sic) was visiting Japan. It happened unfortunately that a slight smudge in the background of the picture was a destroyer of the Japanese Navy which had been escorting the Emperor's ship through Japanese waters. The most critical and acute observer could hardly tell whether the said smudge was a millionaire's pleasure yacht or a sailing junk or a cloud touching the horizon. The Naval authorities were however emphatic that the smudge could be deciphered as a destroyer of the Imperial Japanese Navy, as undoubtedly it was. Hence the commotion. Photographer, editor, printer, publisher were summoned. Feeble arguments were of no avail, murmuring apologies and sweeping bows appeared rather to feed than appease the flames of wrath, explanations were swept aside, and the sentence was delivered: the agency photographer was to be dismissed. Meanwhile the circulation department was frantically engaged in removing the offensive photograph by cutting out the particular page and stamping copies 'censored'. Bans against certain issues of a paper are never imposed till such issues have been printed and usually half distributed, thus complicating the matter into heights of hair-splitting exasperation.

The military and civil police, functioning independently of each other, would despatch a snooper around at bi-weekly intervals and question Japanese in the employ of foreign newspapermen. Once the military police snooper arrested the civilian police snooper for snooping around excessively with foreigners. Snooper No. 2 spent an uncomfortable day or two in his cell before the mistake was revealed.... During the tense days following the death of Melville Cox, most Japanese and foreign newspapermen worked themselves into a state of jittery nervousness that is even now far from laughable in retrospect. The anxiety was very real and the threat was no less real. Military police agents maintained a close watch over the activities of foreigners, and telephones were generally known to be tapped. Agents often prowled outside newspaper offices, and followed foreigners

about with a conscientious sense of duty. One English school master with a passion for walking tours (he was the first to walk the length and breadth of Japan) invariably made it a practice to establish friendly contacts with these footstep-doggers, who were after all doing what they conceived to be their duty. . . . One newspaperman's flat was meticulously combed by the police during his absence at Karuizawa, the popular hill station resort near Tokyo. His wife rarely left him alone for fear that he might be arrested, and because she might be able to inform the Embassy before the military police had tightened their clutches on the victim.

No account, however sketchy and short, of the lot of the newspaperman in Tokyo, may be considered complete without a special reference to one journal in particular and one journalist above all deserving special mention. They were the *Japan News-Week* and Mr. W. R. Wills, its editor and publisher. It is not possible to recall that period of many months when American-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate into conditions of excruciating anxiety, and when the peace of the Pacific appeared to be on the verge of being shattered by some sudden, precipitate move, without affording a position in our thoughts to the *Japan News-Week* and the editor of this gallant journal. Exhorting, pleading, criticising, suggesting, appeasing, but invariably true to the cause of American-Japanese friendship, it contrived in the course of its fleeting career, to effect an American-Japanese understanding. . . . No journal on both sides of the Pacific so faithfully laboured to preserve not only the peace of the Pacific, but enhance the genuine friendship that had for so long characterised American-Japanese relations. The *Japan News-Week*, though accused of being a propaganda sheet, alternately for the Japanese government and then for the Roosevelt administration, gained the support of the vast majority of the public both in the United States and in Japan. It is one of the many splendid American and British organisations that went down before the avalanche of war. . . . So much then for the newspaperman in Tokyo. A more intimate volume

of Tokyo memories than the present one may well afford a position to newspaper tables. For the present, the main thread of our narrative requires to be followed to its climatic culmination.

N. E. I. HITS HEADLINES

With the departure of Admiral Nomura to Washington the Japanese government centred its attention upon the course of events in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Trade negotiations with the latter had been conducted over a prolonged period, two Japanese envoys being despatched to attempt to cajole the N. E. I. authorities to comply with immutable requirements of the new order. Although the voluble Mr. Matsuoka continually assured foreign correspondents that all Japan required was the maintenance of the *status quo* in the South Seas and the establishment of mutually profitable trade relations with territories in that region, it was more than obvious what the 'trade relations' to which Matsuoka referred involved. The Governor-General of the N. E. I. referring to the economic negotiations with Japan declared that the supply of essential war materials to Japan was not possible and that the Netherlands rejected any arbitrary inclusion of the N. E. I. within the new order sphere recommended by the representatives of Japan. The United States had previously in April announced through Cordell Hull that any intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies would prejudice the cause of peace in the Pacific zone.

The statement of the N. E. I. government that it had no desire to participate in the new order, brought forth the Japanese accusation that such 'insincerity' could not be tolerated. An official Tokyo declaration amplified the nature of this 'insincerity' by arguing that in proportion as Japan's 'establishment of a high degree of defensive

preparation', developed her demands on the resources of the Netherlands East Indies necessitated the 'participation of the Japanese in the development of the abundant resources of the East Indies, increased immigration facilities, the right of involvement in their enterprises, shipping, air service, and communications, the admission of Japanese to participation in such development, permission for Japanese ships to call at closed ports for transporting the materials produced by such development, the partial opening of coastwise navigation to Japanese ships, and the development of the fishing industry by Japanese industry.' This was Matsuoka's mutual co-prosperity sphere with a vengeance.

With the American-Japanese relations being tautened to breaking point, the abandonment of negotiations between N. E. I. and Japanese representatives led to a heightening of the tension, and uneasiness prevailed throughout the Pacific region. The N. E. I. authorities were feverishly engaged in defence measures, in common with similar British and American preparatory moves in China, Malaya, the Philippines and outlying Anglo-American territories. Japan however, was yet unsure of her position and the announcement that N. E. I.-Japanese relations remained unaffected, following the rupture of negotiations with the East Indies, appeared to indicate that in spite of her scarcely veiled bellicose and threatening statements, she hesitated to commit herself to any dramatic move. In this hesitation not a few observers of the Pacific scene were inclined to see, justifiably enough, the restraining hand of Premier Konoye who with his colleagues was yet striving within the inner sanctums of the government to prevent the extremists from embracing there and then the forthright policy of 'blood and thunder'.

FRENCH INDO-CHINA HITS HEADLINES

Japan's diplomacy in the French Indo-China region was developing on similar lines, but the Vichy Government being unable to maintain a stand such as that of the staunch Dutchmen, Japan's high pressure methods were attended with some measure of success. In June 1940 Japanese inspectors had been established in French Indo-China territory ostensibly for the purpose of ensuring that supplies to the Chungking government were not despatched over the Yunnan-Haiphong railway. The United States government had then issued a warning expressing concern over any interference with the *status quo* in French Indo-China. Japan followed up her advantage however in September when it was suddenly discovered by the Japanese that the China affair could not be satisfactorily concluded if the French authorities failed to 'afford in French Indo-China all such facilities of a military nature as are required by the Japanese Army and Navy for executing their campaign for the settlement of the China affair.' Prolonged negotiations in Tokyo between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Vichy Ambassador Charles Arsenne-Henry in the course of which it was obvious the Japanese had resorted to much bullying pressure and similar tactics, preceded the final agreement which permitted Japan free entry into certain strategic positions in French Indo-Chinese territory. Governor-General Decoux weakly bleated incongruously that the Japanese move was 'a manifestation of lasting friendship between the two countries.' Commentators felt that it was an extremely one-sided manifestation.

Reaction in America to this move was cautious and indirect, a new loan of 25,000,000 dollars being granted to the Chiang Kai-shek government, and the extension of the embargo by the U.S. on the export of iron and steel scrap. With the exception of a few minor clashes, the establishment of Japanese military forces in French Indo-China was achieved without mishap, though the pulse of the Pacific was by then palpitating with fury. Meanwhile it was not without significance that Japan-Thailand relations

were being skilfully cultivated on the basis of the treaty of amity concluded by both countries. . . . Several clashes between French Indo-China and Thailand, instigated no doubt to a certain extent by Japanese agents, presented Japanese diplomats with a fertile field for intervention, Indo-China-Thai talks being conducted in Tokyo.

On the western side of the wide Pacific Ambassador Nomura received a cordial welcome, though the effusiveness which was then manifested was not without a tinge of nervous uncertainty. A special destroyer of the American Pacific fleet escorted the *Kamakura Maru* into San Francisco, while the Fort Winfield Scott saluted the Ambassador with a 19 gun salvo. . .¹. What precisely were the implications of these pleasant gestures, it is as yet impossible to ascertain, but they were immediately pounced upon by Pacific peace-makers as indicative of the more co-operative atmosphere that had been allegedly created since the appointment of Nomura to his new post. Undoubtedly this cordiality transcended the customary diplomatic courtesy normally accorded to foreign envoys, and was perhaps an index to the sincere desire of the American government to attempt an eleventh hour readjustment of relations with the Japanese government. As has been indicated however, an excessive display of cordiality struck observers as slightly incongruous, in so far as such a manifestation of friendliness was without a factual basis and served to emphasise rather than mitigate the difficulties with which both nations were confronted.

President Roosevelt's unprecedented return to a third term was received both by government spokesmen and the Japanese press as portending a general 'stiffening' of America's Far Eastern policy. Although Matsuoka had previously stated that Japan was not interested in the person of the President, but in the future policy of the United States government, considerable interest was aroused in Japan during the course of the presidential electioneering. Most commentators adopted the view that the election of Wendell Willkie would have eased

the Pacific situation and made possible a new approach to the basic problems that were then threatening the peace of the Pacific. Closer Anglo-American collaboration, and a proportionate maintenance of a determined democratic front in opposition to the Japanese new order in Asia, were clearly foreseen and it is noteworthy that in spite of Ambassador Nomura's presence at Washington, official circles generally appeared to reconcile themselves to the impossible situation into which the Pacific had manœuvred itself.

It was obvious on the most superficial examination that in so far as political policies were concerned, Japan's new order (so far as its nature could be ascertained in China) and America's understandable desire to safeguard her rights and interests in that region, and to maintain an open-door *status quo*, were absolutely irreconcilable, and that so long as neither side was willing to abandon parts of its programme in the interests of a compromise, so long was it utterly futile to avoid an inevitable clash. The latter would follow as night does day . . . Furthermore, it was evident that the Japanese had fully committed themselves to a policy which involved the establishment of their new order in Asia, and conceived an understanding with America as one which reconciled the Americans to the immutable inevitability of such a new order. The Americans, it was urged, should recognise the new conditions prevailing in East Asia, and endeavour to 'understand' the divine task which the Japanese nation had undertaken for the down-trodden masses of the Asiatic continent. Foreign Minister Matsuoka declared with reiterative emphasis that Japan's foreign policy revolved around the tri-partite pact, which was both its substance and foundation. It was an error, he urged, to conceive the pact as being directed against the United States, for it had been concluded in the interests of peace, to prevent the United States from plunging the Pacific into a futile war on the basis of certain issues in regard to China. What the garrulous Foreign Minister failed to specify was how precisely Japan's attachment to the Axis nations in Europe—to which powers the United States

was undeviatingly hostile—could contribute to the peace of the Pacific. If Japan was not susceptible to repressive measures 'short of war' and reacted violently against any form of economic or political pressure, America was no less determined not to be deflected from her policy of extending aid to Britain and safeguarding her interests in the East, by threatening gestures and pressure such as that inherent in the tri-partite pact and in the efficacy of which Matsuoka appeared to trust so much.

It was not impossible that Matsuoka and his colleagues were convinced that the tri-partite pact would wield a restraining effect upon the United States, and their surprise and disappointment at their miscalculation, their woeful misunderstanding of the Occidental mind, were very real and effective. The fact was noted by observant students of the Pacific scene that Premier Konoye, unlike his Foreign Minister, maintained a most significant silence, and never once repeated Matsuoka's declaration that Japan's foreign policy revolved upon and around the tri-partite pact. The United States State Department's recommendation that all non-essentials, including women and children should evacuate, created a stir as much among Japanese government circles as among the peoples on both sides of the Pacific. Not a few elements in the government of which Matsuoka was representative had obviously not expected this move which, had it occurred during a period of less tension, would have been waived aside as of no consequence. The slightest gesture on the part of both the Japanese and American governments, and the slightest improvement or deterioration in the situation, were immediately analysed and interpreted for their 'implications' and 'significances'. In the atmosphere of heightened tension which then prevailed, there was nothing that could escape the stigma of 'significance', even silence and non-activity being so facilely labelled.

The note of apprehensive uncertainty which characterised the New Year 1941 messages from Japanese government leaders faithfully reflected the general

temper of the peoples of the Pacific. Though usually confident and forthright, Matsuoka confessed himself to be in a state of 'breathless anxiety and bewilderment.' In greeting the New Year, as is customary for ministers in Japan, Matsuoka declared ' . . . I fear lest this year may perchance prove to be a most tragic and most unfortunate one for entire man-kind'. In spite of this sombre pessimism, frantic missionaries were cabling each other and various government officials with godly and pious invocations that peace in the Pacific might be preserved, while inspired journalists and enlightened elements were urging the consideration of several conference proposals that were advanced from time to time, but in the absence of any official interest in them, civilian efforts toward a settlement of Pacific affairs, were reduced to nothing more than pathetic, futile and vaporous flourishes—straws in the wind, helpless against the seemingly inexorable march of events.

That the United States government was not in a conciliatory mood was made evident by Secretary of State Cordell Hull's testimony in support of the lease-lend bill, in the course of which he directly charged, without mincing words, that Germany, Italy and Japan were bent 'on a programme of unlimited conquest' constituting a menace to American security. . . . 'The first step in this fatal direction', he declared 'occurred in the Far East in 1931 with the forceful occupation of Manchuria in contravention of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.' This statement was tantamount to a declaration in unequivocal terms that the American government regarded Japan's new order as nothing more than a programme of 'unlimited conquest.' Japanese official reaction to Hull's diatribe was reserved, but it was probable that the Japanese government was there and then engaged in preparing plans based on the assumption which was by that time almost a blatant reality, that an American-Japanese rapprochement was impossible. In the course of debates in the American House of Representatives periodical references were made to the fact that large quantities of war materials had been shipped to

Japan during the last two years, and a plea was thus made on this basis that an absolute embargo should be imposed upon such exports. Loud and clamorous and jittery announcements of this kind were commonplace on both sides of the Pacific, and revealed the querulous bitterness which was mounting in proportion as such sanity and level-headedness that remained, gradually declined.

Meanwhile in the domestic political field of Japan, there were revived indications of the struggle between the restraining forces and the extremists. The New Structure, about which so much had been said, appeared to be back-firing with irritating insistence. Disagreement and dissatisfaction among the ranks of those engaged in its construction were undisguised, while according to the results of a questionnaire addressed to its readers by the *Bungei-Shunju*, an intellectual monthly, almost ninety per cent. confessed their ignorance of the nature of the New Structure. Writers, newspapermen, employees of government departments, teachers, students and public school officials were unable to describe in explicit terms just what the constitution and purposes of the structure were. Although this would normally be accepted as indicating reticence on the part of the sponsors of the new movement, that was most certainly not the case, for the New Structure directors were if anything excessively voluble. High-sounding pronouncements and vague mystical doctrines were being continually preached, but of any definite and explicit definition regarding the functions of the Structure, there was no sign. The argument was thus often advanced that if the Japanese themselves were unable to understand their own projects and reforms, it was slightly less than perverse to expect foreign governments to 'understand' Japan's various orders and spheres of co-prosperity. Moreover the hour was too late to maintain the diplomatic pretence that Japan's new order could be anything but what it obviously was—a cloak to cover her expansionist programmes on the continent and the Southern seas.

SOVIET-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY PACT

In consonance with Japan's ideological alignment with the Axis powers, no less than on the basis of strategic considerations, the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact was signed in April at Moscow, the energetic little Matsuoka representing the Japanese government. That Japan was driven to this extremity and thus consolidate her position firmly within the Axis camp, revealed in what direction the pressure of events was manoeuvring the country. Japan's alienation from the democratic fold was absolute, and at whatever price, she was thus compelled to maintain her position in line with the Axis. Russo-Japanese relations had been subjected to much speculative analysis as it was observed that a Soviet-German rapprochement was hardly compatible with the Anti-Comintern Pact to which both Japan and Germany were signatories. It was furthermore considered unlikely that Japan would precipitate matters in the Southern Pacific while an uncertain peace prevailed over the Soviet-Manchurian border. Legend had it that Matsuoka and Stalin embraced each other at the station when the former was about to leave for Tokyo, and congratulated each other on the fact both of them were Asiatics. . . . The pact was hailed as a 'stabilising force', based on the agreement between both Russia and Japan 'not to hinder each other in the realisation of their historical task'. *Domei* news agency, which not seldom functioned as the mouthpiece of the government, claimed that the pact freed Japan's hands for the execution of her 'immutable policy dedicated to a southward advance for the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere'. Matsuoka himself was not disposed to be modest about his achievement, and described the pact as 'killing five birds with one stone'.

GERMAN ATTACK ON RUSSIA

Hardly had the hailing and hand-clapping subsided however when Germany launched its treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, thus for the second time placing the Japanese government in a position only slightly less embarrassing than that in 1939. Inner government circles were thrown into confusion, and considerable palavering and palace activity paved the way for the full-dress imperial conference—the eighth in Japanese history. Army, navy, court, business leaders, the Premier and the Foreign Minister were closeted with the Emperor, only to emerge and declare that ‘vital decisions’ had been made in regard to the international situation. Further information bearing upon the decisions were unobtainable, and it was therefore widely surmised that a carefully arranged sequence of moves had been adopted, its alternative being contingent upon the course of the Russo-German war. Even at that late hour it was ironical that Japan was to all intents and purposes still sitting-on-the-fence. . . .

Meanwhile the voluble Mr. Matsuoka, who was accounted to be responsible for Japan's latest embarrassment, was dropped in the cabinet reshuffle which took the form of a resignation *en bloc*, Prince Konoye being entrusted to reorganise the cabinet. Matsuoka had moreover been excessively emphatic in playing up the tri-partite pact as the key-stone of Japan's policy. Konoye obviously could not identify himself with a policy so intimately associated with the Axis powers whose totalitarianism he heartily and unreservedly detested. The new government line-up consisting of Konoye as Prime Minister, and former reactionary Baron Hiranuma as Vice-Premier without portfolio, and Admiral Toyada as Foreign Minister, with other posts occupied largely by generals and admirals, was regarded on all sides as one of the most powerful cabinets that had represented Japan in recent years. Wishful thinking so easily generated at every cabinet reshuffle, inevitably entertained the hope that a break-away from the Axis camp was being considered

by the Japanese authorities. But a balanced view of the Pacific situation revealed nothing but a barren and emphatic denial of the faintest possibility of a reconciliation between Japan and the democratic powers. Japan had committed herself to the path of aggression on the continent. . . . There was a certain finality, a careless abandon, a fatalistic acceptance of what destiny ordained, and what the inexorable and immutable march of events dictated, in the statements of Japanese diplomats as the crisis deepened, and the clouds of war lowered over the Pacific. . . .

Aggressive action in China was being continued with renewed vigour. One of innumerable protests lodged at the Japanese Foreign Office read: 'Japanese air bombings over Chungking resulted in the counsellor and third secretary of the British Embassy and the personal secretary of the British Ambassador receiving minor injuries. The American Methodist hospital suffered direct hits, and additional damage was done to the Methodist church and the Catholic St. Mary's cathedral.' Japanese forces in Haiphong (French Indo-China) broke their way into American leased war-houses and seized American owned goods originally destined for China. Forty trucks belonging to the Delaware Corporation were seized, and despite sharp protests, the goods were loaded on Japanese ships and removed. . . .

The closing down of German consulates in the United States, reflecting the mounting firmness and determination of the Roosevelt administration, caused repercussions throughout the Pacific. The Japanese government were not a little alarmed, for an outbreak of hostilities between America and Germany at that stage of the international situation would have confronted Japan with the alternatives of either severing its Axis connections or challenging the might of the United States. If Japan chose war, she wished to choose it at the right time—to wit, when she was ready, and could strike at an advantageous moment. She however did not want war thrust on her. Hence the anxiety with which she stressed the illuminating fact that

Japan desired the friendship of the United States; decrying the story that the tri-partite pact was an instrument of pressure directed against the American government, Premier Konoye asserted that it was of a defensive nature. (Matsuoka's key-stone theory had suffered eclipse.)

Unconfirmed reports at that time suggested that Ambassador Nomura was then engaged in attempting to negotiate a futile non-aggression pact with the United States, such that should any party be involved in a war with a third party the other signatory should remain neutral, and their territorial integrity be mutually respected. These overtures made slight progress at Washington for the United States could hardly agree to arrangements which if implemented would restrict or tie down American action in the event of a Japanese aggressive move in the Southern Pacific. . . . It is a source of wonder how the Japanese ever thought it worth their while to conceive and outline such fantastic suggestions which it was obvious the Roosevelt administration would not care to consider. We cannot suppose that the Japanese expected the American government to agree to such impossible schemes, and it is therefore justifiable to see in these Japanese manoeuvres an attempt to gain time while internal dissensions within the Japanese body politic were being resolved and while the course of the war in Europe was being closely studied.

The Roosevelt administration, though now grimly determined to retaliate swiftly if and when Japan initiated a provocative or aggressive move, was not willing to force the issue with Japan. Shipments of oil and war materials were therefore continued, while American financial and material assistance to China increased rapidly. The strengthening of the Konoye Cabinet suggested however that Japan was about to move—somewhere and soon. Japan had never underestimated Russian strength as Germany had done. Nazi armies were bogged in the vast spaces of the U. S. S. R., and Japan was not at all certain that victory could so easily be achieved by Hitler. If in the long run, Germany collapsed Japan would be surrounded

on all sides by hostile Russia, Britain, China and America. She could not wait to face such a prospect, and no less could she wait to ascertain whether Russia would collapse. Either way, an aggressive move was imperative. . . . The whole of the Pacific realised this, and when Konoye's new cabinet, glittering with Army and Navy uniforms assumed office, yet another crisis confronted the vast seas and lands of the Far East.

The customary crop of rumours all round the perimeter of the Pacific, nominated Russia, the Netherlands East Indies, and French Indo-China as possible Japanese objectives. It was noted that more and more Japanese snips were being deflected from the American run for government purposes, and everyone felt from the President to the office cat in every newspaper establishment in the East and in America, that a big 'something' was in the wind. Panama Canal zone authorities placed obstacles on the passage of Japanese vessels on the pretext that repairs were being made, while Lord Halifax aroused himself sufficiently to declare that 'no one should make the mistake of thinking that under pressure of the European struggle Great Britain need or will allow her legitimate rights and interests in other parts of the world to be ignored or set aside.'

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA

On July 22nd, 1941, the Japanese clapped a censorship upon all news outbound from Tokyo, and almost simultaneously the news leaked out that Japanese demands had been made upon French Indo-China. French government circles labelled the story as entirely false. The following day Japanese troops began the wholesale occupation of French Indo-China territory A barrage of Japanese press accusations accompanied this military action. Indo-China officials had 'betrayed' the principles

of Japan's new order, and Japan therefore found it necessary to demand bases 'as a temporary measure to defend Indo-China against de Gaullists, China and Britain.'

JAPANESE ASSETS FROZEN

Like lightning the speculation whipped throughout the Pacific area. Would America remain satisfied with strong words? The answer came when within twenty-four hours: America and the British Empire froze Japanese assets. 200 million dollars worth of assets were thus frozen, and all commercial treaties with Britain since 1911 were abrogated. Japan similarly retaliated and the U. S. government ordered all troops of the Hawaiian command to be placed on a 'precautionary alert' status. General McArthur was appointed head of the integrated American forces in the East and the Philippines was placed under American military control.

Meanwhile Japanese troops completed their occupation; five air-fields were occupied and the potentially powerful naval base at Cam Rahn Bay was immediately seized. Troops spread inland towards the Thai border, while the coastal districts were placed under tight control. Japanese troops and planes thus entrenched themselves 500 miles from Manila and Singapore. British forces along the Burma-Thai border were increased. As Matsuoka had picturesquely expressed it Japan was expanding over the Pacific 'not for the sake of Japan but for the sake of humanity.' Humanity was not thankful.

By the terms of the farcical 'agreement' between the Japanese and French Indo-China governments, the former respected the latter's territorial integrity, the two promised each other military collaboration for the joint defence of French Indo-China (against whom and what?), and the above stipulations were to remain valid so long as the situation which 'motivated' them continued to exist.

The Japanese occupation of French Indo-China is an excellent instance of propaganda-cum-pressure-cum-military diplomacy of which Germany provided many instances prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe. Both Japanese and German techniques were identical—an admixture of various forms of pressure and a war of nerves. In adopting such a technique Japan, more than Germany, was obviously running a grave risk, for the tension in the Pacific area was such that a general flare-up might possibly have occurred. . . . As it was America and Britain contented themselves with freezing Japanese assets, and Japan was left with the opportunity to start a war on her own terms.

Thailand was clearly next on the list, but Japan could not now bank on Anglo-American toleration; she had already driven them to their extremities. Nevertheless the Japanese press commenced referring to 'British oppression' in Thailand, while the Tokyo radio accused the nationals of the latter country of currying favour with the British and permitting them to station troops along the Thai-Burma border—which Tokyo radio continued—might 'cast a dark shadow on the relations between Thailand and Japan and be unfortunate for Thailand and the whole of East Asia.' Thai was thus cajoled into granting Japan a credit of 10 million bahts for the purchase of rice, and into recognising Manchukuo—a rather incongruous pair of concessions which appeared to appease Japan somewhat. A joint Anglo-American protest and warning couched in vigorous terms fell on deaf Japanese ears. Cordell Hull declared that any Japanese move against Thailand would constitute a threat to American security and territory in the Pacific, and Mr. Eden in the House of Commons commenting on the Indo-China move, stated ' . . . any move which would threaten the independence and integrity of Thailand would be a matter of immediate concern to this country, more particularly as threatening the security of Singapore. I hope that these words may be heeded.' Simultaneous with her move in Indo-China Japan had almost completed a full mobilisation of her forces; although this was probably precautionary,

in readiness for any eventuality arising from British and American retaliation, the maintenance of armed forces at full mobilisation status was hardly conducive to a peaceful atmosphere.

Resentment was caused at Chungking when during the course of a presidential address Roosevelt stated that the United States considered its obligations to China as unimportant as compared with the immediate convenience of the interests of the United States and of the Netherlands East Indies. This was obviously not so much a derogatory statement reflecting upon the Chinese who had fought for so long against the alien aggressor, as an emphasis upon the wider issues which Japan's Indo-China move evoked into prominence. Japanese spokesmen meanwhile were occupied in stressing the 'similarity' between the peaceful occupation by America of Iceland and that of Indo-China by Japan. No one, they purred, could fail to misunderstand the peaceful and divine intentions of the Japanese peoples....

KONOYE CABINET RESIGNS *EN BLOC*

The final acts of this stupendous diplomatic drama were being played with consummate skill both by the Roosevelt administration and the Japanese government. From Chungking, Tokyo, Shanghai, Singapore, Bangkok, Manila—news poured in a seemingly never-ending stream, while the spotlight of world attention played upon the vast rolling waters of the Pacific, awaiting the next move on the Far Eastern chess-board. Japanese action of some kind was inevitable, for the freezing of her assets virtually abolished all trade, and however vast her long-accumulated stocks of iron, oil and other war materials it was unlikely that she would drain them away while remaining inactive. In August the Konoye cabinet tentatively suggested a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting, but this gesture was firmly set aside by the American government which realised that the time for negotiations was passed, and

only an open revocation or moderation by Japan of her stand could be made the basis of a mutual understanding. Having played his last desperate card, Konoye and his cabinet resigned *en bloc* in October. Foreign correspondents in Tokyo crossed their fingers and packed their bags. The peace of the Pacific had been lost.

TOJO

This was confirmed when the 'Razor', raspy little, bullet-headed Tojo, mounted the Premier's rostrum and declared 'We must go on to develop in ever-expanding progression. Naturally difficulties will arise, but if a hundred million people merge into one in iron solidarity and go forward, nothing can stop us. If this state of preparedness is complete, diplomacy will become an easy affair. Wars can be fought with ease. No international pressure can disturb me.... At this time it is a great honour to shoulder the great task of completing the China incident and establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the side of a lofty ideal.... I propose to do everything in my power to lead the nation on this Heavenly Mission. Our Empire is at the cross-roads to rise or fall, and the consummation of this holy task cannot be accomplished by myself alone. You are asked, therefore, to separate yourself from past usages, eliminate all minor difficulties and differences and walk on the broad path, and so commemorate our country's glorious three thousand years history.' Thus spoke Tojo....

General Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief in the Near East at that time, inspected the defences of Singapore, while throughout Allied territory in the Pacific intensified military precautionary measures and the evacuation of civilians were rushed through with feverish haste and anxiety. On the 5th of November the *Japan Times and Advertiser*, the English language organ of the Japanese Foreign Office, sent up a trial peace balloon, setting forth the 'terms' on the basis of which peace could

still be preserved in the Far East. They included the abandonment by the American government of all military and economic aid to the Chungking government; the acknowledgment of Japan's co-prosperity sphere and the recognition of Manchukuo; the abolishment of the military 'encirclement' of Japan; the unconditional ending of the freezing of Japanese assets and the restoration of trade treaties accompanied by the removal of shipping and commercial restrictions.

KURUSU

While the American government continued to ignore these 'feelers' and Tojo continued to expatiate on Japan's various 'immutable' and holy tasks which he confronted with trepidation and awe, Saburo Kurusu, Japan's envoy to Washington, left Japan on what was described as the last mission to save the Pacific from the catastrophe of war. American newspapers reflecting the unconscious wishes of the American peoples, were ready to clutch at the last straw which promised safety and peace; Kurusu's trip was hailed as 'a last opportunity to make amends for past aggression'. There can be no doubt that the Kurusu scene was a consummate piece of stage management. At Manila where the envoy was to catch the Trans-Pacific Clipper to the United States, Kurusu expressed slight hope of succeeding because as he said he was not in a position to offer America concessions, thus placing the United States in the position of the big bad wolf that required appeasing. . . .

Back home in Japan while a supposedly emissary of peace was hurrying forward to placate America, the *Japan Times and Advertiser* declared that Japan's patience had 'reached the point of exhaustion.' Navy spokesmen asserted that the Navy was prepared and 'itching for action'. Chungking spokesmen called for an A. B. C. D. Russian combination against Japan. . . . American marines at Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai were withdrawn. While Kurusu

was stranded at Midway with engine trouble, Prime Minister Churchill declared that should the United States become involved in a war with Japan, the British declaration would follow 'within the hour', and that British naval units were available for service in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Japanese spokesmen in Tokyo replied by threatening to 'force Britain and the United States to retreat from East Asia'. Reports of an imminent Japanese invasion of Thailand coincided with Secretary of Navy Knox's rather irrelevant and superfluous statement that the hour of decision had arrived in America's relations with Japan.

When on November 14th, the Japanese envoy arrived at San Francisco amidst this chorus of mutual recrimination and threats, nerves were on edge at the four major capitals involved as well as in Bangkok, Shanghai and Singapore. One could not but smile grimly at the conception of Saburo-san hurrying across the Pacific on a forlorn mission of peace, when all that the Japanese and American governments were able to do was hurl uncomplimentary epithets across the seething Pacific. Bewildering questions sped through the mind of the Pacific observer. Were the Japanese ready to risk a show-down, with the United States? What fundamental policies, if any, lay behind this reciprocal barrage of public assertion? Was the Roosevelt administration fully committed to a firm stand against Japan, and had appeasement been abandoned? Would China continue to fight for her national existence? Did Churchill mean it when he guaranteed British declaration of war 'within the hour'? Were they all bluffing and if so how far, and when would they drop their bluff and really show their teeth?

On November 15th, Kurusu reached Washington and for the next ten days Nomura-Kurusu-Washington talks held the stage. During the Japanese Diet session war appropriations amounting to 4,315,000,000 yen were approved, and several aggressive remarks were delivered, Premier Tojo assuring his listeners that the government had 'completed all necessary preparations and anticipated every obstacle.' The Imperial Rule Assistance Associa-

tion demanded the expulsion of all foreign interests from East Asia. Meanwhile Chungking was agitating for a common democratic front against Japan, and Chiang Kai-shek called for Chinese unity in the face of the impending crisis.

By November 20th, a hitch had occurred in American-Japanese negotiations. Japanese proposals for peace terms were found unacceptable, and a stalemate was encountered. The American government was meanwhile conducting conversations with British, Chinese, Dutch and Australian representatives. On the 26th, America's final notice of terms upon which an agreement could be sought was handed to the Japanese envoy and ambassador. Japanese reinforcements and war materials continued to pour into French Indo-China. On the 27th, and 28th, the American Note was being studied by the Japanese government, and on the 29th, Tojo exclaimed that the American and British exploitation of Asiatic peoples 'must be purged with a vengeance'; from which it was plain that negotiations had failed absolutely and finally. The cruel suspense however continued when the cabinet decided that negotiations at Washington should continue. At approximately this time Japanese warships and aircraft carriers left Japanese bases for their destinations of war. . . .

PEARL HARBOUR

Nomura and Kurusu informed White House that the Japanese government's reply had not been received yet, but that it was expected any moment. Asked whether Kurusu could reconcile Japan's peaceful intentions with Tojo's statements, Japan's envoy declared that the Premier had been 'badly misquoted'. On the 30th of November, President Roosevelt's request for an explanation of Japanese reinforcements in French Indo-China elicited the reply that additional forces were required to protect Indo-China from a possible attack from China. . . . On the 5th of

December, the Cabinet Board of Advisers in Tokyo stated that negotiations would continue. Sensing an impending move, President Roosevelt despatched a personal appeal to Emperor Hirohito. Twenty-four hours later, Japanese planes zoomed over Pearl Harbour, and British and American territories throughout the Pacific were subjected to Japanese attack. The Japanese who had been awakened from their medieval slumber by America's Commodore Perry eighty years ago, unleashed their war machine which had been fed on American war supplies for the last five years; it reached across the Pacific while planes driven by American petrol and launched from aircraft-carriers, also driven by American petrol, dropped explosives made from American supplies.

SUMMARY OF THE TRIPARTITE PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY, SIGNED ON SEPTEMBER 27TH, 1940 AT BERLIN

THE governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively, wherein it is their primary purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along similar lines, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realised. Accordingly the governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to

assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Article 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Missions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

Article 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

'The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force. At a proper time before the expiration of the said term the Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

EMPEROR HIROHITO'S IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

To enhance justice on earth and make of the world one household is the great injunction, bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors and which we lay to heart day and night. In the stupendous crisis now confronting the world, it appears that endless will be the aggravation of war and confusion, and incalculable the disasters to be inflicted upon man-kind. We fervently hope that the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace will be realised as swiftly as possible. Accordingly we Commanded our government to deliberate on the matter of mutual assistance and co-operation with the governments of Germany and Italy which share in the views

and aspirations of our Empire. We are deeply gratified that a Pact has been concluded between these three powers.

'The task of enabling each nation to find its proper place and all individuals to live in peace and security is indeed one of great magnitude, unparalleled in history. The goal lies still far distant. Ye, our subjects, clarify evermore the national concept of our country's polity; think deeply and look far; unite in heart and strength, and surmount the present emergency, to assist thereby in the promotion of the Imperial fortune co-eval with heaven and earth. September 27th, the fifteenth year of Showa (1940).'

* * * *

Imperial Rescripts, as it is obvious, were in their nature mere formalities and it was accordingly absurd to attach to the person of the Emperor responsibility for the literal meaning or meanings which might be derived from the language in which Rescripts were customarily couched. It was only a subsequent gesture after all the internal frictions and dissensions had been resolved or quelled, and the Japanese government had arrived at a final and momentous decision; it was the repository of what Bertrand Russel has categorised as the repository of traditional power in his brilliant study 'Power'. It was buttressed by the enormous respect and blind faith of the masses, during emergencies, which they invested, in the traditional beliefs and practices of the nation. Government bodies were a cynical organisation, consisting of men who were well versed in the wiles of the political game and who were familiar with the realities underlying international diplomacy. But when a binding and integrating unity was required, and appeal to the emotions was necessary, and a Rescript from the Emperor, was the finishing touch which committed the government and the peoples which it governed to whatever specific decision had been made.

On December 7th, when the Emperor of Japan, said to be one of the most miserable men in the Orient that catastrophic morning when the peace he had so tirelessly

sought to preserve was finally lost, was nevertheless true to his ancestors and to the dictates of tradition, and issued the following Rescript part of which read :

'Hallowed Spirit of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding us from above, we rely upon the loyalty and courage of our subjects in our confident expectations that the task bequeathed by our Forefathers will be carried forward. We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon you, our loyal and brave subjects: We hereby declare war on the U. S. A. and the British Empire.'

This Rescript suffers in the translation. In its original Japanese, couched in all the flourishes and literary graces of which the Japanese language is so full, there could have been few Japanese, however rational or intellectual, that could resist its emotional appeal. When the Emperor had spoken it was action and not talk, that was indicated.

* * * *

When the American Note setting forth the conditions under which a settlement could be sought, was delivered to the Japanese government on November 26th, President Roosevelt anticipating a precipitate move on the part of the Japanese, addressed a personal letter to the Emperor of Japan. It had been widely surmised that the letter was not handed to His Majesty until hostilities had already started, but such an explanation overlooked the even more potent reasons why the letter was a futile gesture on the part of the Roosevelt administration, of value only as documentary evidence of the sincerity with which the American government sought to avert the catastrophe of war in the Pacific. The decision for war could not have been made later than November 28th when the Japanese cabinet was engaged in 'considering' the American Note. Units of the Japanese Navy must have been taking up their positions over the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. To appeal to the Emperor therefore when a collective government such as that of Japan had arrived at a final decision which could be revoked by any one party, was

more futile than is evident on the surface. Whatever the President's motive in despatching his appeal to the Emperor, its only obvious result was to stir up popular indignation against the Japanese and solidify pro-American sentiment. We may be doing an injustice in describing the gesture as a graceful piece of diplomacy. Following is the text of the letter :

'Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples, and wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

'Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel that I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

'Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

'The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two countries during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion, that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all, and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favour of any nation.

'I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both

Japan and the United States, should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

'More than a year ago Your Majesty's government concluded an agreement with the Vichy government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China farther north. And this spring and summer the Vichy government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defence of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made on French Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

'During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

'Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the south-east and south-west corners of that peninsula it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make an attack in one or more of these many directions.

'I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear, inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offence.

'It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

'None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

'There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier and sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

'I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the governments of the East Indies, the government of Malaya and the government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in an assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

'I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, giving thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries, but for the sake of humanity in neighbouring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.'

SHORT NOTE ON SHINTOISM

Any exhaustive study of the implications of Shintoism as a factor in the moulding of the national consciousness of Japan is irrelevant in a book of this kind, and it is therefore the intention of the author to deal with this fascinating aspect of Japanese character when a greater expanse and relevance have been afforded the subject in a second volume. But in considering the origins of the Japanese nation, we had reason to touch upon the subject, and it is not inappropriate that certain clarifications be made in this context.

The Japanese, it is interesting to note, are not a religious people, as that term is generally understood and used. And it is obviously only by attaching to the

label 'religion' a greater significance than is justifiable that the doctrine known as Shintoism may be so categorised. It is thus often stated that the Shinto religion is 'bound up' with the State, and it is thus ignored that Shintoism is but a mystical variation of the worship of the State and is therefore to be identified with the State which is symbolised in the person of the Emperor. Shintoism is totalitarian religion with a vengeance; it is the elevation of the concept of national aggrandisement to the status of a mystico-politico religious emotional binding the peoples of the nation into a unified whole. Thus it is not incongruous from the Japanese view-point to be Christians and Shintoists at one and the same time, observing the requirements of both with fervour and sincerity. To be a Japanese is automatically to accept Shintoism which however does not preclude the possibility of the Japanese being converted to other religions. But such a conversion is never complete; the Japanese does not abandon his Shintoism. He reconciles it with whatever religious faith he may embrace subsequently. And the measure of his success in such a reconciliation is due to his distinction between Shintoism as a national necessity, and Christianity or Buddhism as religions with an universal appeal.

